' ABAID ULLAH KHAN, J.--Lest our observations in view of the order proposed to be passed, should in any way influence the learned trial Court we would not like to say anything on the merits of the case and would confine ourselves to stating the minimum facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal. On the 7th February, 1978, the appellant brought suit for specific performance of contract of sale of the property in dispute alleged to have been entered into by the respondents on the 25th July, 1971. The respondents objected to the validity of the agreement on various grounds. They described the suit to be time-barred for its having been instituted more than three years after the 15th November, 1972, which, according to them, was the date fixed in the deed of agreement for the performance of the contract. The appellant, on the basis of the correspondence said to have been exchanged between it and respondent 1 and what had been set out in the deed, tried to make out a case that the 15th November, 1972, was not the final or firm date of the completion of the contract. Respondents 2 to 4 came up with the plea that the deed of agreement had been got executed by them under coercion and undue influence alleged to have been exercised by respondent 1. They gave out that they were not bound by what respondent 1 settled through correspondence or otherwise with the appellant.
2. An exception to the correctness of the value of the cause for purpose of court-fee was taken. The learned trial Court settled the following issues for preliminary hearing,-
(1) Whether the suit is within time?
(2) Whether the suit is properly valued for the purpose of court-fee?
3. Without giving an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence the learned trial Court of the Civil Judge, Lahore, vide its order of the 24th February, 1979, answered the first issue in the negative and did not decide the other issue.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant, in support of his arguments, made extensive reference to the contents of the deed of agreement and of the various letters which passed between the and respondent 1. These documents were not brought on the record by introducing them in evidence.
Without properly proving and bringing them on the file of the suit it would not be legally in order to make use of their contents for deciding such an important issue as that of limitation. Actually 'respondents 2 to 4 expressed their ignorance of and did not feel bound by what passed between respondent 1 and the appellant. It was only after evidence had been adduced by the parties that the issues involved in the case could have been determined. The issue regarding limitation could not be' treated as a pure one of law which could have been disposed of without receiving and considering the evidence of the parties. As a matter of fact the issue of limitation is linked with other controversial matters cropping up in the litigation. The better course to decide A the suit is to frame all the issues and give finding thereon after receiving the evidence of the parties. The decision of the learned trial Court arrived at without inviting evidence of the parties cannot stand the test of scrutiny of this Court. The appeal is, therefore, accepted, the impugned order is set aside and the suit is remanded to the learned trial Court for decision afresh according to law after striking all the issues and affording opportunity to the parties to lead evidence thereon. While formulating its views the learned Court will be least influenced by what has been said in this judgment.
5. The parties have requested that as the litigation has already dragged on for a sufficient by length of time the learned trial Court may be asked to decide the suit by an early date. The learned trial Court is. Directed to dispose of the suit within a year and report compliance to this Court. The parties will appear before the learned trial Court on the 29th March, 1987. The parties will bear their own costs.