1. SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--Leave to appeal was granted to the plaintiffs in a pending civil suit to examine whether the Lahore High Court by its judgment dated the 22nd May, 1984 correctly affirmed the refusal of the interim order sought for by the appellants. The following points of law specifically raised and noted in the Leave Granting Order required examination:- "(i)When the acquisition proceedings were commenced the disputed property was admittedly evacuee property and was, therefore, not competently acquired in that no permission of the Government was taken as required by section 12 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance. 1949.
2. (ii)The purpose of acquisition, having been changed by the respondents the entire acquisition proceedings were vitiated.
3. (iii)The acquisition proceedings were void for non-publication of notification under section 42 of the Town Improvement Trust Act, 1922.
4. (iv)The official notification,: having been issued in 1956 and no further steps taken by the respondents to pursue the acquisition proceedings to a lawful conclusion, the same were frustrated for non-execution."
5. The land covered by the acquisition proceedings under the Punjab Town Improvement Act and the subject-matter of ligiation was admittedly evacuee property on which the appellants were settled.
6. In the year 1955 or near about, proceedings were initiated for acquiring it under the Town Improvement Scheme. Necessary steps were taken and culminated in the acquisition of the aforesaid land and the deposit of the compensation awarded therefor with the Collector in 1981.
7. The appellants filed a civil suit on 22nd of July, 1981 for declaration and permanent injunction restraining the Multan Development Authority, the respondent, from taking proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act on account of the various legal defects in initiating and pursuing it. Alongwith the suit, an application for temporary injunction was also moved seeking protection of their possession and restraining the defendant ad interim from proceeding with the execution of the Scheme. The trial Court by an order dated 12-12-1982 held as follows:- "In the present circumstances when the possession has been taken over, price has been paid, the balance of convenience lies in favour of the respondent and if the said application is granted it would further delay the implementation of scheme which has already been much delayed. The petitioners have also failed to make out a prima facie case, therefore, the petition is dismissed."
8. An appeal was filed against the refusal of the interim order which was also dismissed on 28-2-1983 by the Additional District Judge observing as follows:- "The admitted position between the parties at this stage is that the possession of the property has been taken over by the respondent. The appellants are no more in possession of the land. In case the temporary injunction as prayed for by the appellants is not granted in their favour they shall not suffer any irreparable loss as they can claim the damages if any or the interest on the compensation awarded to them. On the other hand if the respondent is restrained to carry out its scheme much irreparable loss shall be caused to it. The balance of inconvenience also leans in favour of the respondent as the possession is already with the respondent and hence if the respondent is restrained to carry out its housing scheme duly approved by the Government much inconvenience shall be caused to the respondent."
9. A revision petition was then filed in the High Court which too was dismissed holding as follows:- "The learned counsel for the petitioners had to concede that when the Collector made over the charge of the land to Multan Improvement Trust after the announcement of award in 1966 and the land thereupon vested in the Trust, as envisaged by section 17-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, inserted by para. 6 of the schedule to the Town Improvement Act, the land in question had lost its evacuee character and, therefore, his objection to the acquisition proceedings for the reason that it constituted evacuee property could not hold water... It means that the requirements touching acquisition of the land by the Trust were fulfilled and the acquisition prima facie could not be said to be invalid. The petitioners in the circumstances had no case warranting issuance of temporary injunction. There is no room for interference with the impugned order of the learned appellate Court below."
10. Mr. Bashir Ahmad Ansari, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants, has taken us through the record to point out material legal and jurisdictional defects in initiating the land acquisition proceedings under the Town Improvement Act and the subsequent steps taken pursuant thereto.
11. His contention is that the appellants had a strong prima facie case and having been dispossessed only recently and the execution work of the Scheme having not proceeded to any significant extent, it can still be restrained from undertaking the more ambitious project that it has in view.
12. Mr. Khalid Farooq Qureshi and Mr. Sultan Alam, Advocates, the learned counsel representing the respondents have not only tried to justify legally all the steps taken for initiating and pursuing the matter of acquisition of the land but have also contended that after the possession was taken, roads have been laid out, electricity system has been installed, plots have been made out and substantial progress has been made in the work and the balance of convenience does not in any case justify the grant of the interim injunction as prayed for.
13. No doubt, the appellants have raised substantial questions of law with regard to acquisition proceedings, their legality and the effect and it will require a fuller adjudication at first by the trial Court. For the purposes of an interm order, all that can be said is that the appellants being out of possession, the improvements over the property if at all made during the continuation of the suit is not to affect or prejudice their claim to it for all that has taken place during the pendency of the litigation is at the risk and cost of the respondents. To that extent the appellant's interest are protected and they cannot, on the view taken by all the Courts, stall the development work pending adjudication on merits because it will not serve any fruitful purpose relevant to the adjudication of the dispute as such. In the circumstances, we find that the discretionary orders passed in the case by the Courts, are not in any way open to interference and their view of the law is only prima facie and tentative subject to adjudication in the trial Court.
14. As the proceedings have been pending in the trial Court since 1981 over this interim matter, we hope that all expeditious steps would be taken by both the parties to the litigation and the trial Court to conclude it within six months. No order as to costs.