' Petitioners according to their own pleadings were not a party to Writ Petition No. 175/R of 1970, which was decided by me on the 5th of December, 1973, which order is sought to be reviewed in this petition filed on behalf of Khan Muhammad and others under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan read with Order XLVII, rule 1, C.P.C.
2. I called upon Mr. K.H. Khurshid, learned Counsel for the petitioners to first convince me as to how this petition was competent when the petitioners were not a party to the writ proceedings. Learned Counsel submitted that as the petitioners had been adversely affected by the order of this Court dated the 5th of December, 1973, they are, therefore, aggrieved persons and hence have a locus standi to file this petition in the present form. Learned Counsel relied on PLD 1971 Supreme Court 130, in order to prove that the petitioners were aggrieved persons but in my view this authority would not be of much help to him because in this case the question examined was as to who, would be the person aggrieved within the ambit of Article 98 of the late Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan whereas in the instant case the petitioners have to bring their case within the purview of Order XLVII rule 1, C.P.C. Learned Counsel tried to avail of section 114, C.P.C. Which deals with the power of review and argued that the words "any person considering himself aggrieved" were wide enough to include even those persons who initially were not a party to the proceedings, but at a later stage were affected by an order adverse to their interest. My attention was invited to Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C. And it was submitted that even in this provision the abovementioned words have been repeated, and the learned Counsel, therefore, emphasised that these words would cover the case of even a stranger, the only essential requisite being that he must consider himself to be an aggrieved person, the test for which, according to the learned Counsel would be subjective.
Reliance was also placed on H.M. Saya and Co. Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. Karachi and another PLD 1969 SC 65 with special reference to the following observations:-- "There can be no dispute that the only party which was adversely affected by the order of ad- interim injunction was respondent No.
1. We are satisfied that Saya and Co., deliberately omitted to make them parties with the intention of avoiding a contest. They knew fully well that the reliefs sought were really directed against Wazir Ali Industries Limited, and their bankers. A stranger to a suit or a proceeding is not prohibited by the Code of Civil Procedure from filing an appeal from an order passed therein. It is true that there is no express provision permitting such party to prefer an appeal against such an Order. This omission, however, cannot be understood to amount to prohibition. The Court ought not to act on the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for. To give such a meaning to the omission would result in grave injustice. The facts of this case are clear example in point. The Court should proceed on the principle that every procedure which furthers administration of justice is permissible even if there is no express provision permitting the same.
Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with appeals from decrees and section 104 deals with appeals from orders. These provisions do not in terms say who is entitled to prefer an appeal. The Code, however, lays down that it is the decree or the order that has to be appealed against. If the decree or order appealed from adversely affects a person he should be permitted to challenge the same in appeal even if he was not made a party to the original suit for proceeding." ' and it was argued that the principle laid down in this case was fully applicable to the present petition and hence not only that the petition was competent but also that the order dated the 5th of December, 1973 of this Court deserves to be reviewed.
3. I have very carefully gone through this decision and find that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is only with regard to the appellate proceedings, whereas the scope of review is much different and the review jurisdiction is substantially and materially different to the appellate jurisdiction, because it can be only utilized on the specific grounds mentioned in Order XLVII rule 1, C.P.C. In this connection it would be worthwhile to reproduce in extenso rule 1 of Order XLVII, C.P.C.
Which is to the following effect:- "Any person considering himself aggrieved: (b) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order."
' The important words to be noted in this connection are "desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made". These words leave no room for doubt that the remedy of review could be availed of only by a person who initially was a party to the proceedings in which either a decree had been passed or an order had been made against him, otherwise the very essence of the grounds on which a review would be competent, would be rendered ineffective. It is, therefore, obvious that a stranger to the proceedings would not be permitted to avail of the grounds on which a review petition would be competent. I, therefore, do not agree with the contention of the learned Counsel that a wider interpretation of the words "any person considering himself aggrieved" would be the only proper and reasonable interpretation. On the other hand, I find that these words would have to be read and interpreted in the light of the main rule and when so done in my view their operation would be restricted and would cover the case of only those persons who initially were party to the proceedings.
4. In view of the above I am not inclined to hold that the petitioners who were not a party to the proceedings in the writ petition have a right to file the present petition. I would, therefore, dismiss the same in limine.
5. I may, however, add that so far as my order dated the 5th of December, 1973 is concerned that will be effective and binding only to the parties in the writ proceedings.