' In a declaratory suit by the petitioners with regard to 20 Kanals of land, situated in Chak No.46 Fateh, Tehsil Chishtian, District Bahawalnagar, they also claimed a decree for permanent injunction to restrain the respondents from dispossessing them from the land on the basis or order of A.C./Collector, dated 4-9-1985. In the suit, they also put in an application for grant of a temporary injunction to the same effect. Learned trial Judge rejected the application and declined to issue the temporary injunction for the reason that the Tehsildar's order, whereby respondent No.1 had been ordered to be ejected from the land and, was executed to put the petitioners into possession of the land had been reversed by the Collector and hence neither did the balance of convenience lie in their favour nor were they likely to suffer any irreparable loss in the event of refusal of temporary injunction. He also noticed that section 56(d) of the Specific Relief Act stood in the way of the petitioners being granted the desired order and observed that civil Court would not have jurisdiction in the matter. Plaintiff-applicants filed an appeal thereagainst and they appear to have raised a contention therein that since they were also the co-owners of the land in dispute, therefore, with the ejectment of respondent No.1 and their being put into possession of the land, they had become entitled to hold the land and protect their possession in their capacity as co- sharers. This contention was repelled by a learned Additional District Judge with the observation that the order of restoration of possession passed by the Collector was relatable to the capacity in which it had been passed and could not be ascribed to another status. Consequently, their appeal was dismissed by affirming the view and order of the trial Court. Plaintiff-applicants have now come upto this Court on revision.
3. It is contended in support hereof that the real purpose of the temporary injunction sought by the petitioners was top protect their possession of the land which had somehow come to vest in them since before the making of their prayer and it deserved to be protected without reference to one capacity or the other. This is not quite so as had been contended for them below but the contention has, even otherwise, no merit because it conveniently ignores the fact that the petitioners had themselves taken up the position that respondent No.1 was their tenant and was liable to be ejected but Assistant Commissioner/ Collector had found it to be incorrect and upon accepting his appeal, has also ordered him to be restored to its possession. No doubt, he had the power to so order because, as has been held in Hamejaddi Howladar and another v. Maminaddi Shaikh and another PLD 1959 Dacca B 304, the power of restitution is inherent and rests on the principle that a Court of Justice is under a duty to repair the injury done to a party by its act. To the same effect is also Sohnun v. Mast Ram and others AIR 1929 Lah.
657. Again, in Sri Lakshmi Narayan and others v. Sri Nurath Lal Chakraborti and others PLD 1964 Dacca 177, after reaffirming the above principle, it was held that a person losing C possession by act of Court is entitled to ask for restitution of the same after decree or order dispossessing him is set aside or reversed. In Sh.Mehraj Din v. Ghulam Muhammad PLD 1965 Lah. 374, after considering a number of other cases, Muhammad Akram, J., as he then was, held that restitution of property follows automatically upon the decree being varied or reversed in appeal and a specific direction for restitution is not necessary to be passed by the appellate Court. Thus, restitution of possession to a party who succeeds in getting the adverse order reversed in appeal is nothing more than retracing the steps to E nullify the proceedings whereby the party who was not entitled to the benefit had obtained it from the Court under false colours, is deproved thereof. See Alfred Zahir v.
Siraj-ud-Din AIR 1944 Lah.
165. In this way, petitioners cannot be permitted to reap the fruits of their wrong. Moreso, because they cannot now be heard to say that they can ascribe the benefit to a different title which was not only not set up by them at that stage but was also contrary thereto. In Safaraddi and another F v.
Durga Prasad and others 16 I C 966, it was held that neither section 144 of the C C.P.C. Nor inherent power of the Court confers on anyone new substantive rights. Since in law, only a co-sharer in settled possession of the property can seek to protect it and not the one who has only recently inducted himself therein by pushing out another, therefore, the contention on raised for the petitioners cannot be countenanced and is repelled for the reason also that in the circumstances of this case, the petitioners should not expect to be able to invoke the aid equity for perpetuating their wrongfully secured gains.
3. Orders passed by the two Courts below to refuse to issue the temporary injunction relate to the domain of discretionary jurisdiction, the exercise whereof has been regulated in this case upon due consideration of the relevant rules so that their orders cannot be termed as being either fanciful or arbitrary and, as has been held in Shahzada Muhammad Umer Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another PLD 1970 SC 139 and re-affirmed in Kanwel Nain and 3 others. v Fateh Khan and others PLD 1983 SC 53, they do not become amenable to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
Hence, dismissed in limine.