ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, 1.-These are three statutory appeals under section 67(3) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1976, arising out of two judgments by Election Tribunals constituted under the said Act. Civil Appeals 145-K and 147-K of 1985 are directed against a common judgment, dated 2nd October, 1985, of Mr. Justice Saleem Akhtar/Election Tribunal by which the election petitions filed by appellants Jamshed Ahmad Khan and Hidayatullah Shah calling in question the election of. Respondent Ghulam Hussain to a seat in the Provincial Assembly from Constituency P. C. 81, Karachi XIII, were dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 216-K of 1986 is directed against judgment, dated 20th July, 986 of Mr. Justice Nasii, Aslam Zahid/Election Tribunal, by which an election petition filed by Abdul Waheed Qureshi challenging the election of appellant Zafar Ali from Constituency P. S. 41, Hyderabad V, Sind Provincial Assembly, was accept--ed, with the result that the election of Zafar Ali was declared void and respondent Abdul Waheed Qureshi was declared elected from the said constituency.
2. The main question on which the decision of these appeals turns is the true import and effect of subsection (5) of section 33 and subsection (4) of section 38 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1976, as well as rules 17 and 23 of the Representation of the Peoples (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1977. This question has arisen in the factual background of a number of ballot papers on which the prescribed mark to indicate the' candidate in whose favour the vote was cast, was placed outside the place 'e containing the name and symbol of the contesting candidate for whom the voter was supposed to have voted. As the main and crucial question falling for determination is identical to all these, appeals we propose to dispose of the same by this common judgment.
3. In Constituency P. S. 88, Karachi XIII according to the official result, in which the ballot papers containing the mark outside the pres--cribed space but opposite to the name and symbol of the candidate were treated as valid votes the respective votes secured by the contesting parties before us were as under :- Jamshed Ahmad Khan (appellant)8239 votes Hidayatullah Shah (appellant)not on the record.
Ghulam Hussain (Respondent No. 2)8426 The dispute related to 213 bullot papers which were counted in favour of respondent Ghulam Hussain to emerge as the successful candidate. According to the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos.
145-K and 147-K of 1985 these ballot papers were liable to be excluded as the mark was placed in them outside the space containing the name and symbol of respondent Ghulam Hussain. But the presiding officer and the Returning Officer rejected the objection of the appellants and included these ballot papers as valid votes cast in favour of respondent Ghulam Hussain as the mark was placed in the vacant space opposite to the column containing the name and symbol of the candidate. Mr. Justice Saleem Akhtar, on examining the relevant provisions observed that the primary consideration for determining the validity of a ballot paper, in such a situation, was to "ascertain, the unambiguous and clear intention of the voter from the marking", and held that the 213 ballot papers were valid votes rightly included in the count of respondent Ghulam Hussain.
4. In Constitutency P: S. 41, Hyderabad V the Returning officer had excluded such ballot-papers from the count in which the mark was placed outside the space containing the name and symbol of the candidate. Accordingly in the official results the ,respective votes secured by the con-- testing parties before us, were as under War Ali (Appellant) 6799 Abdul Waheed Qureshi (Respondent) 6749 Respondent Abdul Waheed Qureshi challenged the election of appellant War Ali and demanded a recount. Mr. Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid/ Election Tribunal, on opening the packages containing the valid votes, spoilt ballot papers etc. And recounting the votes, found that the objections raised by parties related to 312 ballot papers on several grounds. The objection material for present purposes was disposed of by the learned Judge by following the view taken, in the earlier case by Mr. Justice Saleem Akhtar. Therefore, basically the correctness of the view taken in that case is in question before us. The result of the reconsideration and recounting of the ballot papers, arrived at in the case in hand as found by the Election Tribunal was that respondent Abdul Waheed Qureshi secured 6831 votes, while appellant War Ali secured 6794 votes. The said respon--dent was accordingly declared elected and the election of appellant Zafar Ali was set aside.
5. Now the question of validity of the votes included in the count of the successful candidates in the two constituencies has arisen in the pec--uliar way in which the ballot paper in each of the elections was formulated and printed. According to rule 11(3) of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Election) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules"), the names of the contesting candidates shall be arranged on the ballot paper in the same order as shown in the list of contesting candidates prepared under rule 7. In the two elections with which we are concerned in these cases, there were 12 and 17 contesting candidates respectively. !t seems, therefore, apparently out of considerations of inconvenience and unwieldi--ness the concerned authorities, did not place the names and symbols of all the candidates in vertical descending order from the top to the bottom of the paper. But the paper was divided by a vertical line in the middle so as to form two columns. The names and symbols of the candidates were then printed in a descending order from the right hand column, separated by horizontal lines, upto the bottom of the paper and the remaining names were printed in the same order in the left hand column.. By this arrange-- ment each candidate's name and symbol was enclosed in a separate compartment. It seems that the common pattern adopted by the Election Commission was thus to divide the ballot paper into 10 compartments in each column so that as many as 20 condidates' names and symbols could be accommodated. Necessarily, therefore, in an election in which there were less than 20 contesting candidates, some or all the compartments, on the left hand side column would remain blank.
However, these blank compartments on the left side of the ballot paper would be in line with the corresponding compartments containing the names and symbols of the candidates in the right side column. In this case in the case of the first election there being only 12 contesting candidates, there were blank spaces in respect of eight compartments. The name and symbol of respondent Ghulam Hussain were printed at fifth position on the right side, so that there was a blank compartment opposite to that on the left side correspond--ing with it. In the other election the name and symbol of respondent Abdul Waheed Qureshi was at 10th position on the ballot paper (at the bottom) and thus, there being only 17 contesting candidates, there was a black compartment opposite to his name also on the left side.
6. In the context of the aforesaid facts, the controversy as to the validity of votes recorded on the disputed ballot papers has arisen due to the fact that the prescribed mark on these was in the blank space included in the empty compartment printed opposite to the name and symbol of each successful party. The basic objection on which the appellants rely is that according to the provisions of the Representation of Peoples Act and the rules a voter was required to cast his vote strictly in accordance with the voting procedure, by placing the prescribed mark in the space in which a candidate's name and symbol were printed ; and such ballot papers in which the prescribed mark was outside the compartment of the candidate on ballot paper, were all vitiated and were to be excluded from the count. The relevant provisions of the Representation of Peoples Act and the rules, which will govern the question raised in the controversy may now be set out as under :- "Section 33(1) .
(2) .
(a)
(b)
(c) , (d)
(e) ,
(3) .
(4) .
(5) On receiving the ballot paper, the elector shall-
(a) Forthwith proceed to the place reserved for marking the ballot paper ;
(b) put the prescribed mark on the ballot paper at any place within the space containing the name and symbol of the contesting candidate for whom he wishes to vote ; and
(c) after he has so marked the ballot paper, fold and insert it in the ballot box.
(7) .
Section 38:
(2) .
(3) .
(4) The Presiding Officer shall-
(a) open the used ballot box or ballot boxes and count the entire lot of ballot papers taken out thereform ;
(b) open the packet bearing the label `Challenged Ballot Papers' and count them ;
(c) count, in such manner as may be prescribed, the votes cast in favour of each contesting candidate excluding from the count the ballot papers which bear-
(i) no official mark (and signature) of the Presiding Officer ;
(if) any writing or any mark other than the mark of his thumb, the official mark, the (signature) of the Presiding Officer and the pres--cribed mark or to which a piece of paper or any other object of any kind has been attached ;
(iii) no prescribed mark to indicate the contesting candidate for whom the elector has voted ; or
(iv) any mark from which it is not clear for whom the elector has voted Provided that a ballot paper shall be deemed to have been marked in favour of a candidate if the whole or more than half of the area of the prescribed mark appears clearly within the space containing the name and symbol of that candidate and, where the prescribed mark is divided equally between two such spaces, the ballot paper shall be deemed invalid.'
Rule 17. Manner of making the ballot paper.-(1) The mark to be put under clause (b) of subsection
(5) of section 33 on the ballot paper, at any place within the space containing the name and symbol of the contesting candidate for whom the elector wishes to vote, shall be a mark containing squares on a rubber-stamp provided for the purpose by the Presiding Officer at the Polling Station and r-o other mark.
(2) No other marking aid or rubber-stamp except the rubber-stamp supplied for the purpose by the Presiding Officer under sub-rule (1) shall be used by the elector for marking his ballot paper.
Rule 23. Count on close of. Poll.-The Presiding Officer shall after taking out the ballot papers from the used ballot box or, ballot boxes-
(a) separate the ballot papers which are unambiguously marked in favour of a contesting candidate from those which bear--
(i) no official mark and (signature) of the Presiding Officer, or
(ii) any writing or any mark other than the official mark, (signature) of the Presiding Officer and the prescribed mark made with the rubber --stamp supplied for the purpose or to which a piece of paper or any other object of any kind has been attached, or
(iii) no prescribed mark indicating the contesting candidate for whom the elector has voted, or
(iv) any mark from which it is not clear for whom the elector has voted, provided that a ballot paper shall be deemed to have been marked in favour of a candidate if the whole or more than half of the area of the prescribed mark appears clearly within the space containing the name and symbol of that candidate ; and where the prescribed mark is divided equally between two such spaces, the ballot paper shall be deemed not to show clearly for whom the elector has voted.
7. Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim who addressed the main argument on the side o'. The appellants placed strong reliance on the language of clause (b) of subsection (5) of section 33 of the Act of 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and contended that a voter was required by the words of command contained in the statute to place the prescribed mark on the ballot paper "at any place within the space containing the name and symbol of the contesting candidate for whom he wishes to vote". He emphasised the mandatory terms in which the provision is couched and submitted that the breach of its terms would result in vitiating the result of such act, i.e. Invalidate the ballot so that it cannot be included in the count of valid votes. Learned counsel sought support for his contention from clause (iv) of subsection (4) of section 38 of the Act and by giving examples of various situations regarding the place of the mark on such a ballot paper argued that a mark placed in the vacant place outside the compartment of the candidate, was requited by the said provision to be excluded from the count as in such a case the law presumes that it would not be clear for whom the elector has voted. Emphasising the Explanation attached to clause (iv) the learned counsel urged that the only exception recognised by the statute where the mark is outside the space provided for a candidate was where more than half of the mark appears, in the place containing the name and symbol of the candidate. According to his argument this fortifies his submission that the provisions regarding the manner of marking the ballot paper were intended to be absolute except for the case provided in the Explanation. Mr. Ali Ahmad Fazeel, learned counsel who argued on the side of the respondents, on the other hand, supported the view taken by the Election Tribunal and urged that the provisions of section.33(5) (b) of the Act are directory in nature and substantial compliance of the same is enough to constitute a valid vote if the marking of the ballot paper is done in such a manner that the intention of the voter is clearly and unambiguously expressed. There is according to him nothing in the provisions of section 38(4) of the Act which required the Returning Officer to exclude the votes in these cases as bad votes. Both sides have relied on a number of decisions in support of their respective contentions.
8. Now as its heading says section 33 of the Act lays down the voting procedure and subsection (5) read along with rule 17, provide for the manner in which the ballot paper is to be marked. The important words are "at any place within the space containing the name and symbol of the contesting candidate for whom the elector wishes to vote". On a plain reading of these provisions it is no doubt clear that the elector is required to indicate the candidate for whom he wishes to vote by putting the mark in the place stipulated by the law. There is no ambiguity about the meaning of the language employed and if the' provisions are literally construed the elector has to place the prescribe 'd mark in the compartment containing the name and symbol of the candi--date of his choice. But the controversy before us is as to the effect of ~ these provisions or more appropriately, whether in case of non-compliance strictly with the requirements of the statute the result will be to vitiate the, ballot paper. The question is whether the provisions stated above are to be given mandatory or directly effect. The learned Election Tribunal referred to certain treatises on election law from the sub-continent- ac well as from the English jurisdiction and culled out the principle that the Court is to give effect to a mark, irrespective of its place on the ballot paper, if in its opinion it clearly indicates the intention of the voter ats: to the candidate for whom he wishes to vote and the statutory provisions as to the place of marking were held to be directory not rendering the vote bad. This view of the law was challenged and it was contended, that. The provisions in question before us are a departure from the past inasmuch as for the first time the statute had emphatically prescribed in precise terms the place for marking the ballot paper and hence the legislative intent was undoubtedly to give an absolute command with all the consequences attending the breach of such provision.
9. We are, however, not satisfied that the provisions of the Act reveal any such intent and our attention was not drawn to the language employed in this regard in the preceding statutes on the subject. Every statute regulating the exercise of franchise by electors arid the conduct of elections usually provides for voting procedure at the poll besides other ancillary matters. There is always some provision for the manner of casting the vote. In the book on Law of Elections and Election Petitions in India by Nanak Chand Pandit and Gianchand Mathur, the learned authors have quoted from an election case reported as Punjab North, 2 H.
1. E. P. 218 as under "The position of the mark on the ballot paper is not material so long as there is a clear indication that the elector intended to vote for a particular candidate. Even where the cross is put outside the space intended for it, but opposite the name of a candidate, it is a good vote for the candidate."
Crawford on Construction of Statutes (1949 Edition) Article 270 at page 538 has observed "Usually, statutes regulating the form and mode . Of execution of a bond will be considered directory. This is also the rule with reference to statutes regulating the conduct of public elections, since anything which prevents a free and full expression of the public will should, under no circumstance, be upheld."
10. On behalf of the appellants, mainly two rules of interpretation of statutes have been pressed in support of the argument that the provisions of section 33(5) are mandatory. Firstly that the section uses mandatory words like "shall"; and secondly that where a statute creates a new right; privilege or immunity and regulates the manner of its exercise, it must be, construed as mandatory. No doubt the principles underlying these rules furnish some assistance in determining the nature of an enactment, but the books indicate that except as to time, there is no general rule of universal application for determining whether an enactment is absolute or directory. In this behalf I am tempted to refer to the observations by Lord Campbell in Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner ((1861)
30 L J Ch. 379), quoted by Craies on Statute Law as under :- "No universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed."
Following this dictum Lord Penzance in Howard v. Bodington ((1877)2PD203added his own observations revealing the difficulty in formulating a positive test for determining the question, as follows :- "I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than in each case you must look to the subject-matter, consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory."
Reliance was also placed on the maxim `expressio unius alterius exclusio' express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another, in support of the argument that when the statute lays down the manner of recording a vote by placing the mark in the space allotted to---a candidate, marking a ballot paper otherwise, by placing the mark outside the prescribed place was impliedly prohibited, with the result that such ballot paper is vitiated. In this behalf reference was made to a recent judgment of this Court reported as Col. (Retd.) Syed Mukhtar Hussain Shah v. Wasim Sajjad and others (PLD1986SC178). A number of decisions were quoted in support of the proposition that where power is given to do a thing in a certain way, this must be done in that way or not at all, and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. As pointed out above, from the quotations from two English decisions, the various special rules deduced from the authorities offer no snore than a clue or guide to the character of a statutory provision. These rules by no means furnish absolute tests. Each case has to be decided on the basis of various considerations, in the light of the provisions, the scope and the object of the legislation in accordance with what the Court ascertains to be the legislative intent. It is not possible to lay down a general rule of universal application in this behalf. It was so held by this Court in Atta Muhammad Qureshi v. Settlement Commissioner and others (PLD 1971. SC61
11. The controversy raised before us essentially falls within the realm of the statutory provisions which regulate the power of the Returning Officer to reject certain ballot papers while counting the votes cast in favour of each contesting candidate. This is an essential part of the machinery provided for . Ascertaining and declaring the result in an election through secret ballot. The law with which we are dealing, has in the first place laid down the procedure for casting votes by the electors and has then laid down which ballot papers are to be included in the count and which ones are to be excluded. The law has not left the matter, merely to inferential consequence directly following the breach of the provisions governing the manner laid down for casting votes.
Subsection (4)(c) of section 38 of the Act and rule 23 set out exhaustively the conditions under which a ballot paper is to be excluded from the count as invalid. There being a specific provision on the subject, the argument that if a vot is not cast in the manner laid down in subsection (5) of section 33, the same is to be excluded, becomes obviously untenable. Nothing prevented the legislature to include an express provision to that effect in sub--section (4) of section 38, that if the prescribed mark is found outside the space containing the name and symbol of the candidate, the ballot paper shall be excluded. On the contrary sub-clause (iv) of clause (c) in subsection (4) of section 38, the legislature provided that a ballot paper which bears "any mark from which it is not clear for whom the elector has voted", will be one of the categories of ballot papers to be excluded.
This in our view reveals the intention of the law-maker that mere place or location of the mark will not vitiate a ballot paper as long as it can be ascertained reasonably for whom the elector has voted. This is in con--sonance with the general principle that the primary object for marking the ballot paper is to enable the voter to- express his will in favour of the particular candidate. A careful analysis of the proviso appended to this sub-clause also shows that the same principle is incorporated therein, so that where more than half of the area of the prescribed mark appears clearly within the space containing the name and the symbol of a particular candidate, the vote shall be counted in favour of that candidate. But if the mark is equally divided between the space of two candidates, the situation would be clearly the one where it will not be possible to say for whom the elector has voted and, therefore, the ballot paper shall be deemed to be invalid. We do not see any particular significance in this proviso which may go to support the contention that the provisions in regard to the marking of ballot papers contained in section 33(5) of rule 17, are mandatory. We feel that the rules laid down by the law under consideration for the manner of marking a ballot paper cannot be given mandatory effect. Even positive words of command used in this. Behalf do not necessarily lead to such an interpretation of the nature of the law under consideration. The question must be determined from a broad view of the end and aim of election and election laws rather than from the phraseology or positive language employed. '['he obvious design underlying the election law is to provide expeditious and convenient mean for expression of the will of the voters free from fraud. It has been said that the election laws are framed to afford opportunity for the orderly expression by duly qualified voters of their preference among candidates. For office, not to frustrate such expression. Therefore, in Bowers v.' Smith (111 Mo. 45 : 20 S W 101), the learned Judges observed that "the cardinal rule, to be followed by election officers and Courts in election matters is to ascertain the intent of the voter as disclosed by the official ballot actually cast and to give effect to that intent by counting the ballot cast".
12. From the aforesaid discussion we are of the firm opinion that the provisions of section 33(5) of the Act and of rule 17, are not mandatory, with the result that only substantial compliance was required. Indeed in the context of the fact that this provision, laying down the manner of casting the vote relates to an election on the basis of adult franchise, where most of the voters would be from the rural background, strict technical compliance with the requirements as to place of the mark, would not be in consonance with the intention of the legislature. In any case, as discussed earlier subsecution (4) (c) clearly lays down an exhautive list of grounds upon which a ballot paper can be rejected and, therefore, non-compliance with the procedure for marking the ballot paper by itself, not being one of the grounds prescribed, cannot ispo facto furnish a ground for rejecting a ballot paper as invalid.
13. Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim has referred to certain decisions which may be noticed at this stage.
In the case of Mukhtar Hussain Shah v, Wasim Sajjad strong reliance was placed upon two principles of inter--pretation of statutes which were found to be attracted to the controversy in that case. The first principle was stated as follows: "So far as election laws are concerned the requirements of law in so far as officers conducting the election are concerned are usually taken to be directory and so far as these requirements concern the voter they are usually taken to be mandatory." As the judgment itself stated, this principle as enunciated is broadly expressed, so that it cannot be taken to be universally applicable in the interpretation of all the laws pertaining to the elections. Similarly reference in this case was also made to an Indian Supreme Court judgment reported as M. V. Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and others AIR1955SC233), in which the learned Judges expressed the principle differently in the words "when the law prescribes that the intention of the voter should be expressed in a particular manner, it can be taken into account only if it is so expressed. An intention not duly expressed is, in a Court of law, in the same position as an intention not expressed at all." The case of Mukhtar Hussain Shah related to an election governed by the Senate (Election) Act, 1975. The manner of recording vote in such an election is governed by rule 17 of the Senate (Election) Rules, 1975. On examining the said rule and particularly the Explanation appended thereto, it was held that in view of the clear prohibitory and negative language employed, the provisions had to be given a mandatory effect, so that a ballot paper which violated such negative command was to be treated as invalid. The question of fact was undisputed that the ballot papers contained unauthorised marks. There is no analogy between those provisions and the provisions of law which are subject-matter of interpretation in the present case, in so far as there is no negative mandate contained in the enactment in question in this case. Even otherwise as pointed out in the reported judgment the electorate in the Senate (Election) consisted of the members of the Provincial Assembly who were responsible persons, in whose case it should not be difficult to ensure strict compliance with the letter of the law, .Whereas in a general election like the present one the electorate is composed of people of much lower intellectual level and background.
The principles of interpretation in regard to provisions of this nature have been described concisely in the following passage from the American Jurisprudence (Volume 26, 2nd Edition, part 257, at page 84)
"However, a statute prescribing the marks to be used by a voter, but not declaring a ballot marked in violation thereof to be void, has been deemed to be directory. In any event, since such statutes tend to limit the citizen in the exercise of his right to vote, they should be liberally construed in his favour, and a number of Courts have declared that if the intention of the voter can fairly be ascertained from his ballot and it appears that he acted honestly, the voter will not be disfranchised or deprived of his right to vote through mere inadvertence, mistake, or ignorance, even though the marking is not in strict conformity with law."
14. These principles are a good guide for interpreting the provisions of law which are the subject- matter of controversy in this case. As regards the Indian decision, the observation on which reliance is placed was made in order to repell a contention that votes which were liable to be rejected as invalid under the election rules expressly, by the Returning Officer, may be taken into account in view of the general object of election laws, namely, to discover the intention of the majority of the voters in the choice of representative, if the elector has shown a clear intention to vote for a particular candidate. It was in the context of this argument that the learned Judges observed that if the intention of the majority of the voters is required to be expressed in a particular manner, it has to be expressed in that manner to be duly considered, otherwise it will amount to not having expressed any opinion at all. The violation rendering the ballot papers invalid, in that case, related to-rule 47(1) (c) of the Election Rules applic--able in so far as the required distinguishing mark as prescribed by the Election Commission was not printed on the ballot papers. It was pres--cribed that the ballot papers for the Parliamentary Constituency should bear a green bar printed near the left margin and that those for the State Assembly should bear brown bar. The disputed ballot papers were printed with a brown bar instead of a green bar which had to be used for the election in question. Rule 47(1)(c), inter alia, provided that a ballot paper contained in a ballot box shall be rejected if it bears a mark different from the one authorised for use at the polling station. These provisions were held to be mandatory and, therefore, the ballot papers were rejected. Therefore, the dictum laid down by the learned Judges, in regard to the election as a whole cannot be made applicable to the interpretation of provisions prescribing the procedure for marking ballot papers by the electors.
15. Mr. M. L. Shahani, learned counsel appearing from the side of the appellant (C. A. 147-K/1985) generally adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim which have been dealt with in the fore--going part of this judgment, but he raised an additional argument which requires to be considered. He contended that the ballot papers used in the election in question were not printed in accordance with the provisions of law and, therefore, the whole election was rendered void. In this con--nection he referred to rule 11 which requires that the ballot paper shall be in Form VI and the names of the contesting candidates were required to be arranged on the ballot papers in the same order as shown on the list of the contesting candidates prepared under rule 7, i.e. in the al--phabetical order. The grievance of the learned counsel was that the ballot paper according to the prescribed form provided for one column only and, therefore, the same could not be printed with two columns carrying the names from the bottom of the right band column to the top of the left hand column. The argument is certainly ingenious but we find no substance in it. We see nothing in rule 11 which mandatorily required that the names of all the contesting candidates should be placed on the ballot papers in one column, howsoever unwieldy it may become. We do not think that the objection raised by the learned counsel in any way vitiates the election or renders the ballot papers invalid on that account.
16. In view of the above discussion we are of the opinion that in Constituency P. S. 88, Karachi XIII, the Returning Officer and the Election Tribunal rightly included the disputed ballot papers in the count of the successful candidate as valid votes. Similarly in Constituency P. S. 41, H.Yderabad V, we affirm the conclusion of the Election Tribunal to set aside the decision of the Returning Officer to exclude the disputed ballot papers from the count of the successful candidate. Accordingly all the appeals are dismissed with costs.