ORDBR S. RAIS AHMAD JAFRI (MEMBER).--The facts leading to this appeal are that the appellant filed a case on 20-10-1985 under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It was actually a complaint and the appellant had prayed that the respondents may be punished in accordance with law. This complaint was also accompanied with a miscellaneous application praying for stay order. On the same date i.e. On 20-10-1985 an interim stay order was issued through which the respondents were allowed to retrench some persons named in the complaint in accordance with the requirements of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Employment)
Standing Orders, Ordinance, 1968. The case was fixed for hearing 13-11-1985. This application alongwith miscellaneous application was withdrawn for the reason that the respondents had already retrenched three persons. However, the appellant had filed another case on 10-11-1985 under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Ordinance. This application was also treated as a complaint by the learned Chairman. Statement of the complainant was recorded under section 200, Cr.P.C.
Statement of a witness was also recorded under section 202, Cr.P.C. The learned Chairman on 24- 7-1986 dismissed the second application /complaint on 24-7-1986 after holding that the complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of unfair labour practice against the respondents. The appellant has also filed a Complaint No. 7(3) of 1986 under section 22-C of the I.R.O., 1969. This complaint was also rejected on 21-9-1986. This appeal has now been preferred against the orders of the learned, Chairman dated 24-7-1986 and 21-9-1986.
2. As regards the order dated 24-7-1986 it may be stated that the appeal against this order cannot be entertained as being hopelessly time-barred on the ground that the appeal was filed on 16-10- 1986.
3. Moreover, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us that he has come only against the order of 21-9-1986 in Complaint No.7(3) of 1986 under section 22-C of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there appears to be some confusion regarding the filing of the Case No. 7(3) of 1986 in which the order dated 21-9-1986 was passed.
Copy of the application has not been filed with the appeal. However, on perusal of the impugned order it appears that the contempt application related to the previous case filed on 20-10-1985 which was withdrawn on 13-11-1985. The learned Chairman, has, therefore, held as under: "That as the main case has been withdrawn none of the ingredients of contempt under section 22- C of I.R.O. 1969 can be said to exist. "
However, the learned Chairman further observed that "even if the contempt petition were to relate to the other case filed on 10-11-1985 it must be mentioned that the same was dismissed on 24-7- 1986 on account of failure of the complaint to establish a prima facie case of unfair labour practice." The learned Chairman further observed as under: ---That being so, it will not be a proper exercise of powers of the Court to embark upon a prosecution of the respondent for contempt.--- The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Chairman has failed to appreciate that the respondents, in their comments, had come up with false allegations and that making such false allegations caused serious prejudice to the appellant. The learned counsel further referred to the words appearing in section 22-C of the I.R.O. 1969 "or does anything which tends to prejudice the case of a party before it "
22-C.
"(a) the Commission shall have power to punish any person who obstructs or abuses its process or disobeys any of its orders or directions, or does anything which tends to prejudice the case of a party before it, or tends to bring it or any of its members in relation to proceedings of the Commission into hatred or contempt, or does anything which, by law, constitutes contempt of Court, with simple imprisonment which ,nay extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, I or with both; and------------."
Perusal of subsection (a) of section 22-C of I. R.O. 1969, would reveal that it is in a different context that the words "or does anything which tends to prejudice the case of a party before it" have been used. Even if it be assumed that the respondents have made false allegations in their comments, it would not justify an action under section 22-C of the I.R.O. 1969. Perhaps, section 56 of the I.R.O., 1969 which lays down a penalty for giving false evidence would have been a more appropriate provision of law to be invoked. The learned counsel submitted that if his appeal against the order dated 21-9-1986 succeeds, it will enable him to reopen the case which was dismissed vide order dated 24-7-1986. We do not agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant and hold that the provisions of section 22-C are not attracted in the present case. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed in limine.