ALI HUSSAIN QAZILBASH, J.--This is an appeal by leave against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 3-4-1978 whereby the constitutional petition of the appellants was dismissed.
2. Property bearing No. S-38-R-107 situate on Circular Road, Lahore, was owned by one Dinanath Mehra, an evacuee. On 6-6-1975, its one-third was declared as an evacuee property by the Custodian, Punjab, Lahore. The two appellants and respondents Nos. 1 to 4 are the occupants of this one-third portion.
3. The case of the appellants is that on declaring the property as an evacuee in the first instance, they applied for its transfer on 29-10-1966 under Settlement Scheme No. VIII and then had submitted similar forms in October, 1967, October, 1973, October, 1977 and lastly on 27-2-1978, but no order was passed.
4. As per decision of the Custodian, the property in question alongwith certain other properties of Dinanath Mehra was partitioned by metes and bounds by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner III, Lahore on 10-1-1978. It was after that, that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 submitted their forms on 4-3- 1978 and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 on 21/ 22-1-1978 for the transfer of the portion in their possession. Alongwith the forms they had submitted applications to respondent No.6 praying for the condonation of delay. Their cases were referred by respondent No.6 to Member, Board of Revenue (Settlement & Rehabilitation Wing), Punjab, Lahore, recommending for the condonation of delay. These recommendations were allowed on 1-3-1978 and 26-3-1978. This was objected to by the appellants who approached respondent No. 5 with the prayer that the condonation allowed should be recalled. This was, however, turned down vide order dated 9-3-1978. The appellants then challenged the orders dated 1-3-1978 and 26-3-1978 through a constitutional petition, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court on 3-4-1978.
5. Leave was granted to consider whether under para 3 of the Management and Disposal of Available Urban Immovable Property Scheme, the Deputy Administrator (Residual Properties), Lahore, had the power to condone the delay in submitting the forms.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the various orders. The objection of the appellants that the forms submitted by respondents Nos. 1 to 4 are barred by time and that respondent No.5 had no jurisdiction to condone the delay, if any, has rightly been termed as misconceived by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. The appellants are obviously wrong in alleging that the property in dispute became available on 6-6-1975 when it was declared to be evacuee property by the Custodian, in that though the property in dispute was declared an evacuee property in 1975, but then the shares of the non-evacuee had not been separated till partition of the property by metes and bounds had not taken place. This was done by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on 10-1-1978 and it was on this date i.e. 10-1-1978 that the property in dispute became evacuee property and available for disposal under the law. It was only after this date that the persons could have applied for its transfer and not earlier.
7. As for the contention of the appellants that respondents Nos. 1 to 4 had submitted application forms beyond the target date (31-10-1977) and delay could not be condoned, is simply devoid of force in view of the Press Note issued by the Government of Punjab, Board of Revenue (Settlement & Rehabilitation Wing) dated 7-11-1978 through which date for filing applications for transfer under the Management and Disposal of Available Urban Immovable Property Scheme was extended to 31-12-1978. Since respondents Nos. 1 to 4 had submitted forms for transfer soon after it became available and much before the extended target date, the question of delay in submitting the forms did not arise. Even otherwise the appellants have no locus standi to restrain respondents No.1 to 4 from submitting their forms because by merely submitting the forms, none of their rights have been infringed.
Thus, finding no force, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.