1. NASIM HASAH SHAH, J.--The following statement of facts will suffice for purposes of the order we propose to make in this case.
2. This appeal, by leave of this Court, is directed against the order of the High Court passed in Writ Petition No.582-R of 1965 on 9-1-1974. It appears that the High Court, after the hearing of this writ petition, had reserved orders in the case, which were announced after considerable delay on 9-1- 1974. According to the orders that were announced the petition was partly accepted. Considering that they had succeeded the appellants applied for a copy of the judgment for "private use" on 7- 3-1974. This was received on the same day viz. 7-3-1974. On perusal of the said copy the appellants found that the judgment was mostly against them. They, therefore, applied for another copy of the judgment this time for "Supreme Court use" on 11-4-1974. The said copy was delivered on 19-4-1974 and the Petition for Leave in this Court was filed on 23-4-1974. On this date the petition was barred by 37 days.
3. The petition for leave came up for hearing on 13-12-1974 but it was dismissed by a Bench of this Court on the ground of limitation.
4. The appellants, thereafter, submitted a review petition seeking review of this order. This petition came for hearing on 20-12-1974 and after hearing learned counsel for the appellants the learned Judges hearing the matter observed that the appellants may file a copy of the High Court's judgment for which they had made an application on 7th March, 1974, and if it was found to be "for private use" and not "for Supreme Court use"', the review would be granted, subject to just exceptions. Thereupon, the appellants filed the said copy, which was indeed found to be "for private use". The review petition was, accordingly, admitted and it was directed that the Petition for Leave be fixed for hearing afresh.
5. The said petition came up for hearing on 19-5-1977, when leave was granted. Today. When the appeal came up for hearing Mr.Masood Akhtar, learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the petition was barred by limitation and there was no reasonable cause for condo nation of delay, while Mr. A . R. Shaukat, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that the delay had already been condoned and this issue could not be raised.
6. We find that the delay was condoned, subject to all just exceptions and, therefore, we are of the opinion that the respondents can take exceptions to the order condoning the delay, which was passed without hearing them. The same view was taken by us in Noor Muhammad v. Mst. Umari Civil Appeal No. 136 of 1974 and Nazar Muhammad v. Muhammad Rafiq and others Civil Appeal No. 293 of 1978.
7. We have, therefore, heard the learned counsel for the parties on this aspect of the matter.
8. We observe that even though there might have been some justification for the appellants in applying for a copy for "private use" in the first instance on the impression that their appeal had been accepted but after the copy was received on 7-3-1974 and it was clear that the judgment was mostly against them and that it would be necessary to challenge it in this Court it was their duty to take expeditious steps in order to obtain all the necessary documents to enable them to move this Court within time.
9. The copy of the judgment was in their hands on 7-3-1974 and they had still four days left for filing the leave petition in this Court. Hence they should have applied for a copy of the judgment for "Supreme Court use" within the said four days. However, they applied for such a copy on 11-4-1974 long after the time for filing the petition had expired. In fact, they could have filed the petition for leave along with the copy obtained by them for "private use", with an application for relaxation of the rule requiring the filing of a copy for "Supreme Court use" only on the grounds being urged for condo nation of delay. This was not done and even after the copy for "Supreme Court use" had been received on 19-4-1974 they took another four days to file the petition, although the petition had already become barred by time. In these circumstances we feel that the objection of the respondents that no sufficient cause is made out for condoning the delay is well-founded and the appellants' petition for leave is liable to dismissal on the ground of limitation. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed hereby.