' USMAN ALI SHAH, C. J.-This Full Bench has been constituted in the present cases in the following circumstances.
' Some landed property was acquired by the Government for public purposes to extend the area of Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul. Notifications under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called "the Act") were issued by the Collector. After the usual formalities, the Collector announced his awards. The landowners were not satisfied with the awards, therefore, they preferred objection petitions under section 18 of. The Act before the Collector for enhancement of the compensation. The learned Collector forwarded the objection petitions to the learned Acquisition Judge for disposal. The record shows that the learned Acquisition Judge did not decide the cases together. He first decided the objection petition in the case titled Fakhre Alam v. Central Government of Pakistan and for the purpose of these cases, it may be stated that the learned Acquisition Judge enhanced the compensation at the rate of Rs, one lac per Kanal to be paid to the landowner. Against the judgment of the learned Acquisition Judge the Government filed R. F. A.
No, 21 of 1984 before this Court and a learned Division Bench upheld the judgment of the learned Acquisition Judge. It may be pointed out that in that case by notification, dated 14th June, 1981 under section 4 of the Act land measuring 265 Kanals 18 Marlas was acquired. This notification was followed by corrigendum, dated 29th March, 1982 by which, in partial modification of the notification, land measuring 19 Kanals 12 Marlas was added to the land measuring 265 Kanals 18 Marlas already acquired by the above notification. The learned Division Bench of this Court was confronted with the question, namely, whether the material date for assessing the compensation to be paid for the land would be the date of corrigendum or the date of the original notification, issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Division Bench answered in favour of the corrigendum. According to the learned Judges, actually the corrigendum was a notification under section 4 of the Act which superseded the original notification. By holding so, it was = observed that the corrigendum would be the notification because "it contained details of all Khasra numbers, including those which were needed by Government to be acquired for a public purpose".
The judgment of the Division Bench is dated 30th April, 1985, reported in 1985 CLC 2228.
2. Now the objection petitions in these cases before us came up for disposal before the learned Acquisition Judge on different dates after the decision of the above-reported case. His judgments in these cases will show that he did not take the dates of notifications issued in these cases under section 4 of the Act as the material dates for the purpose of compensation to be paid to the land owner for the acquired land. He based his finding on the above-reported case. According to the learned Acquisition Judge, the lands were acquired in the same vicinity, the transactions took place on or about the same date and as there is no difference of time between the award given by Collector in the above-reported case and the awards in the present cases, compensation in the present cases for the lands to be paid to the landowners should be assessed at the same rate as assessed in the reported case, namely, Rs, one lac per Kanal. He accordingly allowed the objection petitions and assessed the acquired land in these cases at the rate of Rs, one lac per Kanal.
3. Now when the turn of these appeals came up for disposal before this Court, the Registry of this Court at Abbottabad Circuit pointed out to the Senior Judge of that Circuit that a similar matter reported in 1985 CLC 2228 is again emerging. The Registry referred to an authority reported in PLD 1960 Lah. 687 in which it is held: "With regard to the extent of the binding nature of decisions of the High Court on itself there is no statutory provision in the laws applicable to Pakistan but judicial decisions have laid down certain principles. These may be summarised as under :-
(3) the decision of a Division Bench of the Court can be dissented from by another Division Bench or even by the same Bench and may be overruled by a Full Bench but it cannot be dissented from by a Single Bench."
4.In view of the above, the learned Senior Judge referred the matter for constituting a Division Bench or a Full Bench comprising of Judges other than the Judges who decided the above- reported case. It was in these circumstances that this Full Bench was accordingly constituted.
5.In the course of hearing of these appeals, a question was posed before us whether the learned Acquisition Judge was justified to basic his finding on the strength of the ruling given in the reported case. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length. It may be observed that as a matter of principle of law, in acquisition cases, the material date for the purpose of compensation to be paid to the landowners for the acquired land would be the date of notification issued under section 4 of the Act and for that matter one year's average of the lands sold in the vicinity before the date of notification is taken into consideration as the criterion for assessing the price of the acquired land. The learned counsel for the parties did not controvert this legal position.
6. We do not see any logical standard in the impugned judgments of the learned Acquisition Judge in assessing the lands of the landowners in the present eases at the rate of Rs, one lac per Kanal.
He should not have adopted the 'judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the reported case as an omni bus criterion in ignorance of the material of each case. Legally, he was bound to refer to the dates of notifications issued under section 4 of the Act in each case as the material 'dates for the purpose of compensation and each case should have been examined and decided by him in the light of its own evidence. He did not do any such thing and felt fortified by the ruling in the reported case by which the date of corrigendum was declared as the date for the purpose of compensation. If the learned Division Bench had not given the ruling in favour of the corrigendum, the learned Acquisition Judge would have the occasion to examine thoroughly the evidence on record for the purpose of compensation and decide the cases on the basis of one year's average prior to the dates of notifications originally issued under section 4 of the Act. As the, learned Acquisition Judge was inspired in deciding the present cases by the ruling of .The Division Bench of this Court in the reported case, we are obliged to examine the question whether in the facts and circumstances, of the case, the corrigendum can be held a notification which superseded the original notification issued under section 4 of the Act and for that matter the material date for the purpose of compensation would, be the date of corrigendum.
7. Before we proceed to examine the question of notification and corrigendum, we would like to take note of the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that in petition for special leave to appeal filed by the Government, the Supreme Court upheld the above judgment of the Division Bench and refused leave to appeal by order, dated 19th October, 1985 which order has been reported in 1986 SCMR 188. He, therefore, urged that as the Supreme Court has upheld the judgment of this Court in the above-reported case, it is clear that the Supreme Court had declared corrigendum as notification which superseded the original notification and this Court would have no occasion to hold otherwise. We would have agreed with the learned counsel, if the Hon'ble Supreme Court bad examined this question. By going through the order of the learned Supreme Court, what we find is that the learned counsel who filed caveat in that case on behalf of the Government/petitioner did not invite attention of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court that the corrigendum was issued "in partial modification of the notification under section 4 of the Act and as the notification was not superseded or cancelled, the question may be considered whether the material date for the purpose of compensation would be the date of notification originally issued or the date of corrigendum by which, in partial modification of the notification, land measurins 19 canals 12 Marlas was added to 265 Kanals 18 Marlas already acquired by the notification. The learned counsel for the respondents did not controvert this position nor indeed could he controvert it, as there is no discussion of the Supreme. Court on the above question. He, therefore, agreed that this question is open for examination and decision by this Court.
8. The learned counsel for the respondents then contended that as the acquired land in the present case is situate in the same vicinity in which the acquired land in the reported case is situate and as in the latter case compensation awarded by the learned Acquisition Judge. Was upheld upto the Supreme Court, we would not be justified* to go into the question compensation with regard to the acquired land in the present case. By this contention what the learned counsel means is that we should treat all the acquired lands in the area as bearing same potential value for the purpose of compensation.
9.We have carefully gone through the order of the Supreme Court. We find that the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court had given consideration to the unique peculiarity and suitability of the site of the acquired land in the locality for building purpose to attract customers. The learned counsel for the respondents agreed that in the same area all acquired land cannot be treated as standing on the same footing to bear same potential value. In the reported case, the acquired land was a corner plot situate on the main road and not, only it was found readily available for building purposes but was a plot of all convenience to evince interest of the customers in its purchase in preference to the other lands in the vicinity. We may say that while upholding the order of this Court in the reported case, this was the only consideration which was kept in view by the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court and in this behalf it was observed :- "The average price as worked out by Bin Yamin P. W., Patwari Halqa Urban area, Abbottabad, also is in the neighbourhood of what was determined by, the local Commissioner to be the market value of the land. Besides, it appears that the land in dispute happens to be a corner plot which is considered to be more valuable."
10. Now as on the above legal question, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the reported case does not commend to us, we have no hesitation in examining it in our own way in order to show that the material date for the purpose of compensation in respect of the acquired land would be the date of notification originally issued under section 4 of the Act and not the date of corrigendum in which merely omission of certain land was intended to be added in the notification.
11.We now proceed to furnish our reasons in support of our view that in such case the material date for the purpose of compensation would be the date of notification originally issued under section 4 of the Act and in the circumstances of the case, the corrigendum was not a notification which superseded the notification issued under section 4 of the Act. D We should first give the reasoning furnished by the learned Division Bench in support of its view that the corrigendum was a notification which superseded the notification already issued under section 4 of the Act, and for the purpose of compensation, qua the acquired land, the material date would be the date of corrigendum. In paragraph 12 of the report, this is what the learned Judges observed :- "12. Before we proceed further to ovulate the evidence Which W25 brought on record before the learned Acquisition Judge on the basis of which he determined the compensation to be paid to the respondent for his land, we would like to record our finding on the much debated question as to which would be the material date for determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under the Act in accordance with the measure laid down in the first clause to subsection (1) of section 23 of the Act. As already mentioned, two notifications were issued under section 4 Of the Act by the Collector of the District, one on the 14th June, 1981, wherein many Khasra numbers, including Khasra numbers 44 and 45 measuring 1 Kanal 7 Marlas belonging to the respondent, were mentioned which were likely to be acquired by Government for the public purpose, and the other (by way of corrigendum) on the 29th March, 1982, wherein the Khasra number already notified and the additional area likely to be needed, including the land measuring 4 Kanals 1 Marla represented by Khasra numbers 42 and 43 belonging to the respondent, were Mentioned. This corrigendum, which was a full-fledged notification issued under section 4 of the Act, is available at pages 18-19 of the record of the Acquisition Judge. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the material date for the purpose of determining the compensation would be the 14th June, 1981 on which date the first notification was issued, but the learned counsel for the respondent as already mentioned, argued that this date would be the 29th March, 1982 on which date the corrigendum was issued. We are inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent because what was expressed by the Collector of the District to be a corrigendum was in fact a notification, complete by itself, issued under section 4 of the Act. It contained details of all Khasra numbers, including those earlier notified which were needed by Government to be acquired for a public purpose. It, being complete and self-contained, had, in fact, superseded the first notification issued on the 14th June, 1981. The material date for the purpose of determining the compensation to be awarded for the acquired land was, therefore, the 29th March, 1982."
12. Thus, according to the learned Judges of the Division Bench, the corrigendum abrogated the notification, as if there were no notification issued under section 4 of the Act. In other words, it means that the authorities had intended to acquire the land from the date of corrigendum. In support of this view, the learned counsel for the respondents referred to an authority reported in the case of Sahib Dad Khan v. The Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others (1). By going through this authority, we have not been able to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel. In that case after the original notification issued under section 4 of the Act, another notification was issued under section 4 of the Act. No corrigendum was issued. The Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court, therefore, held that the second notification cancelled the previous notification. As there is no ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that even the corrigendum will take the place of notification and notification already issued will stand cancelled, the contention raised by the learned counsel is not available to him in the present case. In our view, in acquisition cases a. Notification issued under section 4 of the Act can be {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1969 SCM R 317 {{FOOT NOTE}} cancelled only by a notification as contemplated by section 21 of the, General Clauses Act. We are supported in this view by an authority in the case of Harihar Mandar v. State of Bihar and another (1), in which it was observed :- "Wherein a land acquisition proceeding a notification under section 4 is published in Gazette after due enquiry under section 40 and on receiving no objections as called for therein, a draft agreement under section 41 is sent to Government for publication, but the Government, on objection by another party, passes an order for fresh enquiry as to the public purpose of the acquisition and on being satisfied on report of the Collector, continues the proceedings, it cannot be contended that the direction of the Government for a fresh enquiry amounted to the cancellation of the previous notification under section 4.
' Moreover, a notification published in the State Gazette under section 4 of the Act could be cancelled only by a notification similarly published as provided under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Admittedly, when no such notification was issued cancelling the previous one, it could not be said that the previous notification was cancelled or that the proceedings were withdrawn."
13. In the present case, there was no fresh inquiry on the objection of any party and even if there were fresh inquiry, there could have been no question that the direction of the Government for a fresh inquiry amounted to cancellation of the notification previously issued under section 4 of the Act.
14. At this juncture, reference may be made to section 21 of the ,F' General Clauses Act to show that only a notification issued subsequently can cancel a notification already issued and the corrigendum will not take the place of notification in order that the notification already issued under section 4 of the Act should be deemed to have been cancelled. This provision may be reproduced :-
21. Power to make, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind orders, rules or bye-laws.- Where by any (Central Act) or Regulation, a power to issue (notifications), orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred; then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any (notifications), orders, rules or bye-laws so (issued)."
15. A look at this provision will show that it does not admit of any ambiguity or confusion. The word "rescind" occurring in the provision is significant. It means, "to annul, to repeal; to cancel". By going through the corrigendum in the reported case, we have not been able to come to the conclusion that the authorities have rescinded or for that matter annulled or repealed or cancelled the notification already issued under section 4 of the Act.
16. Now we proceed to draw distinction between notification and corrigendum. The word "corrigendum" is self-explaining and is free from any ambiguity. "Corrigendum" according to the Oxford Dictionary, means, "thing to be corrected in book". Its meaning is so clear that {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) AIR 1963 Pat. 139 {{FOOT NOTE}} we have never seen any case-law to interpret or construe it differently. Official corrigendum is a document to contain correction of a mistake or to supply omission in the document earlier issued.
Corrigendum is, therefore, nothing else than to correct the mistake or to supply the omission occurring in the predecessor document. The issue of corrigendum will not render the previous document cancelled, as its very object is to correct the same and not to cancel or rescind it. The validity of the notification originally issued will, therefore, stand in letter and spirit. The corrigendum will not wash it away. What is corrected in the notification by means of corrigendum, the same will be added in the notification to complete it. If, however, the mistake is with respect to the date of the issue of the notification and the date is corrected in the notification by means of corrigendum, in that case the notification will have the effect from the date so corrected. But this is not the position in the reported case.
17. In order to clear the point beyond controversy, we have to observe that in official routine, we have not come across any judicial precedent that corrigendum has cancelled the notification originally issued in the matter. As a matter of common practice, officially, corrigendu is issued in order to correct the notification for completion in all respects. If the intention is to cancel the notification, another notification unqualified by a corrigendum is issued independently with the opening words "In supersession of the notification dated so and so". No corrigendum is issued in such a case.
18. Now in the reported case, as in the notification land measuring 19 Kanals 12 Marlas was omitted to be mentioned, the corrigendum, in partial modification of the notification, was issued in order to add the said 19 Kanals 12 Marias to the land measuring 265 Kanals 18 Marlas already acquired by the notification. There can, therefore, be no question that the corrigendum was a notification which superseded the notification already issued under section 4 of the Act in the matter and the material date for the purpose of compensation would be the date of corrigendum. It may be observed that while the Court is to interpret a statutory provision or a legal document, its duty would be to show the intention at work behind the statutory provision or the legal document. If error is committed unintentionally and in good faith, the same can be corrected by way of corrigendum.
By going through the wording of the corrigendum, it is clear that the authorities had intended to acquire the land from the date of notification already issued under section 4 of the Act. The corrigendum, in so far as relevant, may be reproduced :- "In partial modification of this office notification under section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued vide Endorsement No, 1263-70/ ,Revenue dated 14-6-1981 following additions are made in the above notification on the request of Military Estates Officer Hazara Circle Abbottabad contained in Letter No, GC/Land/49/PMA/II, dated 2-3-1982."
19. The expression "In partial modification of this office notification" is obvious to show that the notification was not cancelled, the moreso as It was stated that following additions are made in the above notification. The corrigendum was thus in the nature of addendum to the notification.
The power to do so is conferred on the authorities and in this behalf reference may be made to section 21 of the General Clauses Act, reproduced earlier hereinbefore, which, inter alia, provides that "where by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notification is conferred then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner if any to add, to any notification".
The upshot of the above discussion is that on the view of the matter that we take, we hold that the material date for the purpose of compensation in respect of the acquired land would be the date of the notification issued under section 4 of the Act in each of these cases. As evidence on the record of each case is sufficient for just decision, we direct that let these appeals be fixed before a Division Bench for disposal on merit and according to law.