DECISION This is an appeal filed by Glaxo Laboratories (Pak). Ltd. Employees Union, Karachi, against the impugned order, dated 29-3-1983, passed by the Sind Labour Court No.V, Karachi, who had dismissed an application under section 34, I.R.O., 1969, submitted before it by the appellant union.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant union which is the C. B. A. Filed an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, espousing the cause of the workers that the respondent-establishment be directed to pay them overtime wages for the work done over and above normal working hours of the factory at twice the ordinary rate of pay with retrospective effect after calculating the hourly rate of wages of the employees on the basis of their daily normal working hours and further for the payment of compensation for withholding the overtime wages for the last several years. That every worker is performing his duty assigned to him and that they are doing the overtime beyond the normal working hours and were being compelled to stay for overtime till late hours. That the workers doing work over and above the daily normal working hours be treated as overtime and the workers be paid their overtime wages at twice the ordinary rate of pay under section 47 of the Factories Act for the work done in excess of their actual normal working hours, while the respondent-establishment were paying overtime wages arbitrarily to the workers only at the ordinary rate of pay and not twice the ordinary rate of pay for the work done in excess of normal working hours upto 9 hours a day and/or in excess of 48 hours a week.
That any work taken from the workers over and above the normal hours of the respondent-factory, is an overtime work and the workers ,are always entitled to claim "extra pay for overtime" under section 47 of the Factories Act, means twice the ordinary rate of pay for the work done in excess of the normal working hours of the factory. That the appellant union was making demands from time to time but the respondent-establishment paid no heed to it, therefore, it sent a letter, dated 9-2- 1981 to the respondent-- establishment and made this demand but the respondent-establishment refused to accept the claim of the workers by their latters, dated 25-2-1981, hence, the appellant union filed an application before the learned Labour Court under section 34 of I.R.O., 1969.
3. The respondent-establishment resisted the claim of the appellant union on the ground that an application under section 34 of the I.R.O., 1969 of the appellant union was not maintainable as it has got no right guaranteed or secured to it under any law, award or settlement to enforce their alleged claim under section 34, I.R.0. , 1969 and that the claim of the appellant union was not covered or regulated by section 47 of the Factories. Act, 1934 and further that the claim of the union was barred by the collectively bargained settlement, dated 7-9-1980 arrived at between the C. B. A.
Appellant Union and the respondent-- establishment. That the continuous past practice of payment of overtime at single rete of work done for less than 9 hours a day or 48 hours a week was existing in the respondent-establishment and it had become a condition of service of the workers in the respondent-establishment, therefore, no cause of action accrued to the union for justifying its demand and that the application was barred by limitation.
4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits-in-evidence and they were duly cross-examined before the learned Labour Court. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has dismissed the application of the appellant union, hence this appeal.
5. I have heard Rasheed Ahmad, the learned Advocate for the appellant-union and Mr. S.Qamaruddin Hassan, the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent-establishment and have carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case.
6.Mr.S.Qamaruddin Hassan, the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent-establishment has contended that as the appellant union has got no right guaranteed or secured to it under any law, award, or settlement to enforce their alleged claim under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, or under section 47 of the Factories Act, 1934, therefore, the present application under section 34, I.R.0_ 1969, was not maintainable in Law. In this respect, Mr. Qamaruddin Hassan has relied upon a decision of this Tribunal dated 8-9-1985, in Appeal No. Kar-54 of 1984 in the case of Messrs Shamsi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Shamsi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. Workers Union and also on a Full Bench Authority, reported in 1984 PLC 1359, wherein it was contemplated that workers themselves may file their grievance application under section 25-A or 25-A(10) of I.R.O., 1969, and an application under section 34 would not apply in case of individual workers. Section 34 (as amended by Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1973), and section 25-A, object of omitting word 'work man' from the provisions of section 34, seems to be that in section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969, right has been given to workman to seek redress of his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or by any award or settlement in the manner provided therein.
Section 34 of I.R.O., 1969 is relevant to be re-produced hereunder:- "agent or any employer may apply to the Labour Court for enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award of settlement."
7. In nustshell, it contemplates that only Collective Bargaining Agent or Employer can apply to the Labour Court for enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to him or to it by or under any law or any award or settlement and not to the workman. So, section 34. I. R.O., 1969, does not apply where workman is agitating his own case or the case of other workman. He can only agitate under section 25-A or under section 25-A(10) of I.R.O 1969. In the instant case, the appellant union which the C.B.A. Union in the respondent-establish menu is agitating the cause of individual workmen under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance; 1969. Thus, as it could not do so. Therefore, an application of the appellant union, under section 34, I.R.O., 1969, was not maintainable and liable to be dismissed.
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that I maintain the impugned order and would dismiss this present appeal.