DECISION Tills is an appeal against an order of the learned First Labour Court, Karachi, dated July 13, 1971, whereby the learned Court ordered the appellant to pay one month's notice pay and four months' wages as gratuity. The facts giving rise to the appeal briefly put are these.
2. The respondent, Noor Gul, was employed as a Driver by the appellant-Company. It is alleged by the respondent that he received a letter on 15th March 1971, from the Personnel Officer of the Company that his service had been terminated with effect from 15th March 1971. On the other hand, the cast of the appellant-Company that the respondent had submitted his resignation on 15th March 1971, which was accepted by the Company by a letter of the same date. The respondent claimed that he did not resign and, therefore, he was entitled to re-instatement or in the alternative for the payment of his legal dues, that is. Earned Wags, Notice Pay, Gratuity, Leave Dues, etc, The learned Court having come to the conclusion; that the respondent had not resigned from service held that his services could not be deemed to have been terminated on 15th March 1971, and therefore, he was entitled to Notice Pay and other dues, as already stated above.
3. Mr. S. P. Lodhi for the respondent has taken a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal. He contended that the impugned order was not an award and, therefore, no appeal lay under section 37(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance).
Subsection (3) of section 37 of the Ordinance reads as under :- "Any party aggrieved by an award given under subsection (1), may prefer an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal within thirty days of the delivery thereof and the decision of the Tribunal in such appeal shall be final."
4. In this connection, it would be also necessary to refer to subsection (4) of section 37 of the Ordinance. Under sub--section (4) of section 37 of the Ordinance, "all decisions of a Labour Court, other than awards referred to in subsection (3) of the section shall be final and shall not be called in question in any manner by or before any Court or other authority". The contention of Mr. Lodhi, relying on subsection (4) of section 37 of the Ordinance, was that the impugned order being a decision no appeal lay.
5. Award is defined under section 1 of the Ordinance co mean the determination by a Labour Court of any industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes an interim award. The impugned order, it was submitted, in order to be an award, must be a determination of any industrial dispute. In--dustrial dispute is defined under the Ordinance to mean, "any dis--pute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person." Mr. Lodhi, relying on the case of Abbas Ali Shah v. West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore and 2 others (1970 PLD 373), contended that the dispute in order to be an industrial dispute must be between workmen and employers. An individual dispute with the employers cannot be an industrial dispute. It is true it was so held by the Appellate Tribunal.
6. Mr. M. A. Khan, the learned Representative for the appellant contended that the impugned order is an award. In this connection, it will be necessary to refer to the provision of section 34 of the Ordinance, as it stood at the the when Abbas Ali Shah's case was decided. One of the points for determination in Abbas Ali Shah's case was as to whether an individual could make an application under section 34 of the Ordinance. Section 34 of the Ordinance prior to its amendment on 16th October 1970, mad as under:- "Any party to an industrial dispute relating to a matter arising out of any right guaranteed or secured to an employee or workman by or under any law for the the being in force or an award or settlement may apply to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute."
7. It was contended in Abbas Ali Shah's case that the phrase "any party" is wide enough to include an individual workman and that the word "workmen" in the definition of industrial dispute also included the singular, read with section 13 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
8. Section 34 of the Ordinance was amended, after the decision of Abbas Ali Shah's case and was published in the Gazette, Extraordinary on October 17, 1970. The amended section 34 of the Ordinance reads as under :- "Any collective bargaining agent or any employer or workman may apply to the Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement."
9. Under section 34 of the Ordinance, as it now stands, an individual workman has also a right to apply to the Court for enforcement of the right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement. Mr. M. A. Khan submitted that in order to avail of the remedy provided under section 34 of the Ordinance a person must be a workman within the meaning of the definition of "workman" given under sec--tion 1 (xxviii) of the Ordinance. It reads as under :- "'workman' mean any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and, for the purpose of any proceedings under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid of or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal discharge, retrenchment, lay of, or removal has led to that dispute."
10. On an analysis of the above definition, it, would appear that it covers the case both of a workman, who is to employment and also who has been dismissed from service. Mr. Khan laid emphasis on the phrase "for the purpose of any proceedings under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute". His submission was that unless the proceedings under the present section 34 of the Ordinance can be said to be an industrial dis--pute, the respondent cannot claim to be a workman. In other words, it was submitted by Mr. Khan that it is the dismissal or discharge of the respondent which has led to the industrial dis--pute in the shape of an application under section 34 of the Ordinance. In the result, it was contended that after the amend--ment of section 34 of the Ordinance, whereby a workman was given a right to make an application under section 34 of the Ordinance the word "workman" in the definition of industrial dispute should include the singular. It was urged that those who amended section 34 of the Ordinance were aware of the current law and yet amended section 34 of the Ordinance, so as to confer a right on a workman to make an application for enforcement of his right under section 34 of the Ordinance. In order that a person maybe a workman within the meaning of section 34 of the Ordinance, he has to conform to the definition of section 1(xxviii) of the Ordinance. It is not every dismissed or discharged person who can be said to be a workman within the meaning of section 1 (xxviii) of the Ordinance. A person who had been dismissed or discharged from service can be said to be a workman only if he has raised an industrial dispute and not otherwise. If the application under section 34 of the Ordinance amounts to raising an industrial dispute, the decision thereon would be an award.
It. It would be useful to refer to the observation of Lord Blackburn, while disposing of the submission of Mr. M. A. Khan in the case of H. Young 8c Company v. The Mayor and Corpora--tion of Royal Leamington S.P.A. (1883 A C 517 The relevant observation reads as under :- "We ought in general, in construing an Act of Parliament, to assume that the Legislature knows the existing state of the law; and in the present case I have no doubt that in fact those who prepared the Act of 1875 knew of the differences of opinion that had been expressed, and really intended to pro--vide that those difficulties should not arise with respect to the urban authorities they were creating. I think, bearing in mind this, it is not possible to construe sec--tion 174 as meaning anything else than that when the subject--matter of a contract exceeds --50 in value the contract must be under seal ; and that the distinctions and differences which, according to the opinions of the Court of Queen's Bench might dispense with a seal in the case of an ordinary corporation should not do so when the contract was by an urban authority, and related to a subject-matter above that value."
12. Keeping in view the above observation of Lord Black--burn, I have come to the conclusion that those who have amended section 34 of the Ordinance knew the interpretation given by the Appellate Tribunal, which is the final authority; so far as the awards of the Labour Courts are concerned, that workmen in the definition of industrial dispute did not include workman; conferred a specific right under section 34 of the Ordinance on a workman to apply therein for enforcement of his right. The intention of those who amended section 34 of the Ordinance to include a workman appears to be that. The word "workmen" in the definition of industrial dispute should also include 'the singular, i.e. Workman. If I were to hold that workmen does not include the singular within the meaning of section 13 of the General Clauses Act, it will render the amended section 34 of the Ordinance to be futile. No dismissed or discharged workman would be able to take advantage of the right conferred on him under section 34 of the Ordinance, as be would not be a workman within the meaning of its definition.
13. Mr. Lodhi had contended that if an application under section 34 of the Ordinance is made by a Collective Bargaining Agent, the decision thereon by the Labour Court would be an award, but not, if an individual workman were to apply under the said provision. It is difficult to understand the reasoning of Mr. Lodhi that if a Collective Bargaining Agent applies under section 34 of the Ordinance, the decision by the Court would be an award, while if an individual workman applies under the very provision it will be only a decision. This concession of Mr. Lodhi also supports the contention of Mr. Khan that the deter--mination of the dispute under section 34 of the Ordinance would be an award.
14. The right conferred on the workman under section 34 of the Ordinance is a very valuable right.
The definition of industrial dispute and that of workman must be so read together that it does not deprive the worker of his right specifically conferred on him by the amendment of section 34 of the Ordinance in October 1970. Rule of Interpretation of Statute also is that different provisions of an enactment must be so read together that it is beneficial to the subject rather than otherwise. The Industrial Relations Ordinance has a bias in favour of the worker. The different provisions of the enactment must be so read together that it is most beneficial to the worker.
15. I would hold, for the reasons given above, that the determination of the application under section 34 of the Ordinance by the Labour Court is an award. The appeal now to come up for arguments on merit.
16. Considering the importance of the point raised by Mr. Lodhi, I had asked the Registrar to issue notice to the Representatives who usually appear for the Labour and for the Management. Of all those who appeared to assist me Mr. Fakharuddin Farooqi supported Mr. Lodhi and the rest of the Representatives were for the proposition that the determination of the dispute under section 34 of the Ordinance is an award. While disposing of the preliminary objection I would like to express my appreciation of the assistance given by the learned Representative, who addressed me.