MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE, J.-.One Murad Khan, son of Kalloo, was the owner of agricultural land in village Gadi, Tehsil Nuh, District Gurgaon. Umar Khan, son of Murad Khan, migrated to Pakistan and filed Claim Form No. 4673 for the land owned by his father in India. The claim was duly verified in the name of said Murad Khan and in lieu thereof Umar Khan petitioner got allotment of land.
Subsequently in 1952, mutation of inheri--tance of Murad Khan was sanctioned in favour of Umar Khan petitioner alone being his son. In 1962, the Director of Enforcement lodged a complaint for cancellation of allotment of the land frauduently obtained by Umar Khan. The case was taken up by Ch. Muhammad Hassan, Deputy Settlement Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore, as a delegatee of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The allegation was that the said Murad Khan never migrated to Pakistan and that his other son and daughters were still fin India as Indian Nationals. Umar Khan petitioners contested the proceedings and contended that his father Murad Khan died during Partition while coming over to Pakistan and his mother was also killed during the disturbances and he being the only son and legal heir of the deceased right-- holder, rightly filed the claim form in respect of the agricultural land abandoned by his father in India and secured allotment of land as his legal heir. He denied that his father was still in India and that he had other heirs also who were in India. After recording the evidence of the parties, the learned Deputy Settlement Commissioner came to the conclusion that Murad Khan died in India leaving behind two sons Umar Khan petitioner and Umroo and three daughters Umri, Ghogari and Runniout of whom only Umer Khan migrated to Pakistan while the others were still in Iadia as Indian Nationals and as such Umar Khan was entitled to be compensated only to the extent of his own share i.e. 2/7th in the property owned by his father Murad Khan. It was accordingly ordered that mutation of inheritance of Murad Khan be reviewed and allotment to the extent of 2/7th share of Murad Khan be allowed to remain intact and the balance cancelled which should be allotted to the deserving claimants. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order the petitioner challenged the same before this Court through the present Settlement Revision.
2. Mr. Azim-ud-Din, the learned counsel for the petitioner, raised a technical plea that Ch. Muhammad Hassan, Deputy Settle--ment Commissioner, West Pakistan, was not delegated any power under sections 10 and 11 of the Land Settlement Act by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and, therefore, the impugned order was liable to be quashed having been passed without lawful authority. On behalf of the Settlement Department, Mr. Maqbool Elahi Malik referred to pages 487 and 488 of Latif's book (1970 Edition) where is specifically mentioned that Ch. Muhammad Hassan, Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Land), West Pakistan, had been duly delegated these powers by the Chief Settlement Commissioner vide Memo. No. 5703-1--Ad-Reh/64, dated 21-10-1964. Mr. Azim-ud-Din after this did not press this plea and argued the case on merits.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the validity of the delegation of the powers by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in favour of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. His argument is that at the time when the proceedings started and later, on 21-10-1964 when powers under sections 10 and 11 of the Act were delegated to Ch. Muhammad Hassan, the Chief Settlement Commissioner had the power of review under section 20 (1) and (2) which were then in force. If, therefore, he had not delegated this power and instead, himself had exercised the same, the petitioner had the right of review before him. He further contends that finality to an order under the Act can be attained under section 22 subject to the provisions of Chapter VI which includes section
20. In other words, his argument is, that an order passed under the Land Settlement Act can attain finality under section 22 only when remedies under Chapter VI are exhausted. If the power under section 10 was exercised by the Chief Settlement Commissioner himself, he had the power to review that order under section 20 and after the review this order would have become final under section 22. It is argued that powers exercised by a delegatee of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under sections 10 and 11 of the Act cannot be reviewed either by the Chief Settlement Commissioner himself or by his delegatee. The Chief Settlement Commissioner cannot review this kind of order passed by his delegatee because such order cannot be said to have been passed by himself or by his predecessor-in office. Similarly, his delegatee is not competent to review because he himself is not Chief Settlement Commis--sioner and moreover this power of review under section 20 cannot be delegated, as under section 30 powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner specified in Chapter VI of the Act (which includes of section 20) cannot be delegated. The net result, according to the learned counsel, is that an order passed by a delegatee of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under sections 10 and 11 is not subject to review either by the Chief Settlement Commissioner himself or by his delegatee. On this reasoning the learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the effect of delegation is as if the provision relating to review contained in section 20 has been deleted. This, according to him, the Chief Settlement Commissioner was not competent to do, because this is the function of the Legislature alone. On this premises his argument is that the Chief Settlement Commissioner alone could exercise the powers under sections 10 and 11 and not his delegatee. We do not find any substance in this argument. The relevant portion of subsection (2) of section 30, which, authorises the Chief Settlement Commissioner to delegate his functions, is reproduced below:-- "The Chief Settlement Commissioner may delegate all or any of his functions under this Act to any other Settle--ment Authority except the powers specified in Chapter VI of the Act."
Thus the Chief Settlement Commissioner is empowered to delegate any of his functions or powers under the Act and sections 10 and 11 being under the Act and being one of his functions, he delegat--ed the same in favour of Ch. Muhammad Hassan, Deputy Settlement Commissioner.
Even before the amendment of section 20 of the Act, section 30 was intact and had not so far been amended. The plain reading of this subsection makes it clear that there is no restriction imposed upon the Chief Settlement Commissioner to delegate his functions except the powers specified in Chapter VI of the Act. He can delegate all or any of such functions under the Act. It is no provided under this subsection that he cannot delegate his functions under sections 10 and 11 and these sections are not in Chapter VI of the Act. Since the Legislature has not imposed any limitation for not delegating his powers or functions under sections 10 and 11, we cannot restrict its meaning and read some thing into it which does not exist there. The language used in this subsection is plain and simple and leaves no room for any doubt for its meaning that no restriction has been imposed upon the Chief Settlement Commissioner to delegate his functions or powers under sections 10 and
11. The intention of the Legislature, therefore, appears to be quite clear and should be given effect to. Since subsection (2) of section 30 exists in the Statute from the very beginning when section 20 was intact and Chief Settlement Commissioner enjoyed powers of review, it can safely be presume that the Legislature knew that by delegating the powers under sections 10 and 11, the aggrieved party would be deprived of it right of review under section 20. The Legislature, therefore, while enacting section 30 must be conscious of the effect of delega--tion under sections 10 and 11 of the Act. If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner be accepted then we will have to read this clause differently as if the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to delegate are limited to such matters only as are not reviewable by him under section 20(1), but no such limitation has been placed by subsection (2) of section 30 The only exception under this subsection is the power as specified in Chapter VI of the Act but sections 10 and 11 are not in that Chapter. Although there is no other limitation prescribed by the Legislature in the Act yet if the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, this exception will be extended beyond Chapter VI. We accordingly hold that the delegation of powers by the Chief Settlement Commissioner under sections 10 and 11 was valid and no exception can be taken to the same.
4. As regards the merits, the learned counsel for the petitioner half-heartedly tried to argue that Umar Khan petitioner was the only heir to succeed his father Murad Khan. The evidence produced against him is not of interested witnesses. It is an admitted fact that Umroo, son of Murad Khan, along with his wife visited Pakistan as Indian National on passport issued by the Indian authorities.
The argument of the petitioner that this Umroo was not his real brother but somebody else, having the same parentage, is not convincing. It is possible that the name of the father may be similar, but we are otherwise convinced that the petitioner has failed o establish his case. If he had no brother and sisters living in India, he should have produced different evidence to establish his case. He has not produced any respect--ables from his own village, like Lambardar or any other relation, to support his case. If he was the only son of his father, there was no difficulty to establish the same. In our opinion, he has failed to prove the same. Moreover, this being the pure question of evidence, it is not for this Court to set aside such a finding of fact especially when it is based upon the evidence placed on the B record. It cannot be said that on the material placed, the learned Deputy Settlement Commissioner could not reasonably come to that finding. In the circumstances, we see no justification to set aside that finding of fact.
5. For the foregoing reasons, we find no substance in this Settlement Revision and dismiss the same with no order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.