DECISION This is an appeal filed by Pakistan Railways, Karachi, against an impugned order, dated 29-11-1984, passed by the Sind Labour Court No. II, Karachi, who had allowed the grievance petition of the respondent under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969.
2. Briefly stated the facts are that the respondent was a permanent employee of the appellant Railways and as a criminal case was registered against him under section 409, P.P.C. And section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act on the allegation of corruption during the course of the employment in the appellant Railways, therefore, the respondent was placed under a suspension, initially for three months on 15-10-1981 under the provisions of Railway Servants Efficiency and Discipline Rules. That after more than 5 months from the date of initial suspension, a charge-sheet was issued to the respondent on 31-5-1982 and it was promptly replied by the respondent on 5-6- 1982. That, since thereafter, neither the respondent was taken on duty nor any domestic enquiry was instituted against him, but he was unauthorisedly and illegally kept under suspension for an indefinite period. That, as the appellant Railways did not need to any of his representation against his illegal suspension for an indefinite period, therefore, the respondent had served grievance notice upon the appellant Railways on 19-10-1983 and thereafter submitted his grievance petition before the learned Labour Court.
3. The case of the appellant Railways before the learned Labour Court was that as the cause of action accrued to the respondent on 15-10-1981, but the respondent instead of filing the grievance notice within the statutory period of three months, had filed the same on 19-10-1983, i.e. After a period of 2 years, therefore, his grievance petition before the Labour Court was not maintainable on its being time-barred. On merits, it was the case of the appellant Railways that the respondent was working as a Senior Commercial Assistant (Parcel) at Karachi Cantonment Station and that on a complaint from Messrs Central Television Corporation, Karachi to the Railway Police, Karachi, a criminal case was registered against the respondent under F.I.R. No.57/81 on 26-5-1981 under section 409, P.P.C. Read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the respondent was arrested on bail as intimated by the A.I.-G. Crime, P.R.P., Lahore, therefore, the respondent was put under suspension and that as the criminal proceedings were still pending against the respondent, therefore, the Rules do not permit to take the respondent back on duty at the stage specially when the case was pending trial in the competent Court of Law. That as no final decision has been taken against the respondent, therefore, his grievance petition being premature was liable to be dismissed.
4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits-in-evidence and they were duly cross-examined.
As both the parries restricted themselves only on the legal issues, therefore, the learned Labour Court by rejecting the objections of the appellant Railways, had directed them to re-instate the respondent in service, with full back benefits, hence, this appeal.
5. I have heard Mr. Chaudhry Rasheed Ahmad, the learned Advocate for the appellant Railways and Mr. Khalid Javed, the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent and have also perused the record and proceedings of the case. The only legal points to be determined in the present appeal are that, firstly, whether a grievance petition against a suspension order is maintainable or not; and secondly, whether it is within time or not? It was contended by Mr. Choudhry Rasheed Ahmad, the learned Advocate for the appellant Railways that no grievance petition is maintainable against the order of suspension inasmuch as it is not a penalty and further the Law has given a right to the employer to suspend an employee who is found guilty of subversion, corruption or misconduct and since the respondent was found guilty of corruption, he was placed under suspension by the competent authority, initially for a period of three months on 15-10-1981, therefore, unless a final penalty is imposed upon the respondent, he could not maintain the grievance petition under section 25-A , I. R. O., 1969. I see no force in this contention of the appellant Railways. It has been argued by Mr. Khalid Javed, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent that if suspension of an employee is not in accordance with the provisions of law and is illegal, then, the Labour Court has ample power to entertain a grievance petition against the same and to scrutinize its legality and validity. He submitted that according to the provisions of Railway Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, a Railway servant, accused of subversion, corruption or misconduct can be placed under suspension with the approval of the competent authority initially for a period of three months, then, an approval of the competent authority is mandatory after every three months, but, in the case of the present respondent there is nothing on record to indicate that the approval of the authority had been obtained, at any time, after the expiry of initial suspension for three months, vide order, dated 15-10-1981 and in view of this legal position and the circumstances, the suspension of the respondent beyond the period of three months from the date of initial order, without the approval of the authority for its continuance is illegal and invalid. In support of his contention, Mr. Khalid Javed had placed reliance on a case reported in 1983 PLC at page 808, wherein it was held that 'since no order of extension of suspension was obtained from the authority, the suspension became illegal on the expiry of three months and was set aside'. I, therefore, hold that the learned Labour Court had rightly held that the respondent could not be deemed to be under suspension after expiry of the initial period of three months and was entitled to be re- instated in service with full back benefits after expiry of the initial three months and was also entitled to maintain his grievance petition under section 25-A, I. R.O. , 1969.
6. It was next contended by Mr. Choudhry Rasheed Ahmad, the learned Advocate for the appellant Railways that the respondent was suspended vide order, dated 15-10-1981 and he neither submitted the grievance notice within the statutory period of three months nor filed the grievance petition in Court within five and half months as provided in Law, therefore, his petition was hopelessly time-barred. Again, I see no force in this contention of Mr. Choudhry Rasheed Ahmad.
On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Khalid Javed, the learned counsel for the respondent that having been placed under suspension, a continuing cause of action had accrued to the respondent inasmuch as suspension is a continuing wrong and every day during the suspension had given a fresh cause of action. The respondent was continuously perusing the matter with the Railways authorities and had moved several applications wherein he had requested for withdrawal of the order of suspension and for his being allowed to resume his normal duties and then, having failed to get redressal of the grievance, he served a grievance notice upon the appellant Railways on 19-10-1983 and thereafter a grievance petition was submitted before the learned Labour Court on 10-11-1983, therefore, the petition of the respondent was well within time. In support of his contentions, Mr. Khalid Javed has placed reliance on the case reported in 1983 PLC 596 and the other case at page 808, wherein it was held by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal that 'suspension is a continuing wrong and every day during the continuity of suspension gives a fresh cause of action to the aggrieved party'. I fully agree with the contention of Mr. Khalid Javed and, therefore, hold that in these circumstances of the case, the grievance notice, dated 19-10-1983 served upon the appellant Railways by the respondent and the grievance petition, dated 10-11-1983, submitted before the learned Labour Court, could not be deemed to be time-barred and were within the statutory period given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
7. For the reasons, stated by me above, I see no reasons to interfere with the impugned order. I would maintain the same and dismiss this appeal. The respondent is directed to be re-instated in service forthwith with full back benefits.
M.Y.H./897/Lb.