1. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.-This appeal by the West Pakistan Bar Council Tribunal by special leave is from the order of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court allowing the respondent's writ petition and holding that the order of interim suspension of the licence of the respondent to practise as an Advocate passed by the West Pakistan Bar Council Tribunal constituted under the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1965 (hereinafter called 'the Act'), is without lawful authority.
2. The facts leading up to the passing of the impugned order of the interim suspension are as follows The respondent, Mr. Yusuf A.I Khan, was enrolled as Advocate of the West Pakistan High Court on the 11th April 1966, and his name was accordingly entered in the Roll of Advocates of the West Pakistan Bar Council under section 23(i)(b) of the Act.
3. On the 17th December 1968, the respondent was convicted in two cases, namely, Criminal Original Nos. 150 and 205 of 1968, by a Division Bench of the then High Court of West Pakistan at Lahore for contempt of Court under Article 123 of the 1962-Constitution read with section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
4. The High Court sent a copy of the judgment in Criminal Original No. 150 of 1968 to the West Pakistan Bar Council to consider whether in the interest of litigant public, the respondent is a fit person to continue to remain on the Rolls of the Bar Council as an Advocate'. This reference was made under section 36(6) of the Act. Two appeals filed before this Court by the respondent from the aforesaid two orders of conviction for contempt were dismissed on the 7th May 1970. This Court also dismissed the review application filed by the respondent from the orders of the Court dismissing the said two appeals.
5. On the 21st April 1971, the Advocate-General of the then Province of West Pakistan (as Chairman of the Council) made an application under Rule 51 of the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1969, asking for the suspension of the respondent's licence to practice as an Advocate pending the inquiry against him, and in consequence the licence was suspended by the Tribunal on the 28th December 1971, after having con--sidered the written reply of the respondent and after having heard him. There was no appeal from this interim order of the Tribunal to the Disciplinary Committee although Rule 51 of the said Rules provided for such appeal. Instead the respondent filed a Constitution Petition before the Lahore High Court from the aforesaid order of the Tribunal suspending his licence and the petition was admitted for hearing on the 14th January 1972 and it was ultimately heard and allowed by a Full Bench of the Court. On the 17th January 1972, the respondent made a miscellaneous application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for appointment of an amicus curiae and the application was allowed and Mr. Farooq Hassan, Advocate was appointed as, an amicus curiae.
6. The Tribunal in question consisted of 'Mr. Justice Abdul Qadir Sheikh as its Chairman and Messrs Abid Hassan Minto arid Dost Muhammad Khan Awan, Advocates as its two Members; the two last named having been elected under section 5(1)(c) of the Act.
7. The Full Bench of the High Court allowed the respondent's Constitution petition on the following three grounds :---
(1) That the West Pakistan Bar Council Tribunal was not validly constituted because after the dissolution of the West Pakistan Province it could not be presided over by Mr. Justice Abdul Qadir Sheikh who had become a Judge of Sind --Baluchistan High Court ;
(2) that the two members of the Tribunal were not approved by the High Court ; and
(3) That after dissolution of the West Pakistan Province there was no Advocate-General, West Pakistan and so no notice was served on him as required under section 38 of the Act.
8. The Full Bench accordingly found that the Tribunal had no lawful authority to pass the order impugned before the High Court and declared it to be without lawful effect.
9. Leave was granted to consider whether the omission on the part of the High Court to take notice of Article 19 read with Articles 15 and 17(4) of the Province of West Pakistan (Dissolu--petition) Order (President's Order No. 1 of 1970) has affected the decision of the Court.
10. It has been contended before us by Mr. Kamal Mustafa Bokhari, Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab, appearing on behalf of the appellant, that the learned Judges of the High Court totally failed to take notice of Article 19 of President's Order No. 1 of 1970 which has preserved the continuation of the existing laws including the Act with the necessary adaptations to be made by the President and failing him by the Tribunal concerned. It has also been submitted that the existence of the said Tribunal and its functions have been maintained and continued under Article 15 of the said Order.
11. The relevant provisions of President's Order No. 1 of 1970 are as follows :- "15. Other Courts.-Subject to the provisions of this Order and any order of the competent authority, all civil, criminal and revenue Courts, and all tribunals established under law, which were exercising jurisdictions and functions in the Province of West Pakistan immediately before the appointed day shall, as from that day, continue to exercise their respective jurisdictions and functions and all persons holding office in such Courts or Tribunals shall continue to hold their respective offices.
12. 17(4). Unless otherwise directed by the competent authority, all authorities and officers, judicial, executive and ministerial, exercising jurisdictions and functions immediately before the appointed day shall, as from that day, continue to exercise their respective jurisdiction and functions.
19. Continuation and adaptation of existing law.-(1) Except as expressly provided by or under this Order all existing laws shall continue in force, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, until altered, repealed or amended by the appropriate Legislature or other competent authority.
(2) For the purpose of bringing the provisions of any existing law into accord with the provisions of this Order, in relation to laws in the Central legislative field; the President and in relation to other laws, the Governor of the Province concerned, may by order, make such adaptations, whether by way of modification, addition or omission, as he may deem necessary or expedient, and any order so made shall, unless otherwise provided therein take effect or be deemed to have taken effect on the appointed day.
(3) Any Court, tribunal or authority required or empowered to enforce an existing law shall, notwithstanding that no actual adaptations have been made in such law by an order made under clause (2), construe the law with all such adaptations as are necessary to bring it into accord with the provisions of this Order.
13. Explanation.-In this article, 'existing law' means any Act, Ordinance, Order, Rule, regulation, bye-law, notification or other legal instrument which, immediately before the appointed day, had the force of - law in the whole or any part of `the Province of West Pakistan whether or not it had been brought into operation."
14. It is thus evident that the West Pakistan Bar Councils Act has been preserved with the necessary adaptations and the con--stitution of the West Pakistan Bar Council Tribunal and its functioning thereunder, too, have been preserved and continued. Article 19 read with Articles 15 and 17(4) makes this absolutely clear and it is indeed unfortunate that Article 19 which was the main Article for the purpose of deciding the issue was not at all brought to the notice of the High Court.
15. The respondent who has appeared in person has -sought to negative this contention on the ground that inasmuch as Articles 12 and 13 of President's Order No. 1 of 1970 have preserved the existence and continued functioning of certain Corporations, namely, Water and Power Development Authority and West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation, and as no such provision has been made in regard to the West Pakistan Bar Council, Article 19 which is a general provision, has no application to the said Bar Council.
16. The language of Article 19 of the President's Order No. 1 of 1970 is quite clear. As there is no express provision by or under the President's Order No. 1 in regard to the Act, the Act shall continue in force, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, until altered, repealed or amended by the appropriate Legislature or other competent authority. It is no body's case that the Act has been so repealed or amended. Sub-Article (3) of Article 19 also clearly authorizes any Court, Tribunal or Authority required or empowered to enforce an existing law, to make the necessary adaptations while enforcing an existing law. Besides, it may be pointed out that Water and Power Develop-- ment Authority and West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation, which had till then been under the Provincial Government, were brought under the Central Government by President's Order No. 1 of 1970 after the dissolution of the Province of West Pakistan. No such change was contemplated for the West Pakistan Bar Council. We, accordingly, hold that the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1965, together with the Committees and Tribunals constituted there--under remain valid and their personnel as well as their function also have been validly continued.
17. The respondent, however, has contended that rule 51 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1969, which authorizes the Tribunal to order suspension of the Advocate pending enquiry against him, and whereunder the respondent Advocate's licence has been temporarily suspended pending the adjudication of the said reference to the Bar Council, is ultra vires the Act. He has argued that section 36 of the Act provides for suspension only after the Advocate concerned has been found guilty of pro--fessional or other misconduct. The Act does not provide for ad interim suspension pending the termination of the proceeding under section 36 of the Act and the finding of guilt against the Advocate concerned.
18. The relevant sections of the Act and Rule 5 framed under the Act are as follows : "Section 36. Punishment of Advocates for misconduct.-(1) An Advocate on the Provincial roll may, in the manner hereinafter provided, be reprimanded, suspended or removed from practice if he is found guilty of professional or other misconduct.
(2) Upon receipt of a complaint made to it by any Court or by any other person that any such Advocate has been guilty of misconduct, the Bar Council shall, if it does not summarily reject the complaint, refer the case for disposal to a Tribunal constituted under section 37 (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) and may of its own motion so refer any case in which it has otherwise reason to believe that any such Advocate has been so guilty.
19. "Section 38. Procedure in inquiries.-(1)In inquiries relating to conduct of Advocates, . The Tribunal shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed.
20. (3)(a) On completion of the enquiry the Tribunal may either dismiss the complaint or where reference to the Tribunal was made at the motion of the Provincial Bar Council, direct that the proceedings be filed; or it may make an order imposing any of the penalties referred to fn subsection (1) of section 36.
(b) Where the Tribunal makes an order for the suspension of an Advocate from practice, it shall specify the period of suspen--sion, and for that period the -Advocate shall be debarred from practising in any Court of before any authority or person in Pakistan.
21. Rule 51.-The Tribunal, after a case is referred to it, shall have power to suspend the Advocate concerned, pending enquiry against him, and to vary or rescind such order. An appeal shall lie, against an order of the Tribunal under this rule to the Disciplinary Committee of the Pakistan Bar Council within one month from the date of the order or within such extended period as the Disciplinary Committee may on sufficient cause being shown permit."
22. It is thus evident that an order of suspension can only be made after the Advocate concerned has been found guilty of misconduct. This view finds support from section 38(3)(b) of the! Act which provides that the Tribunal making an order for suspen--sion of Advocate from practice shall specify the period for suspension and for that period the Advocate shall be debarred from practising in any Court or, before any authority or person in Pakistan. On the contrary the ad interim order of suspension as passed in the present case may be continued indefinitely, until such time as the Tribunal thought fit to conclude the proceeding and make the final decision.
23. Mr. Bokhari has sought to meet this contention by Citing -the case of Sardar Shah Bokhari v. Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan (PLD 1965 SC 479), and arguing on its basis that although the provisions of section 10 of the Bar Councils Act, 1926 were similar to those of section 36 of the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1965, it was held that the High Court was competent to pass an interim order of suspension.
24. "3. (1) When a report and copy of a judgment are received under the last preceding rule, the Registrar/Deputy Registrar shall cause them to be laid, with the least possible delay, before a Bench of two Judges of the Court. The Bench may make such preliminary inquiry as it considers necessary, and, if it is of opinion that a prima facie case is made out for taking action against an Advocate, shall pass an order directing that the case be heard by a Bench of three Judges and shall call upon the Advocate-General to draw up a statement of charges against the Advocate.
25. When passing such order, the Bench may also suspend the Advocate from practice, pending the decision of the disciplinary proceedings against him.
(ii) The Bench of two Judges may issue notice to any Advocate to show cause against an enquiry being directed on the ground that the matter imputed, if true, does not constitute reasonable cause for suspension or dismissal.
(iii) If the Bench is of opinion that there is no ground for taking disciplinary action against the Advocate, its decision shall be final."
26. It was observed that subsection (4) of section f 9 of the Bar Councils Act, .1926 had preserved the force of the existing High Court Rules applicable to Advocates of the High Court `unless such a construction is. Repugnant to the context or to any provision made by or under this Act. . ..' It was common ground between the parties that no such Rules had been framed under the Bar Councils Act, 1926. It was accordingly held that Rules 3 and 4 of the High Court Rules and Orders undoubtedly gave powers to the Court to suspend the licence of an Advocate pending an enquiry against him. It was also observed that the provisions of section 10 of the Bar Councils Act, 1926 which was similar to section 36 of the Act and Rule 3 of the High Court Rules could both stand together and there was no repugnancy between them. On a consideration of the Bar Council Act of 1926 it was held that except for the enquiry stage delegated to the Bar Council the force of the High Court Rules was not detracted. The Court observed that if it was the intention of the Legislature to do away with the effect of the High Court Rule in question, one should have expected an express provision to be made accord--ingly. The Legislature must have been aware. That such a rule existed and that over the years, power had been exercised there--under by the High Court.
27. Furthermore, that the power to direct ad interim suspension of the licence, of an Advocate against whom an inquiry was pending, was really ancillary to the power of punishment, after final adjudication and therefore, the High Court should be deemed to have tat inherent power to pass such an order in an appropriate case. It was clearly in the public interest, it was observed, that such a power should be available and neither any principle nor authority had been cited to negative such an implied power. It may be mentioned here that the High Court which had the power of passing an interim order of suspen--sion of the Advocate's licence had itself provided for an elaborate procedure. It was only when a Bench of two Judges of the Court found that a prima facie case had been made out for taking action against an Advocate that the Bench might temporarily suspend the Advocate from practice pending the decision of the Disciplinary Proceedings against' him before a Bench of three Judges.
28. The case under report has no application to the facts of the present case inasmuch as it is the Tribunal constituted under the Act that has passed aft interim order of suspension under Rule 51 of the Rules framed under section 48 of the Act. There is noth--ing to show that the Tribunal arrived at any finding that a prima facie case had been established against the respondent. Section 48 only authorised the Pakistan Bar Council to frame rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. The purposes can be gathered from the provisions of the Act. Section 36 of the Act which deals with this matter of suspension speaks about making an order of suspension of the Advocate's licence only if the Advocate con--cerned is found guilt of professional misconduct. The Act no--where provides for an ad interim suspension as has been passed in the present case. No inherent power such as was attributed to the High Court can be claimed by the Bar Council, which is a creature of the Statute and must act within it. We accordingly hold that rule 51 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1969 is ultra vires and consequently the order of interim thereunder is illegal.
29. The parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal.