' This judgment will dispose of 7 appeals bearing Nos. RSA No.621/75, 121/76, 122/76, 123/76, 124/76, 125/76 and 126/76 as in all these appeals common questions of law and facts are involved.
2. The appellants/plaintiffs filed their respective suits alleging that they had paid under the contract, a portion of the sale price and according to the terms and conditions applicable to the partied, the Thal Development Authority, the respondent, was under obligation to make the trial boring; to level the land which was allotted to each of the appellants/plaintiffs within a specified period and then after fulfilling these obligations demand to pay outstanding price through instalments could be made. It was asserted that the respondent without serving any notice and acting illegally and unauthorizedly cancelled the allotment. The learned trial Judge, vide judgment, dated 24-9-1975, dismissed each of the suits recording the finding that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction in the matter in view of the Thal Development (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance XIX of 1975. The appeals filed,by the appellants/plaintiffs were also dismissed in limine vide order, dated 17-12-197.5 of the then District Judge, Mianwali. The present regular second appeals were then filed.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on Barkat Ali v. Administrator, Thal Development PLD 1978 Lah. 867 wherein the learned Judge of this Court held that:- "The rights are to be governed by the law in force when the action was commenced and change of the law during the pendency of the suit, unless purely procedural, does not affeCt its course or tenor and that section 1(2) of the Ordinance did not take away the vented rights or impair the pending action in express terms or by necessary implication."
' On the question of interpretation of section 74-A added by Ordinance XIX of 1975, the learned Judge observed as under:- ' Section 36 of Act V of 1912 and the instant section 74-A being in pair material, there was definitely a question in this case for determination by the Civil Court whether the act of the Collector in cancelling the allotment was without notice, and was thus taken not "under the Act" and whether the Civil Court was not divested of its jurisdiction to decide it."
4, Following the afore quoted view, it is evident that the Civil Court, could not have thrown out the suits on the question of jurisdiction. In each of the suits filed by the appellants, the assertion made inter alia was that notice was not given before cancelling the allotment and as such the respondent had not acted under the law. The question whether the aforesaid assertion is factually correct or not, is a separate question which will require adjudication on the basis of evidence to be led during the trial. But the suit which raises such a question cannot be thrown out without a trial.
Section 74-A introduced by Ordinance XIX of 1975 did not divest the Civil Court of its jurisdiction to determine the question of legal effect of the order of the Revenue Officer on the rights of parties before him. It was obligatory for the learned trial Court to look into the grievance of the appellants/plaintiffs in accordance with the well established principles of law.
5. For the foregoing reasons, these appeals are accepted. The judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below are set aside with the result that the suits of the appellants/plaintiffs shall stand remanded to the learned trial Court for disposal on merits in accordance with law. The respondent shall bear the costs of Appellants.