S.A. NUSRAT, J.--The judgment of the High Court, which is sought to be challenged through this petition for special leave to appeal, was passed in the background of the following facts:-
1. The disputed shops bearing Municipal No.6-7/69 and 6-7/68 situate at Toghi Road, Quetta, were transferred in favour of one Naik Muhammad. As the transfer price was not paid, a notice dated 25-1b-1966 was issued to him which was returned undelivered. Thereafter the shops were inspected by an Inspector of the Settlement Office who submitted his report dated 23-6-1970 categorically stating that no person by the name of Naik Muhammad was found to be in possession of the shops. In the circumstances, the disputed shops were put to auction on 29-5- 1974 and were transferred to Muhammad Ayub, respondent No.1. On payment of full transfer price, a document of permanent transfer was issued to him on 12-6-1974. Respondent No.1 thereafter sold these shops on 21-9-1976 to late Abdul Hakim son of Mian Muhammad and Mst. Sughran daughter of Allah Bakhsh vide mutation No.1127. Abdul Hakim, having died, is now represented by his daughters, respondents Nos.3 and 4 herein. The above purchasers, after serving a legal notice upon the petitioner, filed an ejectment application against him on 7-4-1980. The petitioner thereupon, on 21-7-1982, filed an application before the respondent No.6 stating that he was an illiterate person and was not aware of the formalities with the result that the shops were transferred to the first respondent. This application was followed by another application dated 14-9-1982 stating that the petitioner may be excused for not having filed an application in time and the time for making the application for transfer may be extended. These applications were thus made by the petitioner seeking transfer of the disputed shops in his own right.
2. On such applications, the transfer in favour of the first respondent was cancelled by the respondent No. 6 giving an opportunity to the petitioner to have the shops on payment of prescribed price by the Provincial Government vide order dated 2-10-1986. This order was challenged by the first respondent in the High Court in a constitutional petition which was allowed as per impugned judgment and hence this petition.
3. In deciding the constitutional petition, it has been found by the learned High Court that admittedly on the enforcement of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal)
Ordinance, 1974, no proceedings in respect of the disputed shops were pending before any Settlement Authorities as the applications were filed by the petitioner in 1982. In this view of the matter the only question requiring examination was whether the Member Board of Revenue, respondent No.6 herein, had any jurisdiction to reopen the case after the expiry of more than 12 years from the date of issuance of permanent transfer deed in favour of the first respondent. The learned High Court relying on section 2(2) of the above-mentioned repealing Ordinance and judgments of this Court, came to hold that the transaction of transfer in favour of the first respondent was a 'past and closed' transaction and the Member Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to cancel the final transfer standing in favour of the first respondent. As a result, the order of the Member Board of Revenue was declared to have been passed without lawful authority.
4. We heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the impugned judgment.
A reference to the two applications made by the petitioner clearly shows that he had initiated the proceedings much belatedly in 1982 and as no proceedings were admittedly pending on the repeal of the. Evacuee and Displaced Persons Laws, the Member Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to cancel the transfer which stood already finalised in favour of the first respondent. As observed by the learned High Court, the properties were put to auction after 8 years of the issuance of notice to Naik Muhammad. The judgment of the learned High Court is well considered and no further question of law arises in the matter requiring consideration. The petition has, therefore, no merits and is dismissed accordingly.