DORAB PATEL, J.-In the course of his employment with the appellant, the respondent met with an accident on 7th October 1964 and fractured his left thigh bone. He therefore filed a claim for Rs.
1,908 against the appellant under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereafter called the said Act.) This claim included a sum of Rs. 788 for medical expenses and as the amount claimed was decreed by the Commissioner, Workmen's compensation, Quetta (hereafter called the Commissioner), the appellant has filed an appeal which has now come up for hearing before me.
2. As the appellant had filed his claim before the Commis--sioner more than one year after the accident in which he had been injured, Mr. Muftakhiruddin's first submission was that the claim was the-barred under section 10 of the said Act and, in particular learned counsel appeared, to think that the Commis--sioner could have entertained the respondent's claim only if it had been supported by an application under section 5 of the limitation Act, 1908. But as the Limitation Act is applicable only to suits, appeals and applications, and as the said Act does not anywhere refer to a claim before the Commissioner as a suit. Mr. Muftakhiruddin further argued that a claim under the said. Act had to be treated as a suit for the purpose of limitation. In making this submission learned counsel implied that the Commis--sioner under the said Act was a Court, bat this is contrary both to the object and to the express provisions of the said Act. Thus section 19 expressly ousts the jurisdiction of the civil Courts with regard to claims under the said Act, whilst section 23 empowers the Commissioner to exercise the powers of a civil Court, but only for certain purposes, therefore it is clear that the Commissioner is not a Court, and a claim before him cannot be treated as a suit under the Limitation Act. I am fortified in my opinion by a judgment of the Bombay High Court in J. Hogan v. Gafur Ramzan (AIR 1934 Bom. 28) where the same view has been taken. As the Commissioner is not a Court, the appellant can succeed only if its plea of limitation is supported by section 10 of the said Act, which prescribes the manner and mode of filing claims under the said Act. Section 10, in so far as it is relevant, reads as follows: "No claim for compensation shall be entertained by a Commissioner . . . . Unless the claim is preferred before him within one year of the occurrence of the accident ---.
Provided, further, that the Commissioner may entertain and decide any claim to compensation in any case notwithstanding that . . . . . . . The claim has not been preferred, in due the as provided in this subsection, if he is satisfied that the failure was to . . . . . Prefer the claim . . . . . . . . Was due to sufficient cause."
There is nothing in the language of this section, to support the argument that a claim before a Commissioner is analogous to a suit for the purpose of limitation. On the contrary, the provision that the Commissioner can entertain a claim filed after more than one year for "sufficient cause" is inconsistent with the scheme of the Limitation Act under which suits have to be dismissed unless they are filed within the prescribed period of limitation. Not only therefore is the Limitation Act not applicable in terms to a claim under the said Act, but I see no analogy whatever such a claim and a suit in the civil Courts. Another provisions which fortifies me in my conclusion is section 30 of the said Act. This section deals with appeals against orders of the Commis--sioner, and it describes the period for filing appeals against orders of the Commissioner as a period of limitation and expressly enacts that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to appeals under the Act. The absence of any similar provision with regard to claims filed before a Commissioner is significant. In the circumstances discussed, I have no doubt that the provisions of the Limitation Act are cot applicable to section 10, which is to be construed by itself.
3. Section 10 confers discretion on the Commissioner to extend the period of limitation and the plea of the appellant in the instant case, as set out in his rejoinder, wag that he had not filed a claim within one year because he was pursuing his claim with the appellant. It is relevant to observe here that he was in the appellant's service, after his accident, therefore it was natural on his part, as an employee, not to precipitate matters but to seek relief through persuasion and negotiations as far as possible I have no doubt that such circumstances would constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of the proviso to section 10 quoted above, the more so, as to respondent was not cross.
Examined by the appellant on his contention that he had delayed filing his claim because of correspondence with the appellant. It is true that this plea is contained to his rejoinder, and in a civil suit pleadings by themselves would not constitute evidence, but as .I have held that proceedings before the Commissioner are not in the nature of a suit, the Commissioner was clearly entitled to rely on the pleadings of the parties, as he has done. In the result, not only was there evidence before him on which he could hold that the respondent had sufficient cause for his delay in filing his claim, but I agree with his view that the respondent had proved sufficient cause within the meaning of the proviso to section 10. The claim was therefore rightly entertained by him.
4. Mr. Muftakhiruddin then submitted that the amount decreed was exaggerated and not supported by evidence, and as I have pointed out, the amount decreed included a sum of Rs. 788 for expenses incurred by the respondent at the Combined Military Hospital, Quetta. As the respondent did not examine the Hospital Authorities to prove the expenses paid by him, Mr. Muftakhiruddin submitted that this item of Rs. 788 had not been proved, and that the Commissioner committed an error of law in allowing this claim. The argument assumes that the provisions of the Evidence Act are applicable to proceedings under the said Act, but as observed by Faruqui, J. In Ahmed Bros. v. Mahmoodul Hassan Khan (PLD 1965 Kar.. 83): "The Evidence Act does not apply in terms to the proceedings (under the said Act) which are of a summary nature."
I am in respectful agreement with this view, and merely because the respondent did not summon the hospital authorities to proved his payment in the manner required in a regular suit, it does not mean that the Commissioner erred in accepting his claim. The only question is whether there was evidence in support of the Commissioner's finding, and here I have to observe that the respondent has said in his evidence that he was compelled to go to the Combined Military Hospital for treatment, that he had paid Rs. 788 for his expenses in the said Hospital, and he also produced a cer4ificate of payment (Exh. P. 4). As he was not cross-examined on this statement, there was evidence before the Commissioner on which he could hold both that the respondent had been compelled to go to the said Hospital for treatment and that he had spent Rs. 788 on his treatment, therefore, I do not see how the Commissioner's finding in the respondent's favour can be set aside in an appeal under the said Act.
5. Mr. Muftakhiruddin then submitted that even if the appellant had proved that he had reasonably and properly incurred medical expenses amounting to Rs. 788 he was not entitled to recover them under subsection (1) of section 11 of the said Act. This subsection reads as follows: "11. Medical examination.-(1) Where a workman has given notice of an accident the employer shall, before the expiry of three days from the the at which service of the notice has been effected, have the workman examined free of charge by a qualified medical practitioner, and the workman shall submit himself for such examination, and any workmen who is in receipt of a half-monthly payment under this Act, shall, if so required, submit himself for such examination from the to the Provided that a workman not examined free of charge as aforesaid may get himself examined by a qualified medical practitioner and the expenses of such medical examination shall be reimbursed to the workman by the employer: This subsection is attracted only when a. Workman has to be examined by a medical practitioner selected by the employer. But, in the instant case, as the respondent had been examined by the appellant's doctor, the section has no relevance to learned counsel's argument. When I pointed this out to learned counsel, he submitted that his case was supported by the proviso quoted above.
According to Mr. Muftakhiruddin, the proviso conferred a right on the workman to recover the expenses of a medical examination only in cases where the employer had failed to have him examined, therefore it barred him from recovering the expenses of medical treatment from his employer, except when the employer had refused to give him medical treatment. But the proviso refers to the charges of a medical examination and not of medical treatment, and if the Legislature had intended to bar the workman's right to recover the expenses of medical treatment reasonably incurred by him, it would have done so by appropriate language. There is no ambiguity in the proviso, and I see no reason to construe the words "medical examination" to mean "medical treatment". Additionally, the proviso to subsection (D) of section 4 expressly refers to medical treatment, therefore it is clear that the Legislature was aware of the difference between the expenses of medical treatment and the expenses of a medical examination. The reference to the expenses of a medical examination in the proviso to section 11 is thus deliberate, and the proviso refers-only to the expenses of a medical examination and not of medical treatment. Learned counsel's argument is frivolous.
7. The Learned counsel's next submission was that sections 3 and 4 specify the relief to which a workman is entitled under the said Act and as they do not contain any provisions for the payment to a workman of the expenses of medical treatment such a claim is barred under the said Act. The argument is contrary to the practice of the Courts (See a judgment of Waheeduddin, J. In Pakistan Beverage Company v. Ahmed Shah (PL D 1960 Kar.. 331), and to my own experience, but at least it has to merit of novelty. I would therefore have appreciated greater assistance from learned counsel, but unfortunately learned counsel could not advance the position beyond a bald statement that this was his interpretation of the said Act. Learned counsels arguments assumed that sections 3 and 4 of the said Act did not contain any provision for the payment of medical expenses. But this is not correct because, as I have pointed out, the proviso to subsection (D) of that section expressly refers to such expenses. Under that subsection, an employer is liable to pay half monthly payments to a workman for temporary disablement, and the proviso expressly prohibits' him from deducting from such payments the expenses of medical treatment, therefore it is clear that even the sections on which Mr. Muftakhiruddin relied do not exclude a workmen's right to such expenses. It is true that the said Act does not appear to make any other express provision for such payments, but, at the highest, this means that there is some ambiguity in the statute, and that ambiguity has to be construed according to the principles for the construction of statutes.
8. It is settled law that an ambiguity in a statute has to be construed so as to further the objects of the statute and not to defeat them. In the instant case, as there is no doubt that the object of the said Act is to protect the rights of the workman, any ambiguity in it has to be construed so as to protect such rights and not to curtail them, therefore merely because the said Act does not expressly state that the workman shall be entitled to recover from the employer the expenses reasonably required for his medical treatment, it does not mean that he is debarred from recovering such expenses. A provision which lends support to this view is subsection (5) of section 3, and I would test the reasonableness of learned counsel's submission by reference to the-- rule laid down in this subsection. Under this subsection, a workman has to elect between filing a claim under the said Act and prosecuting his remedy in the regular Courts, and if he files a claim under the said Act he is barred from suing his employer in an action in tort: Taking a hypothetical case of a workman injured by his employer's negligence, such a workman would have to alternative remedies, namely, a claim under the said Act or a suit for damages in tort. If he files a suit, he would be entitled to general damages, as compensation for the disability caused by the accident, and to special damages, which would clearly include all expenses reasonably incurred for medical treatment. If I accept Mr. Muftakhiruddin's argument, it would mean that a workman could recover the expenses of medical treatment only by filing a suit in the regular Courts. But as the very object of the said Act is to provide him with a speedy and efficacious way of enforcing his rights, those objects would be completely defeated if I accept Mr. Muftakhiruddin's argument. This is another reason why I am not able to accept Mr. Muftakhiruddin' Submission and I bold that a workman is entitled to recover in a claim under the said Act expenses reasonably incurred by him for his medical treatment.
9. Mr. Muftakhiruddin then challenged the assessment of the respondent's disability at 20% by the Commissioner. In order to appreciate this argument, I have to point out that the appellant's doctor had assessed it at 10%. While Dr. Hamdani, Superinten--dent and Civil Surgeon, Quetta, who had also examined the respondent had assessed it at 20%. As an appeal under the said Act can lie only on a substantial question of law, according to learned counsel, the Commissioner committed a gross error of law in preferring Dr. Hamdani's evidence to that of the appellant's doctor. As both the doctors had appeared before the Commis--sioner and had expressed their opinions about the extent of the respondent's disability, the Commissioner was entitled, in the exercise of his discretion, to decide whose evidence was to be preferred, and no question of law is involved in this objection much less any substantial question of Law. Additionally, not only was the appellant's doctor its paid servant, but unlike him. Dr. Hamdani was a consultant holding a very high qualification. I also find that the appellant's doctor has tried to help his employer's case. Thus he first said in his cross- examination that he had issued a certificate of disability to the respondent on compassionate grounds only and that the respondent had not suffered any disability because he was able to continue working on the job on which he had been engaged at the the of the accident. But in answers to questions of the Court he contradicted himself and said that his certificate had reference "to the physical condition of the patient and not the duties of the person concerned." I am not impressed by his evidence, and not only do I see no error of law in the appreciation of evidence by the Commissioner, but I agree with the appreciation of evidence.
10. Mr. Muftakhiruddin then submitted that Dr. Hamdani's assessment of the respondents disability at 20 %; was not fit to be believed because the appellant had continued to keep the respondent in its employment, and that he was getting the same pay as before the accident. Apart from the fact that the appellant's sympathy for the respondent may not outlast the dismissal of its appeal, compensation under the said Act is for loss of earning capacity and not for the loss of any particular job. A workman is free to change his employment, and merely because the respondent has so far been able to continue his former employment with the appellant, it does not mean that he would always be able to keep that employment, nor does it mean that his earning capacity has not been diminished. The question is of evidence. I am not impressed by the evidence of the appellant's doctor, and the result is that the appellant has failed completely to show that the compensation due to the respondent should be reduced merely because it has so far retained him in tee employment. I may also observe here that the same view ha, been taken by a learned Single Judge of the West Pakistan High Court, in Nanak v. Executive Engineer (PLD 1962 Lah. 169).
11. Finally, Mr. Muftakhiruddin submitted that the compensation due to the respondent had not been correctly calculated under Schedule IV of the said Act. Learned counsel was notable to refer me to any evidence in support of this submission, and the reason for the absence of evidence in this respect is that the appellant had not raised- this objection before the Commissioner. Further, as it has not taken this objection in its appeal, it cannot now be permitted to advance this objection long after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation.
12. No other argument was raised. The appeal is utterly devoid of merit and is dismissed.