' Relevant facts for the disposal of this I.-C.A. Are as follows:- ' ABDUL SHAKURUL SALAM, J.--Sher Muhammad had purchased 21 Acres of land from Shah Muhammad alias Shah Nawaz. The latter's wife Mst. Nazeer Begum filed a civil suit which was decreed in her favour. Appeal failed before the District Court. Sher Muhammad filed an appeal in the High Court.
2. According to Mst. Rehmi, the decree-holder had taken possession in pursuance of the civil Court decree of the land in dispute alongwith the Ahata situated therein. However, Sher Muhammad forcibly retook the possession. He sent his men to Mst. Nazeer Begum who lived away. She sent four persons including Nazar Muhammad brother of Mst. Rehmi to Sher Muhammad to sort out the dispute. Allah Dittd, Muhammad Shari!, Shafiq and Muhammad Hanif fired at the four persons, hitting Nazar Muhammad on the left front side of the chest killing him instantaneously. Immediately after the occurrence, deceased's and Mst. Rehmi's brother Sadiq went to the S.H.O. To lodge a report. He was directed to go with the dead body for post-mortem examination. No report was lodged. Mst. Rehmi filed Writ Petition No,4779 of 1985 stating the aforesaid facts and pointing out that a F.I.R.No,210 of 1985 instead had been recorded against the deceased's relatives. She also stated that the aforementioned four persons were harassing and threatening the petitioner and her brother to desist from pursuing the case.
3. According to the F.I.R. No,210 of 1985 lodged by Allah Ditta, his maternal-uncle Sher Muhammad had purchased 21 Acres of land from Shah Muhammad alias Shah Nawaz who got a civil suit instituted through his wife which was decided in favour of his wife from the civil Court and Sessions (District) Court. His uncle filed an appeal in the High Court and obtained a stay order. Shah Muhammad through hired persons continued to try to take forcible possession of the land and Ahata. Today (3-9-1985) at 11-a.m. When his uncle had gone to Basirpur, in order to take forcible possession, Messrs Iqbal alias Bali armed with .12 bore gun, Jehangir armed with Sota, Muhammad Yar armed with rifle 7 mm, Nazar with rifle 7 mm, Azam with Sota, Mulazim with Sota, Amir with Sota, Shari! With .12 bore gun and four others names not known, attacked on the Ahata of the maternal- uncle Sher Muhammad. .Raising Lalkaras and firing they entered into the Ahata. He and Muhammad Shafiq fired with their .12 bore gun and rifle 7 mm. In their self-defence from inside the Ahata. The assailant went out of the Ahata. Hearing the firing, his uncle Sher Muhammad came running. He was injured by the assailants with Sotas. He saved his uncle by firing. In the fire exchange, he also received injury on the finger of the left hand side. One of the assailants whose name is Nazar son of Alawal, caste Macchi is lying injured on the spot. Hearing the firing many persons had arrived at the spot. The assailants had run away firing.
4. On the writ petition filed by Mst. Rehmi, sister of Nazar Muhammad who had died on the spot, a learned Single Judge called for a report from the S.H.O. Concerned. He then passed the following order:- "Petitioner's contention is that the investigation was not impartially carried out and there was no basis to declare them as aggressors. According to them the police was bound to record the report in respect of the versions put forward by them. It is not understandable as to how without recording the report of the petitioner the police had come to the finding that the petitioner's side was aggressor and that Nazar Muhammad had died on account of their firing. This could have been more appropriately done if both the version had been before the police and investigation had been carried out in respect of them after affording full opportunity to both the parties to lead their respective evidence. Since the S.H.O. Has himself admitted that nobody from the petitioners side had approached him with a request for the registration of the case, I would, therefore, direct the petitioner to approach the S.H.O. Concerned who shall perform his statutory duty and record a report under section 154, Cr.P.C. And carry out the investigation in accordance with law. Needless to say that if the report is found to be false the case may be got cancelled and the petitioner proceeded against for making a false report. This is vide order. Dated 10-3-1986 which is challenged by the appellants."
5. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended that after the registration of the case under F.I.R. No, 210 of 1985 there was no justification for directing the registration of a case on the behest of respondent No,4 who had only given a different version of the encounter. Further, learned counsel has contended that before the direction was issued by the learned Single Judge the appellants even though parties to the writ petition were not heard. Learned counsel for the appellants has also referred to para. 2 of the interim order in this appeal dated 13-1-1987 which is to the following effect: "2. However, it is stated by the learned counsel for the appellants and respondent No,4 that the latter on whose motion the writ was issued by the learned Single Judge, does not want to press the writ petition as the parties have entered into a compromise and she would like to withdraw the writ petition."
' Learned Additional Advocate-General was requested to appear as it was felt necessary to hear the State in view of the submission of learned counsel for the parties. The case has come up for final hearing today. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No,4 now states that the respondent had told him in his office that she had not entered into a compromise.
6. A perusal of the report F.I.R. No,210 of 1985 shows that 12 persons, armed with guns, rifles and Sotas are alleged to have attacked and entered the then complainant party's Ahata. From inside, the complainant and Muhammad Sharif fired. Assailants went out. Complainant's uncle came to the spot and was given Sota blows. The complainant got an injury on a finger of left hand in the cross-firing. The person who lay dead outside the Ahata, a case was sought to be registered in that behalf. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that once a F.I.R. Is recorded, no second F.I.R. Can be recorded. He relied on a D.B. Judgment to which one of us (A.S.Salam, J.) was a party. The case is reported as Kaura v. The State 1979 P Cr.LJ 521. The relevant facts were that an elder brother of the deceased had lodged F.I.R. No,23 against one person. The deceased's son wanted another F.I.R. To be recorded accusing some other persons.
' It was held that once a F.I.R. Is recorded all other information subsequently supplied can be looked into and no second F.I.R. Need be recorded. This is very different from saying that if a F.I.R. Is recorded, an aggrieved person or party who has lost a life or lives has no right to lodge a report giving information of commission of a cognizable case. When such an informaion is given the Officer Incharge of a Police Station, is required by law vide section 154 of the Cr.P.C. To reduce it to writing and then to proceed in accordance with law. A case from the Privy Council may be referred.
It is reported as Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 P C 18. Relevant facts in the case were that one S.M. Saleh made a report on 31st August 1941, and later on 5th September of the same year. The offence in the first was stated to be in breach of section 420, Penal Code. The facts were set out in a loose and slovenly manner and condescend on little exact detail. The result was that it was at least doubtful whether the offence should not have been described as committed in breach of section 417 instead of section 420. The vital difference between the two being that whereas an offence against the latter section is a cognizable one, that against the former is non-cognisable and investigation of it can only be undertaken by the police on the instructions of a Magistrate, whereas in the other case the police can act on their own motion under sections 154 and 156, Criminal Procedure Code. It was observed that "However this may be, and however, the offence may be described in the report itself, their Lordships are satisfied that there can rightly be spelt out of it an offence against section 409, which is also a cognizable offence and possibly also one against section 420. Apart from this, the later report though again it condescends upon rather meagre particulars, plainly indicates an accusation of an offence against section 409 and the offence is so described. In their Lordships view therefore, both information reports charge the accused man with cognisable offences under which the police are entitled to inquire without a Magistrate's order. Their Lordships think it right to set out these matters because it was strenuously argued before them on behalf of the respondent that the only accusation of which account could be taken was that contained in the first of the two reports, that the offence there charged was a non-cognisable offence and, therefore, the police were precluded under section 155, Criminal Procedure Code, from inquiring into it without a Magistrate's order. The argument as their Lordships understood it was that the only information report under sections 154 to 156, Criminal Procedure Code, was that recorded on 31st August, 1941, that the allegations recorded at a later stage of 5th September were not an information report, but a statement taken in the course of an investigation under sections 161 and 162 of the Code, that there was therefore, no reported cognisable offence into which the police were entitled to enquire, but only a non-cognisable offence which required a Magistrate's order if an investigation was to be authorized. Their Lordships cannot accede to this argument. They would point out that the respondent in his case treats each document as a separate information report and indeed, on the argument presented on his behalf, rightly so, since each discloses a separate offence, the second not being a mere amplification of the first, but the disclosure of further criminal activities In truth the provisions as to an information report (commonly called a first information report) are enacted for other reasons. Its object is to obtain early information of alleged criminal activity, to record the circumstances before there is time for them to be forgotten or embellished, and it has to be remembered that the report can be put in evidence when the informant is examined if it is desired to do so".
From the above observations, it would be quite clear that information's can be laid one after the other, to be recorded as F.I.Rs, if these disclose separate cognizable .Offences, the second or later not being the mere amplification of the first but the disclosure of other criminal activities.
Recording of a second F.I.R. Or a direction to that effect, therefore, depends upon the circumstances of each case. Counter-cases are often recorded and tried. No hard and fast rules or principles can be laid down as to when a second F.I.R. Can or should be recorded. The matter has to be seen in the context of the totality of the circumstances and the allegations. If an occurrence is reported and F.I.R. Recorded, then any information in elaboration thereof, its explanation or amplification will not call for recording of a fresh or second F.I.R. The information is there. All its contents and aspects have to be investigated. All facts newly found, alleged, added etc. Will be taken into account. Information supplied or statements made in that behalf will be recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. No new F.I.R. Need be recorded. But if a new case is made out or allegations of a cognizable case are levelled Showing a genuine grievance, then the aggrieved party is entitled to have his case registered and investigation made. These observations are just guidelines. These are by no means exhaustive. As said earlier all depends upon the circumstances of each case. The matter has to be approached with a sense of understanding, responsibility, fairness and even handed application of law and principles of justice. If the facts do not warrant registration of a case, direction can be declined in discretion as in Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram Khan and another 1975 SCMR 149; Muhammad Ijaz v. The S.H.O. Police Station, Rajana, Faisalabad 1979 SCMR 490. If the party has a grievance, or counter-version of the occurrence, notwithstanding recording of F.I.R. From the other 'side, direction can be issued, Akram All Shah v. Station House Officer, Police Station Kotwali, Kasur and 2 others PLD 1979 Lah. 320; Muhammad Aslam v. Station House Officer, Police Station, Mamukanjan PLD 1979 Lah. 907; Mirza v. S.H.O. Police Station, Chauharkana 1982 P Cr. L J 171; Abdul Ghent v. S.H.O. P.S. Saddar, Sheikhupura etc. 1983 P Cr. L J 2172; Muhammad Boota v. S.H.O. I.-C.A. No,64 of 1981 decided by a learned Division Bench on 8-7-1981.
Not so if no useful purpose would be served and the alternate remedy of a complaint is more efficacious, Malik Muhammad Aslam v. Police Station Saddar, Sargodha etc. PLD 1981 Lah.
138. Looking at the case in hand from the aforesaid perspective and principles laid down in the precedent case, it may be noticed that "the allegations in the writ petition were that the brother of the deceased namely Muhammad Sadiq, went immediately after the occurrence at 11-00 a.m. To the S.H.O. Police Station Baseerpur to lodge the report. Report was not recorded. He was directed to accompany the dead body for post-mortem examination. On the other hand, F.I.R. Was recorded on the statement of Allah Ditta at 1-30 p.m. It may be noticed that as in this case, if somebody having an injury on a finger rushes to the Police Station and gets registered a case against others, then the side who had earlier laid the information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence of murder before the S.H.O., cannot be said to have no right to have its grievance recorded and investigation made. So also will be the position if the aggrieved person had been looking after the seriously injured or dead and were to lodge the report subsequently after the recording of the F.I.R. On the behest of the other side. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge fell in error in directing the registration of a case on the motion of the side who had lost a life simply because the other side who had suffered an injury on a finger had succeeded to get a F.I.R.
Recorded earlier.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants has laid stress on the fact that the investigation by the police after the registration of the case in obedience to the direction given by the learned Single Judge also helps the appellants. We do not intend to make any comments on this aspect of the case as we have already noticed that the learned Single Judge has already directed in the order impugned in this I.-C.A. That "if the report is found to be false the case may be got cancelled and the petitioner proceeded against for making a false report".
8. When it was stated before this Court on 13-1-1987 that the appellants have entered into a compromise with respondent No,4 who had filed the writ petition for registration of a case, the learned Additional Advocate-General was sent for so as to have the view of the State on the question whether in a case, registered under the orders of this Court, the parties' private arrangements can nullify the effect of the said registration of the case? It appeared that in a case where murder had taken place it is the duty of the State to investigate the matter and come to a correct conclusion and get the accused punished for their crime. Today, learned counsel for respondent No,4 has even repudiated the compromise. As regards non-hearing of the appellants before the learned Single Judge we have heard the learned counsel at length and perused the record with his assistance. Learned Assistant Advocate-General has submitted that under the orders of the learned Single Judge the case was registered before the order was suspended in the appeal. The same had already been given effect to. The investigation has also been made.
9. In all the circumstances of the case there is no justification whatsoever to interfere in the order of the learned Single Judge. This I.-C.A. Is, therefore, dismissed but the parties are left to bear their own costs.