' This petition seeking revision of the order of the learned Civil Judge, Kharian, dated the 1st October, 1985, dismissing the suit of the petitioner as withdrawn on the basis of the statements of his.
Mukhtar-i-Khas and counsel and of the learned District Judge, Gujrat, dated the 20th May, 1980, dismissing his appeal against the first mentioned order, arises out of the following circumstances.
One Fazal Ahmad, son of Ghulam Muhammad alias Gaman, sold 7 Kanals 18 Merles of the land in dispute, situate in the area of Chak Rajadi, tehsil Kharian, district Gujrat, to Muhammad Sherif, respondent 1, through a sale-deed which was registered on the 12th November, 1983, for an ostensible sale consideration of Rs.1,10,000. Allah Dad, petitioner, who claimed himself to be a collateral heir of the vendor and co-sharer of the land in question, brought suit to pre-empt the sale on the 5th November, 1984. By means of special power-of-attorney he appointed Mukhtar Ahmad, son of Muhammad Ashraf, respondent 2, to be his Mukhtar-i-Khas to pursue the suit for which purpose he was given various powers.
2. Respondent 1 contested the suit. On the 1st October, 1985, Mukhtai' Ahmad, attorney of the petitioner, and Chaudhry Munir Ahmad, Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner, made signed statement before the learned trial Court that compromise had been effected with respondent 1 and that the suit should be dismissed as withdrawn. Accordingly the learned trial Court passed the order dismissing the suit as withdrawn.
3. The petitioner questioned the validity of the order of dismissal of this suit in appeal before the learned District Court. In the memorandum of appeal he took up the plea that the authority given to the Mukhtar-i- Khas to effect compromise had been struck off from the power-of-attorney but this fact had been ignored by the learned trial Court. He maintained that the Mukhtar-i-Khas had been appointed to prosecute the suit through various stages and not for disregarding his interests and further that even if he had been given power to enter into compromise, it had to be exercised so as to protect and not to jeopardise his interests,
4. When the learned counsel for the petitioner put forth his argument before the learned appellate Court below that despite deletion of the word 'Razinama' from the power-of-attorney, the Mukhtar- i-Khas had withdrawn the suit, the learned counsel for respondent 1 produced before the Court photostat copy of the power-of-attorney wherein the word 'Razinama' was found intact and had not been deleted. The learned Court noticed that the note given at the foot of the power-of- attorney that the word 'Razinama' had been deleted was in different ink and, handwriting and that the said note was not visible in the photostat copy laid before it by respondent 1. The learned Court was of the view that the deletion of the word 'Razinama' and addition of the note had been forged subsequently in order to create ground for appeal. The learned Court was convinced of the authority of the Mukhtar-i-Khas to make statement of any kind including the one for effecting compromise. It considered the statement of the learned counsel for the petitioner withdrawing the suit to be binding upon him.
5. The view formulated by the learned appellate Court touching commission of forgery in the contents of the power-of-attorney by drawing a line across the word 'Razinama' and appending the note that the word 'Razinania' had been excised for reasons given by it, cannot but be endorsed. The petitioner had himself signed Wayalatnama in favour of his counsel authorising him to effect compromise and withdraw the suit. Such an authority he had conferred upon his attorney through unforged power-of-attorney. In these circumstances the petitioner is bound by their act of withdrawing the suit.
6. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned trial Court ought to have satisfied itself by making inquiry that the compromise was for the benefit of the petitioner before proceeding to pass order dismissing the suit as withdrawn is too specious to be considered seriously. When the Mukhtar-i-Khas and the counsel for the petitioner stated before the learned trial Court that the suit had been compromised and that it should be dismissed as withdrawn especially when they enjoyed authority to make such a statement there was left no option with the learned trial Court except to dismiss the suit.
7. The learned counsel referred to the observations of the Supreme Court of Pakistan appearing in Abdul Aleem v. Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab 1982 SCM R 229 that "we consider that this is a fair compromise and will end the dispute between the parties in an amicable manner in accordance with their wishes", and in 'the case of Anjuman Intizamia, Jamia Masjid Kalan v. Nisar Ahmad 1985 SCM R 1203 that "the terms of the compromise appear to be reasonable", in support of his argument that the learned trial Court ought to have held inquiry to ascertain that the compromise was reasonable and for the benefit of the petitioner before proceeding to pass the impugned order of dismissal of the suit. These observations of the august court were made in passing and were not meant to lay down flaw enjoining conducting of inquiry contemplated by the learned counsel.
8. The impugned orders of the learned Courts below are unexceptionable and do not demand any interference in revision. This petition is dismissed in limine.