ANWARUL HAQ, J.-This order will dispose of Letters Patent Appeals bearing Nos. 161, 165, 166, 168 and 169 of 1969, which are by nine out of 18 persons who have been declared to be touts by our learned brother Bashir-ud-Din Ahmad, J., and have been forbidden from entering the precincts of the Courts. It has further been directed in the order dated the 28th of March 1969 that the names of these persons shall be published in the Gazette as touts. The proceedings were taken against 20 persons, two of whom, namely, Messrs Muhammad Ayub and Maula Dad were, however, excluded from the declaration, on the ground that they were practising members of the Bar and action against them was being taken separately by the Bar Council.
2. The proceedings against the appellants and others were initiated by means of a requisition (Exh.
P. A.) submitted to the President of the High Court Bar Association at Lahore (hereinafter referred to as the Association) by 16 members of the Association calling for a special general meeting to "consider the steps to be taken to remove the menace of some undesirable lawyers, i.e. Raja Maula Dad alias M. D. Janjua and Raja Muhammad Ayub, and the touts from the premises of the High Court at Lahore". The requisition further stated that a copy of the proposed resolution was being attached. This resolution is Exh. P. B. And is worded as under :- "The High Court Bar Association resolves that as (Nos. 1 to 20 names of the appellants and others) are habitually acting as TOUTS, therefore, they are unanimously declared by this House as TOUTS and it is further resolved that the names of these touts be sent to the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, for placing their names on the list of touts".
The requisition and the resolution were both signed by Major Waheed-ud-Din Virk, Advocate of Lahore as the mover, and were supported by 15 other members of the Association. In the absence of the President of the Association, the requisition came up before the Vice-President, who passed an order on the 7th of September 1967, calling the meeting for the 9th of September 1967. 64 members of the Association attended and the proposed resolution annexed to the requisition was unanimously passed. In the High Court the matter was placed before Bashir-ud-Din Ahmad, J. For action under section 36 of the Legal Practitioners Act. All the named persons except Mansab A.I filed written statements denying the allegation that they were touts. After recording the evidence on both sides and taking into account the effect of th6 resolution passed by the Association, the learned Judge made the declaration already mentioned.
3. On behalf of the appellants the order under appeal has been challenged before us on the following grounds :-
(1) That the learned Judge in Chambers has erred in thinking that the resolution of the Association had been validly passed, as the resolution, in fact, suffered from the following infirmities, viz.-
(a) the requisition being for a special general meeting, it could not be converted into a requisition for an urgent general meeting to be convened under rule 29(3) of the Association Rules ;
(b) the notices for the meeting were not issued in accordance with the provisions of rule 31 ;
(c) the meeting having been convened during the summer vacation of the High Court, the resolution does not validly reflect the will or the opinion of the majority of the members of the Association, and
(d) the proposed resolution was not annexed to the requisi--petition, and appears to have been inserted later ;
(2) That in any case the evidentiary value of the resolution is considerably weakened by the fact that it does not separately consider the case of each of the persons who were sought to be declared as touts ; and in particular it loses almost all its value as against the appellant Haji Muhammad Bashir whose .Antecedents and activities were favourably commented upon by 42 members of the Association on an application submitted by this appellant ; and
(3) That once the invalid resolution is eliminated from consideration, then there is hardly any evidence left to indict the appellants of the charge of being touts.
4. Before dealing with the various contentions raised on behalf of the appellants, we may dispose of a preliminary objection taken by Malik Amjad Hussain on behalf of the Bar Association to the effect that the order passed by the learned Single Judge declaring the appellants and others to be touts and making certain consequential directions, is in the nature of an administrative or disciplinary order, and cannot be regarded as being a judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court, with the result that no appeal lies against such an order. The learned counsel submits that the nature of the order passed by the learned Judge in Chambers is not altered by the mere fact that he adopted a procedure comparable to that obtaining in ordinary judicial proceedings, namely, of recording evidence and hearing arguments of the parties before deciding whether action should or should not be taken against the appellants in accordance with the resolution of the Bar Association.
5. The first question which arises in this connection is regarding the true nature of the order under appeal. Section 36 under which the proceedings were taken against the appellants, is-- in the following terms :- 36.-(1) Every High Court, District Judge, Sessions Judge, District Magistrate and every Revenue- officer, not being below the rank of a Collector of a district, (each as regards their or his own Court and the Courts, if any, subordinate thereto), may frame and publish lists of persons proved to their or his satisfaction, or to the satisfaction of any subordinate Court as provided in subsection (2-A) by evidence of general repute or, otherwise, habitually to act as touts, and may, from time to, time, alter and amend such lists.
(Explanation.-The passing of a resolution, declaring any person to be or not to be a tout, by a majority of the members present at a meeting, specially convened for the purpose, of an association of persons entitled to practise as legal practitioners in any Court or revenue-office, shall be evidence of the general repute of such person for the purposes of this subsection).
(2) No person's name shall be included in any such list until he shall have had an opportunity of showing cause against such inclusion.
(2-A) Any authority empowered under subsection (1) to frame and publish a list of touts may send to any Court subordinate to such authority the names of any persons alleged: or suspected to be touts, and order that Court to hold an inquiry in regard to such persons ; and the subordinate Court shall thereupon hold an inquiry into the conduct of such persons and, after giving each such person an opportunity of showing cause as provided in subsection (2), shall report to the authority which has ordered the inquiry the name of each. Such person who has been proved to the satisfaction of the: subordinate Court to be a tout ; and that authority may include --the name of any such person in the list of touts framed and published by that authority: Provided that such authority shall hear any such person who before his name has been so included, appears before it and desires to be heard.
(3) A copy of every such list shall be kept hung up in every Court to which the same relates.
(4) The Court or Judge may, by general or special order, exclude from the precincts of the Court any person whose name is included in any such list.
(5) Every person whose name is included in any such list shall be deemed to be proclaimed as a tout within the meaning of section 13, clause (e), and section 22, clause (d).
(6) Any person who acts as a tout whilst his name is included in any such list shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
6. It will be seen that not only the High Court but certain other judicial officers as well as revenue officers have been given the power to act under this section, and they have further been authorised to alter and amend the list of touts from time to time. Subsection (2) enjoins that the person against whom proceedings are initiated shall be given an opportunity of showing cause against being included in the list of touts, and subsection (2-A) permits the necessary inquiry to be held by a subordinate Court or authority which has then to report the matter to its superior.
Subsection (4) mentions two alternative authorities, namely, the Court or Judge, thus indicating that a Judge acts under this section not necessarily as a Court, but as a presiding officer of his Court. The provisions of the section leave no doubt that the power conferred by it is of an administrative or disciplinary nature, although it is enjoined that the power shall not be used against any person unless he has been given an opportunity of q showing cause against the proposed action. This is a fundamental requirement of natural justice and compliance with it would not automatically convert administrative proceedings into judicial proceedings. The section does not attach any finality to the order made by the High Court or the authorities mentioned therein, and they are permitted to alter or amend the list of touts from time to time. These factors point to the conclusion that the power is indeed of an administrative nature.
7. The question as to what is an administrative or a judicial order was discussed at length by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. The Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service, Sargodha (PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 437) and it was laid down that "the true question always is whether the act which is-complained of is a judicial act and not whether the procedure adopted by the tribunal is judicial or quasi judicial or whether the dominant or general aspect of the tribunal is that of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body. A tribunal is not always furnished with the trappings of a Court, nor will such trappings make its action judicial. The character of the action taken in a given case and the nature of the right on which it operates must determine whether that action is judicial, ministerial or legislative or whether it is simply the act of a public agent". It was further added that "in the case of an administrative tribunal, however, the emphasis is on policy, expediency and discretion to enable it to achieve the object with which it was set up. In the case of such a tribunal the approach in determining the relevant facts is therefore often subjective and not objective, there being generally no lis before it in which the parties are arrayed against each other for the enforcement of a private right or liability and who for that purpose are entitled to produce evidence and adduce legal argument. The word `quasi' as prefixed to the word `judicial' may either indicate that the tribunal is not acting purely administratively or that it is acting in a manner in which a judicial tribunal is expected to act". This view was reiterated by their Lordships in Messrs Faridsons Ltd., Karachi v. Govern--ment of Pakistan and others (PLD 1961 SC 537).
8. Judged in the light of the principles laid down in these two decisions and the factors mentioned by us in the preceding paragraph, as emerging from the various provisions of section 36 of the Act, it seems clear that the order passed by the learned Judge against the appellants cannot be treated to be a judicial order in the strict sense of that term, and that at best it could be regarded as a quasi-judicial order for the reason that the procedure followed by the learned Judge was of that nature. In A char Khuda Bakhsh v. Bar Association, Karachi (AIR 1937 Sind 4), it was held that "proceedings to declare a man a tout are not judicial proceedings, but proceedings of a departmental nature which relate to the working of the Courts". Again in Muhammad Abdul Latif v.
Secretary, Bar Association, Gujranwala (AIR 1947 Lah. 313), a Full Bench observed :- "The jurisdiction exercised by Courts or presiding officers of the Courts, "under section 36 of the Legal Practitioners Act, is neither a civil nor a criminal jurisdiction, but is a disciplinary or administrative jurisdiction and an order under section 36 by a District Judge declaring a person to be a tout is not a judgment within the meaning of section 224(2), Government of India Act. Hence such an order though not revisable by High Court on its civil or criminal side, can be interfered with by the High Court on its administrative side and this power is not affected by section 224(2), Government of India Act."
It was added that no appeal lay against such an order.
9. On behalf of the appellants reference was, however, made to re : Adiraju Somanna (I L R 1938 Mad. 988), in which a learned Single Judge has held that an order passed by the District Judge under section 36 of the Act falls within the scope of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is capable of being revised by the High Court under that section. The major portion of this judgment is devoted to the discussion of the question whether such an order was amenable to revision by the High Court under section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 or section 15 of the High Courts Act, and whether section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be invoked in such a case. Having answered these questions in the negative, the learned Judge then proceeded to consider whether section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could be invoked and it would be useful to reproduce here the relevant portion of the judgment as appearing on page 994 of the Report :- "A reference to section 115 would show that the High Court is competent to make such order as it thinks fit, if it finds that a case has been decided by any Court subordinate thereto, and in which no appeal lies, if such subordinate Court has either acted beyond or failed to exercise a jurisdiction or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. 1t cannot be denied that the District Judge was acting in his case as a Court and not in an administrative capacity. The question then is whether the finding given by him against the petitioner and declaring him to be a tout would amount to a decision of the case pending before him."
The remaining part of the judgment is then devoted to answering the last question just mentioned, namely, whether it was a case decided within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
10. It will be seen that on the essential question which we are considering here, namely, regarding the true nature of the order made under section 36 of the Act, the learned Judge has merely contented himself by observing that "it cannot be denied that the District Judge was acting in this case as a Court and not in an administrative capacity". This observation or conclusion is not supported by any reasoning, nor by an examination of the relevant provisions of the section itself.
This view was specifically dissented from by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of Muhammad Abdul Latif to which we have already referred. Harries, C. J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, forcefully brought out the difficulty involved in accepting the view that such an order could be revised under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. His Lordships pointed out that although orders passed by a District Judge could be so revised, but orders of Sessions Judge and District Magistrates would have to be revised under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, a further difficulty would arise with regard to orders made by Revenue Courts or their presiding officers. On this view of the matter it was concluded that the jurisdiction under section 36 of the Act was a peculiar jurisdiction created by that section, and it has neither a civil jurisdiction nor a criminal jurisdiction, but a jurisdiction of a disciplinary or administrative nature.
We are in respectful agreement wit this view.
11. The question now is whether an order of a disciplinary or administrative nature made by a learned Single Judge of this Court is open to appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent. This clause lays down that "an appeal shall lie to the High Court of Judicature at Lahore from the judgment (not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction . . . . . ) of one Judge of the said High Court . . . " The term "judgment" as defined in clause (9) of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure means "the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order", and ordinarily connotes any decision given by a Court on questions at issue between the parties to a proceeding properly before the Court. It is clear that the reference is obviously to judicial decisions given by a Single Judge, and the clause is not intended to provide .An appeal against decisions of an administrative or departmental nature. This position emerges quite unambiguously from the exceptions mentioned in parenthesis in the clause, and also from the types of cases in which appeal would lie under the Letters Patent only if a certificate of fitness is granted by the learned Single Judge.
12. The learned counsel for the appellants as well as for the Association have referred us to several decided cases with a view to bringing out the true meaning of the term "judgment" as used in the clause in question. All these cases, however, clearly relate to orders made in proper judicial proceedings. In Gokal Chand v. Sanwal Das and others (1 I L R Lah. 348), it was observed that "the term `judgment' in section 10 of the Letters Patent would. Include any interlocutory judgment which decides, so far as the Court pronouncing such judgment is concerned, whether finally or temporarily, any question materially in issue between the parties and directly affecting the subject-matter of the suit". The same idea was elaborated in Shibba Mal and others v. Rug Narain (10 I L R Lah. 132), and it was held that "the term `judgment' is not synonymous with the word `decree', and an order passed by a. Single Bench on an application filed by the appellant against a preliminary decree, for staying further proceedings in pursuance of that decree, amounts to a `judgment' within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent". In Firm Shaw Hori Dial and Sons, Madras v. Messrs Sohna Mal Beli Ram (AIR 1942 Lah. 95), a Full Bench observed that "the word `judgment' in clause 10 is not synonymous with decree. Clause 10 contemplates orders other than the judgments in a decree. Whether an order amounts to a judgment within clause 10 must be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case, and the tests propounded in 31 Mad. 1 and 17 W R 364 serve as a good guide". It was further held that an order determining the forum in which, the suit is to be tried, or an order refusing to transfer a suit are --judgments within the meaning of clause 10, and so is an order registering a decree as that of a Revenue Court under section 100 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. The broad definition of- the term "judgment" adopted by the Full Bench was "a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties determining some right or liability. It may be either final or preliminary or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit and a preliminary and an interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it leaving other matters to be determined".
13. The nature of the appeal provided under clause 10 of the Letters Patent was considered by a Division Bench in Sheikh Muzaffar Din v. Mst. Allah Vasai and others (PLD 1953 Lah. 284), and it was stated that "a Letters Patent Appeal is not really an appeal in the strict sense. It may be more aptly described as an internal arrangement for reviewing its own decisions given in the first instance by one member of the Court. The first as well as the second decision remains a decision of the Court".
This view was followed in Abdul Haq v. Saif-ur-Rehman and others (PLD 1968 Lah. 478). From these two decisions as well as those noticed in the preceding paragraph the position clearly emerges that the appeal contemplated under clause 10 is obviously one arising out of a judgment or order made by a learned Single Judge in the exercise of his judicial functions and has nothing to do with any order made on the disciplinary or administrative side. This view is strengthened by the observations appearing in Mumtaz Khan v. Chief Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner and another (PLD 1966 SC 276), in which their Lordships were considering the question whether an appeal would lie under clause 10 of the Letters Patent from the order of a learned Single Judge passed in writ jurisdiction. It was held that an order passed by a learned Single Judge in writ jurisdiction, pertaining to a civil matter, amounts to exercise of original jurisdiction within the contemplation of section 103 of Government of India Act, 1915 and would, therefore, be appealable as a judgment under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court. The learned Judges stated that "in the general connotation of the term a judgment would merely mean a judicial determination or a decision of a Court, and it would be interlocutory or final". They went on to add that "the term `judgment' in clause 10 should not be confined to decrees, but was of a wider import and an order passed in writ jurisdiction was a `judgment' in every sense of the term as it finally decided the rights of the parties and it was clearly rendered in a proceeding of a civil nature as rights to property were adjudicated upon".
14. It was submitted by Mr. Lodhi, the learned counsel for one of the appellants, that the proceedings against the appellants were indeed of a civil nature and, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge would amount to a "judgment" as held by the Supreme Court in Mumtaz Khan's case. This proposition cannot, however, be accepted in view of the opinion we have already expressed regarding the true nature of the order under appeal.
15. For the foregoing reasons, we consider that it must be held that the present appeals are not competent under clause 10 of the Letters Patent as the order made by the learned C Single Judge under section 36 of the Legal Practitioners Act is not a "judgment" in any sense of the term, but is merely an administrative or a disciplinary order regulating the functioning of the Courts. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that in such circumstances the order of the learned Single Judge may still be open to review by a Division Bench of this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers vis-a-vis orders passed by Judges sitting in Single Bench, just as orders made by District Judges have been held to be revisable by the High Court in the exercise of its power of superintendence and control. Such an argument, however, proceeds on an assumption which is not warranted by clause 10 of the Letters Patent. While the High Court has undoubtedly power of superintendence and control over the subordinate Courts, apart from its revisional powers in respect of civil and criminal matters as such, a Division Bench of this Court has no such power of superintendence and control over the functioning of learned Judges of the Court sitting in Single Bench. The power conferred by clause 10 o L the Letters Patent is a specific power of hearing appeals from the judgments of learned Single Judges in specified cases and situations, and cannot be extended to, or converted into, a genera supervisory power such as is enjoyed by the High Court over Courts subordinate to it.
16. It was next contended that, in any case, section 36 of the Act itself permits a periodical review of the list of touts, prepared by a Court or a Judge, and we should accordingly treat the present appeals as applications for review of the order passed by our learned brother. Reference was made in this. Behalf to Mirza Akbar A.I v. Mirza Iftikhar A.I and others (PLD 1956 FC 50) and Lt.-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty, Government of Pakistan, Karachi (PLD 1962 SC 335), which are, however, cases dealing with the power of review enjoyed by the Federal Court and its successor, namely, the Supreme Court of Pakistan. These cases are of no direct relevance in the present context as they do not deal with the question whether an order passed by a learned Single Judge is open to review by a Division Bench of the same Court. If the proceedings taken by the learned Single Judge may be regarded as being of a civil nature, then the question of review would fall to be dealt with under order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, rule 5 of which enjoins that such an application should be presented to the Judge or Judges who had decided the matter in the first instance, unless such judge or Judges be not available for a period of six months next after the application. For this reason as well the review application, if any, would lie to the Judge who has made the order against the appellants.
17. However, the correct position appears to us to be that there is no question of treating the present appeal as being in the nature of review applications as permissible in ordinary civil proceedings. Subsection (1) of section 36 clearly gives power to the Court or the Judge concerned to alter and amend the list of touts from time to time. Such alteration or amendment is not to be equated with the specified power of review conferred by Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure or by any comparable or similar provision in any other law. The power to alter or amend, from time to time, the list of touts as drawn up under section 36 of the Act is clearly a power of a wider nature, not confined by the limits laid down in power XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. It appears to us that it would be open to the Court or the Judge concerned to re-examine either the entire list or the case of any particular person from time to time and to pass any appropriate order in that behalf. Such re- examination may indeed be in the nature of afresh appraisal of all the circumstances appearing against the person concerned. On this view of the matter we consider that it would be open to the Administration Judge in the High Court, who may be dealing with the matter of touts from time to time, to alter or amend the list of touts as drawn up in the order under appeal. This may be done either suo motu or on an application being made in this behalf by an interested party.
18. Ordinarily the view taken by us regarding the maintainability of these appeals would conclude the matter, but as the several learned counsel appearing for the appellants have addressed lengthy argument also on merits, we would like to deal with this aspect of the case as well.
19. Subsection (1) of section 36 contemplates that a person may be declared to be a tout on the basis of evidence of general repute or otherwise, and Explanation to the subsection makes it clear that the passing of a resolution in this behalf by the Bar Association shall be evidence of general repute of this nature. If, therefore, the resolution passed by the Association in this case is a valid resolution in accordance with the provisions embodied in the Explanation to section 36(l) of the Act, then the requirements of the law would be amply met. It is for this reason that the learned counsel appearing for the appellants have strenuously attacked the validity of the resolution passed by the Association.
20. The first ground of attack on the resolution is that as the requisition was for a special general meeting, the same could not be converted into a requisition for an urgent general meeting to be convened under rule 29.3 of the Rules of the Association. Rule 29 speaks of two kinds of meeting, namely, a special general meeting and an urgent general meeting. The special general meeting is to be convened by the Executive Committee of the Association within twenty days of the receipt of any requisition in this behalf ; whereas an urgent general meeting can be convened by the Secretary not later than three days from the receipt of the necessary requisition, provided` that period of notice may be further reduced by the President or, in his absence, the Vice-President. The submission on behalf of the appellants is that as the requisition was for a special general meeting, it could be convened only by the Executive Committee and within twenty days of the receipt of the requisition, but the Vice --President of the Association acted illegally in treating the requisition as being one for an urgent general meeting and thus reducing the period of notice to two days. It is contended that such being the case, the meeting was not validly convened and, therefore, the resolution passed at such a meeting is of no legal effect.
21. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants proceeds on the assumption that the Explanation to section 36(1) of the Act contemplates a resolution of the Association in accordance with the rules and bye-laws of that Association, and that any contravention or violation of these rules or bye-laws would necessarily invalidate the resolution, so as to deprive it of its evidentiary value under the law. Such an assumption may perhaps be valid if one were examining matters relating to the internal management of the Association, but in the present case we are concerned solely with the provisions as embodied in the Explanation just mentioned. All that this Explanation requires is the passing of a resolution by a majority of the members present at a meeting, specially convened for the purpose, of an Association of persons entitled to practise as legal practitioners in any Court or revenue-office. It will be seen that the Explanation does not concern itself with the internal rules or bye-laws of such an Association. The requirements of law are that the resolution should be passed by a majority of the members present at a meeting, and the meeting should be specially convened for the purpose. Now, in the present case there is no doubt whatsoever that the meeting was indeed specially convened for the purpose of considering the menace of touts or tourism, and a resolution listing the names of the persons to be declared as touts was attached with the requisition submitted by the members of the Association for convening the special general meeting. The resolution was passed unanimously by the persons present at the meeting. It appears to us, therefore, that, subject to further discussion of the question of, notice, the resolution was validly passed at a meeting specially convened for this purpose, and it is irrelevant in this context to consider whether the meeting was a special general meeting or an urgent general meeting, and whether the resolution of the Association prescribed a different period of notice in either case.
22. A similar question was considered by a Division Bench in Ghafoor Khan and others v. Emperor (AIR 1928 All. 334), and it was observed that "whether a resolution passed by a meeting of a Bar Association declaring certain persons to be touts was or was not regularly passed must be determined by reference to the Explanation to section 36, subsection (1), and not by reference to any rules framed by an Association. The Act only requires that `members' shall vote and that the resolution shall be passed by a simple majority irrespective of the rules of the particular Bar Association. When forwarding the resolution the Secretary of the Bar Association ought to state the total number of members belonging to the Association, the number of those who attended the meeting and the figures of the votes for and against the resolution". A similar view was expressed by a learned Single Judge in Chatur Bhuj v. Emperor (AIR 1931 Lah. 57), and it was held that in order to enable a Court to admit in evidence the resolution of the Bar Association declaring certain persons to be touts, it is necessary to establish that it was a meeting specially convened for the purpose of passing the resolution in question. Of course, this implies that the meeting should have been properly convened and that the object of the proposed meeting should have been properly notified to all the members of the Association". The learned Judge then elaborated this point by stating that "the notice should be to all the members who are able to attend and it must be given in a reasonable manner and at a reasonable time before the meeting takes place". The learned Judge added that it was not always legally necessary that there should be personal service of notice on all the members, but it must be established that the mode of giving notice was authorised by the rules and regulations of the Association.
23. We may now proceed to consider the second objection raised by the appellants to the effect that the notices for the meeting were not issued in accordance with the provisions of rule 31. The precise submission is that individual notices were not sent as required by rule 31 of the Association.
On behalf of the Association evidence was led to show that the notice for the special general meeting was posted on the Notice Board in the Library of the Association, and the Notice Book was also circulated in accordance with rule 31(a)(ii) to such members who were in Lahore at the material time. The learned Judge in Chambers has expressed the view that it was not necessary to send out notices by post to every member not resident in Lahore, and has referred to the proviso to rule 31 to the effect that if there is substantial compliance with the rule then the validity of a resolution passed at such a meeting shall not be affected. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge that there has indeed been substantial compliance with the requirement that notice of the meeting should have gone to all persons who would ordinarily be expected to attend the special meeting. Rule 31 does lay down, inter alia, that a notice may be posted in the Library and the Notice Book may be circulated to members who can be conveniently informed in that way. In these circumstances, the resolution cannot be said to be vitiated for lack of postal notices, as the explanation would seem to require only reasonable notice.
24. It was next contended that as the meeting was convened during the summer vacation of the High Court the resolution did not reflect the opinion of the majority of the members of the Association. It is true that the meeting was convened during the long vacation of the High Court, but there is no requirement either in law or in the rules of the Association that such a meeting cannot be convened during the summer vacation. We have already stated that the meeting was attended by 64 members of the Association and the resolution against the appellants was passed unanimously. In these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the resolution does not satisfy the requirements laid down in the Explanation to section 36 (1) of the Act.
25. Another objection taken on behalf of the appellants was that the, proposed resolution containing the names of persons to be declared as touts was not appended to the requisition and.
Therefore, the members attending the special meeting were not aware of the names of persons who were to be considered in this behalf. This argument was sought to be built up en the manner in which the fact of the resolution being attached as an appendix to the requisition appeared to have been written or typed by the convenors of the meeting. The argument implies that the gentlemen of the Bar who convened the meeting are now falsely alleging that the resolution was appended to the requisition. We are unable to subscribe to any such insinuation and have no reason to doubt the evidence of the learned members of the Bar to the effect that the resolution was indeed appended to the requisition when it was signed and circulated for the purpose of convening the special meeting. We must hold, therefore, that the names of the appellants were indeed mentioned in the attached resolution and, therefore, the members attending were aware of the identity of persons against whom they were called upon to vote.
26. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the resolution of the Association was validly passed in accordance with the requirements embodied in the Explanation and, therefore, it provided evidence of general repute such as is mentioned in subsection (1) of section 36 of the Act.
As held in Yeshwant Rao Shantaram v. Secretary, High Court Bar Association, Nagpur (AIR 1932 Nag. 141), Kunden Lal v. Emperor through Bar Association, Dehra Dun (130 I C 629), Bar Association, Gujranwala v. Ch. Nazar Muhammad (PLD 1959 Lah. 27) and Rajjab A.I Bhiyan v. The State (PLD 1963 Dacca 774), ordinarily the resolution praised by the Bar Association declaring certain persons as touts would be sufficient evidence of general repute, and it would not be necessary to summon witnesses to give evidence of such general repute. The learned Judge in Chambers was, therefore, justified in acting upon the resolution.
27. On behalf of one of the appellants namely, Haji Muhammad Bashir, it was strenuously contended that 42 members of the Association lead endorsed an application submitted by him thus exonerating him of the charge of being tout and, therefore, at least as against him the resolution; should not have been acted upon. It is true that such a document was placed on the record, but we consider that such an endorsement or certificate from some members of the Association did not detract from the evidentiary value which is conferred on the resolution of the Bar Association under the explanation to section 36(1). It may perhaps still be open to the Association to convene a special general meeting for considering the case of this particular appellant or other cases and reporting the result to the High Court for alteration or amendment of the list as provided by subsection (1) of section 36 of the Act, but that would be a separate process, and such a result cannot be achieved by any of the appellants by obtaining a good chit by personally approaching several members of the Association in their individual capacity. When the Association meets as a body to pass the resolution mentioned in the Explanation, it is not necessary for it to record its findings separately about each person mentioned in the resolution. It must not be forgotten that the Association meets to consider the general repute of the persons mentioned in the resolution, and not to determine whether individual allegations or incidents concerning them are proved or not.
28. Besides the resolution, individual members of the Association gave evidence against some of the appellants and others, and an attempt was made by the learned counsel for the appellants to assail that evidence on several grounds, including personal animus. We do not think it necessary to examine these contentions for the reason that the resolution of the Bar provided the necessary evidence of general repute as required by law, and it was only as a matter of abundant caution that the Association sought to produce additional evidence in support of its allegations against the appellants. Suffice it to say that the learned, Single Judge has given good reasons for accepting this evidence.
29. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that these appals must be dismissed not only on the ground that they are not maintainable under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, but also because the general repute of the appellants stands established on the record on the basis of the resolution validly passed by the Bar Association in this behalf, as contemplated by the Explanation to section 36(l) of the Legal Practitioners Act. We accordingly dismiss these appeals, with no order as to costs.
S. A. H.