This appeal is directed against a decision of the learned Labour Court, given on 9-3-1980, dismissing the grievance petition of the appellant, filed under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969, challenging the termination of his service on the ground that the appellant had received all his dues from the respondent Society and hence had ceased to be an aggrieved person and consequently he was not entitled to file a grievance petition.
2. The circumstances which have given rise to this appeal, briefly stated are that the appellant was employed as a teacher in the National Education Society, the respondent herein, and was teaching in the Little Folks School. On 25-4-1978, his services were terminated by the respondent Society, vide letter from the Deputy Administrator of the respondent Society, which reads as follows: - ---Mr. Mian Abdul Malik, Assistant Teacher.
Little Folks Secondary School, Karachi.
Dear Sir, We write to inform you that in accordance with terms of your agreement of service, your service with our School is terminated with immediate effect.
(2) We are paying you three months' salary in lieu of notice and your salary for the current month cheque for both of which for Rs.2,664 is enclosed.
(3) Your are also paid your Provident Fund dues, cheque for which Rs.1,775.57 of the Fund is also enclosed.---
3. The appellant challenged the termination of his services by way of a Civil Suit but the same was dismissed on 15-5-1978, on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in the matter. In the meanwhile, on 6-5-1978, the appellant served a grievance notice upon the respondent Society, but as he obtained no redress despite the service of a second grievance notice, dated 22-5-1978, he preferred a grievance petition before the learned Labour Court on 24-7-1978.
4. The grievance petition was resisted by the respondent Society on several grounds, including the ground that the appellant was not a workman and the establishment of the Society was not an industry. It also contended that the service of the appellant had been terminated in accordance with the terms of his employment agreement. The learned Labour Court repelled the respondent Society's contention that its establishment was not an industry and the appellant was not a workman but dismissed the grievance petition solely on the ground that the appellant having accepted his dues in full and final settlement was not entitled to file or maintain a grievance petition. In coming to this conclusion, it referred to the decision reported in 1975 PLC 318 and 1975 PLC 74.
5. I have heard Mr. Shaft Muhammad, Advocate, for the appellant and with his assistance have examined the record of the case. I am of the view that the appeal has no merits for more than one reason. In the first place, as held by the Labour Court, the appellant had accepted his dues given to him by the respondent Society at the time of termination of his services. Those dues included not only his salary for the current month but also 3 months salary in lieu of notice as also his Provident Funds. But unreservedly accepting those dues he had ceased to be an aggrieved workman as held by a Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the case of Majeed Baig v. Fatehally Chemicals Ltd.
6. The main ground, however, on which the appeal fails is that clearly the appellant is not a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders and consequently cannot enforce a grievance petition under section 25-A against the termination of his services, since a right to challenge the termination of services, which is founded on Standing Order 12, can only be challenged by a person who is a workman for the purpose of the Standing Order, as held by this Tribunal in the case of Johnson & Johnson v. Zubair Ahmad, decided on 10-10-1979. A person can only be deemed to be a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders if he is employed to do any manual or clerical work, whether skilled or unskilled, as pointed out by a Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the case of Muhammad Aqil v . S . L . A . T , PLD 1978 Kar. 649. A teacher in a Secondary School is not expected or ordinarily required to perform any clerical work. Even if he is required to do any such work it would be incidental to his main work of teaching. However, in the instant case, there is no evident that the appellant was required to do any manual or clerical work. The learned Labour; Court appears to have fallen in error in thinking that if any person is employed in an industry he necessarily must be a workman. A person may be employed in an Industry or Commercial establishment yet he may not be a workman for the purpose of the Standing Orders, unless he is employed to do any manual of clerical work.
7. Finally, it would appear that the grievance petition was filed beyond the period of limitation, as provided in subsection (4) of section 25-A, I.R.O. The first grievance notice given by the appellant to the respondent Society is dated 6-5-1978. The grievance petition, therefore, should have been filed within 2J months of that notice. In other words, C it should have been filed latest by 21-7-1978, but has actually been filed on 24-7-1978. As such, it was filed 3 days beyond the period of limitation.
8. In view of the above position, I find no merit in this appeal and accordingly dismiss it in limine.