' The respondent Mst. Pathani, a minor, filed a suit on 30-5-1984 through her mother acting as her next friend, for grant of a decree of jactitation of marriage. Petitioner contested the suit on the basis of written statement dated 3-10-1984 on the contention that she is major and had been lawfully married to him by her father with her own consent. The question of her minority was set down to be settled in issue No.1 and the lawfulness of her marriage in issue No.2, the third issue was that of relief. Parties led their evidence wherein petitioner relied upon a birth certificate produced as Exh.
D.1 and a Nikahnama as Exh. D.2 in support of his contention that she had been born on 23-3-1967 and was married on 27-3-1983 on the basis of Nikahnama Exh. D.2. Genuineness of both the documents was seriously contested. It was also confirmed by the observation of the learned Family Judge, recorded upon seeing her in the Court, that she is a minor and Secretary of the Union Council was ordered to be summoned with the original record at the expense of the defendant who, however, failed to comply with the direction with the consequence that genuineness of his documents was wilfully neglected by him to be established. The plaintiff-respondent examined Lady Doctor Ibrar Hashmi, who had medically examined her, to establish her age to be 111 to 12 years. For the reasons detailed at length in his judgment dated 14-11-1985, learned Family Judge concluded that the Nikahnama Exh. D.2 had been forged and was a false document. Such was also the finding reached by him with regard to the birth certificate which had been produced as Exh. D.1.
A decree for jactitation of marriage was consequently passed in her favour and against the defendant.
2. Petitioner challenged this decree by means of an appeal before a learned Additional District Judge who considered the evidence and concurred with the trial Court in his findings recorded as under:- "The statement of Nikah Khawan Muhammad Bakhsh D.W.6. Is doubtful as he relied upon a birth certificate Exh.D.1 which did not exist at the time of alleged marriage. The perusal of Nikahnama Exh.D.2 and birth certificate Exh.D.1 leads to the inference that both the documents do not bear genuine character. The observations of the learned trial Judge with reference to cuttings/over- writings in the documents are correct and the appellant has no satisfactory explanation."
' He also concluded that evidence of the petitioner was devoid of truth and authenticity so that the learned trial Judge had rightly discarded its credibility. Findings adverse to the petitioner recorded by the trial Court were also affirmed in the appeal with the conclusion that she had never been legally wedded with him and his appeal was dismissed on 19-1-1987.
3. Petitioner has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court to assail this decree on the main plea that the evidence of his witnesses including the Nikah Khawan D.W.6 deserved acceptance. There is no substance in this contention because the evidence of his' witnesses has been duly considered and rejected by the Courts below. Appraisal of evidence is the function of the trial and appellate Courts and their findings reached on the basis of record, more particularly the concurrent findings, are not open to be assailed even in a second appeal which has not been.
Provided by law in such cases and writ jurisdiction is much more limited in its scope so that it is not open to be exercised in absence of any illegality committed in the process of reaching findings of fact or any other error of jurisdiction committed by the Courts below. Neither of these two conditions has been made out in this case, therefore, the mere fact that one set of evidence was in the view of a litigant better than the other, does not furnish a basis for sustaining a writ petition.
Contention of the learned counsel is, therefore, 'repelled.
4. The only other argument attempted to be raised is that thelearned Family Judge had not held proceedings for reconciliation between the parties, with the object of effecting a compromise between them as per the requirements of section 12 of the Punjab Family Courts Act, XXXV of 1964, therefore, trial of the suit had been vitiated. I do not find any merit in this contention either.
Reconciliation or effort at effecting a compromise between the parties is not an indispensable requirement in every suit, to be resorted to without regard to the nature of the case and the controversy involved therein because when spoken of in section 12(1) of the Act, it is prefixed by the epithet 'another' which has reference to such an effort made earlier under section 10(3), where it has been conditioned upon feasibility and the expression used is, 'if this be possible' and is also preceded by the requirement to ascertain the points at issue between the parties. It is thus clear that effort at compromise or reconciliation can be made in appropriate cases only and whereas effort may be made for reproachment between a husband and wife, there cannot be any question of such an effort being made between a woman and a man whom she does not acknowledge to be her husband. The very nature of controversy raised in this suit negates the scope of conciliation, the idea whereof cannot fit in the framework of a jactitation of marriage suit. Moreover, such a plea was not raised by the petitioner in his memorandum of appeal filed before the learned Additional District Judge and a new plea is not open to be raised at this stage for the first time. The contention is without substance and is accordingly repelled.
5. There is no force in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed in limine.