This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lyallpur now Faisalabad whereby he on 9-3-1971 acquitted Iqbal, Falak Sher, Boots and Bahalak respondents of the charge under section 326/34, P.P.C.
2. The prosecution case was that the respondents in furtherance of their common intention launched attack on Muhammad Siddiq P.W. 5 and caused him grievous as well as simple injuries through acid and with Dangs.
3. To prove its case, the prosecution produced 7 witnesses. Latif P.W. 3, Muhammad Sharif P.W. 4 and Muhammad Siddiq P.W. 5 gave the ocular account of the occurrence. They supported the prosecution case. The medical evidence shows that Muhammad Siddiq P.W. Had received six injuries, out of which one was found grievous and the rest were of simple nature. The rest of the evidence is almost of formal nature.
4. When examined under section 342, Cr.P.C. The respondents denied all the incriminating circumstances. In defence one witness was produced.
5. The learned counsel for the State, submits that the learned trial Court could not have disbelieved Muhammad Latif P.W. 3 on the short ground that he had suppressed his relationship with Muhammad Siddique and Muhammad Sharif P.Ws. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondents has supported the judgment of the learned trial Court.
6. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties with care. 1 am of the view that since Muhammad Latif P.W. Has suppressed his relationship with the other witnesses, therefore, A he is a basically a dishonest witness and has given evidence with a motive other than of telling the truth. To disbelieve a witness, it is not necessary that there should be numerous reasons. If there is only one reason, that may be sufficient to discard the evidence of that witness. The learned trial Court has applied its conscious mind to the B relevant evidence and has considered the matter in accordance with the guiding principles laid down by the superior Courts. To my mind the judgment is neither perverse nor illegal. It is well settled that once an accused person is acquitted, then strong and exceptional grounds are C required to interfere with the judgment of the trial Court which I do not see in this case. There being no merit, the appeal is dismissed.