' AKHTAR HASAN, J.--This I .C.A. Arises out of the order dated 22-4-1985 of the learned Single Judge by which Writ Petitions Nos.1299/77 and 1602/77 were simultaneously disposed of.
2. A serious objection was taken to the maintainability of the I.C.As. And for that purpose, unnecessary details can be conveniently shorn off. In nutshell, the lands in dispute in both the Writ Petitions comprising Khatas 1.55 and 177 of village Maugjoo Chak and 393 in village Tanbuli allotted to the initial claimants respectively on 28-4-1964, 7-8-1968 and 28-10-1964, were cancelled on 10- 9-1977 on a Mukhbari application. Obviously, it evoked the two Writ Petitions which succeeded and hence the present I.C.As.
3. In support of the contention, reliance was placed on Muhammad Abdullah v. Deputy Settlement Commissiner etc. PLD 1985 SC 107 which was claimed to be on all fours with the present case. It was explained that in these "proceedings" the "original orders" were passed either in 1964 or 1968 when the lands were first allotted to the writ petitioners and that since those were then subject to the incidence of appeal under section 18 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, the I.C.As. Were barred by the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.
Emphasis was laid on the fact that the order dated 10-9-1977 by which the appellants' Mukhbari petition was accepted was not the "original order" for purposes of the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 and that for determining the maintainability of the I.C.A. It was entirely irrelevant.
4. On the other hand it was argued for the appellants that the order dated 10-9-1977 was no more amenable to appeal or revision etc. As by the time the Evacuee Laws had been repealed and hence the embargo placed by the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 did not apply to it.
5. There is not much for the appellants in their plea. Similar were the facts before the Supreme Court in the precedent case. The argument that the fresh order passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on 12-6-1975 ought to have been treated as the "original order" was held no longer acceptable nor was the contention allowed that after repeal of laws such an order was no more subject to any appeal, revision or review. The rule laid down was that the "original order" shall be deemed to be the order passed by the lowest officer or authority in the heirarchy. The test prescribed was to see if such an order was subject to an appeal or so under the relevant law then applicable.
6. The contention that the present appellants not being party to the orders passed in 1964 or 1968 had little right to challenge them in appeal, revision or review could not be accepted as precisely this very plea was repelled by the Supreme Court in the aforecited case. What has to be seen is not the right of the present appellants to challenge the original order, nor the adverse effect of the order impugned in the writ petition, but instead the availability of an appeal etc. Against the order which might have been passed initially in the proceedings started under the Statute. Obviously, it will take us back, at least in Settlement cases, to the original allotments even though the present appellants being not party to those proceedings, had no occasion whatsoever to impeach them.
The philosophy seems to be to present fait accompli of a matter which might have passed through the gruelling test of appeal, revision or review etc. Additionally the present appellants possibly could come to challenge it in appeal even as a third party by leave of the Court. Thus, they could not be heard saying that they had no occasion to call it in question. If they are raking up their right to get the property through Mukhbari now, perhaps they could avail their eligibility even at earlier stages by impugning the first ever allotment.
7. Consequently, we dismiss the appeals as being not competent.