A. R. SHEIKH, J.-The Chief Administrator of Auqaf (respondent No. 1) by notification dated the 26th of February 1971, under section 6 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance No. XXVIII of V64 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) published In the official Gazette of the 9th of March 1971, took over and assumed the administration, control, management and maintenance of the Dargah Syed Muhammad Ismail Shah (commonly known as Hazrat Karamanwala) in Chak No. 56/2.L. Tehsil Okara, District Sahiwal. The present petition under Article 98 of the abrogated Constitution Act of 1962 has been filed by Syed Muhammad All Shah Bokhari claiming that he being the son of the late Saint is the owner of the said property which is not Waqf. In the petition it has been further stated that the petitioner has made an application under section 7 of the Ordinance before the District Court Sahiwal for a declaration to the effect that the property in question is not Waqf property, and the same is pending before the said Court, but because the learned District Judge is precluded from granting the interim relief in the form of an injunction in view of the provisions of section 9 of the Ordinance, the petitioner having no other adequate remedy has been obliged to approach this Court for issuance of a proper writ for declaring that the impugned notification is without lawful authority, with the further prayer for restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession of the petitioner. The writ petition has been resisted.
2. The legal question raised in the writ petition being of great public importance, likely to arise in a large number of cases, we summoned the Advocate-General to assist the Court. He has accordingly appeared before us and argued the case. We have also heard learned counsel for the parties and we express our gratitude to all of them for the assistance rendered.
3. As the question of the property being Waqf or otherwise is pending before the District Court, the same has not been argued before us and we do not feel called upon to express any opinion on that part of the case.
4. The challenge to the action of the respondents rests on the contention that as the notification for taking over and assumption of control has been issued without a show-cause notice and hearing the petitioner or making an enquiry, the impugned action being violative of the principles of natural justice is without lawful authority and the ex post facto -hearing provided under section 7 of the Ordinance before the District Judge is not an adequate substitute for prior hearing. It is further contended that there being no express provision to the contrary in the Ordinance, the rule of audi alteram parten should be considered to have silently crept into the provisions of the statute.
Comparing sections 6 and 16 of the Ordinance, it is argued that even the intent of the Legislature appears to be that before having recourse to the drastic step of taking over the Waqf property under section 6 the person incharge of the Waqf property may be asked by the Chief Administrator, under section 16, to improve its management as par directions of the Chief Administrator and this process presupposes a show-cause notice and prior enquiry. It is contended that in accord with the legislative will section 16 is to be read as a rider to section 6 because the absence of a hearing before the decision is made is not adequately compensated for by subsequent hearing before the District court under section 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that whenever an exercise of power effects the rights of the private citizens that exercise of power is subject to observance of natural justice and he maintained that to this rule there seems to be no exception apart from a state of emergency prevailing in the country. In support of his contention he has relied on Manzur-ul-Haq v. Controlling Authority (PLD 1963 SC 652), Abdur Rahman v. Collector and Deputy Commissioner (PLD 1964 SC 461), University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmed (PLD 1965 SC 90), Abdus Saboor Khan v. Karachi University (PLD 1966 SC 536), Utahullah Roy v. Province of East Pakistan (1970 D L C 566) and Kundan Bibi v. Walayat Hussain (PLD 1971 Lah.360).
5. In order to appreciate the arguments addressed at the bar, it will be advantageous to give a short resume of the provisions of the Ordinance. The preamble of the Ordinance states that the Ordinance has been promulgated to consolidate and amend the law relating to management of Waqf Properties. Section 1 deals with short title, extent and commencement. Section 2 is the definition section. Sections 3 and 4 pertain to appointment of the Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Administrator and Deputy Administrator etc. Section 5 deals with other appointment. Section 6 is the main pillar of the Ordinance, around which the entire scheme of the Ordinance revolves. It empowers the Chief Administrator to take over and assume the administration, control, management and maintenance of the Waqf property by a notification. Section 6-A prescribes tire manner for eviction of persons wrongfully in possession of Waqf property and section 6-B vests the Administrator with the power to terminate a lease or resume a tenancy for breach of conditions. A person aggrieved by orders passed under sections 6-A and 6-13 may appeal to the Chief Administrator under section 6-C. Then comes section 7, which provides for a petition to the, District Court against notification for declaration to the effect that the property is not Waqf property, that the property is Waqf property within the limits stated in the petition. Section 8 deals with appeals to the High Court against the decision of the District Court. Section 9 provides for a bar against grant of temporary injunction in cases pending under sections 7 and 8. The decision of the District Court under section 7, if not appealed against and of the High Court under section 8 attain finality by section 10. Under section 11, the Chief Administrator shall, where the gross annual income exceeds Rs. 5,000.00, and in other cases may, settle a scheme for the administration of Waqf property taken over by him. Section 12 deals with sale of Waqf property by the Chief Administrator and section 13 prescribes the use of Waqf property and application of income therefrom. Then comes section 14 dealing with the obligation of tile Chief Administrator to maintain accounts. Section 15 provides for recovery of rents and lease moneys in respect of Waqf property as arrears of land revenue and section 16 deals with powers of the Chief Administrator .To call for returns and issuance of instructions and directions in respect of Waqf property, control of which has not been assumed by him. Bar of jurisdiction of civil Court is provided for under section 17; while section 18 deals with the effect of orders etc. Inconsistent with the Ordinance. Section 19 provides for protection of action taken under the Ordinance and section 20 enumerates various offences. Section 21 provides for power to frame rules and section 22 is the repeal and savings section. The survey above of the provisions of the Ordinance would show that each and every section provides for a specific situation which, may arise in a particular case. The Chief Administrator is empowered under section 6 to take over and assume the administration, control, management and maintenance of Waqf property. Sections 6 and 11 read together provide for settling of schemes for administration of Waqf property of which control has been assumed, while in cases where the Chief Administrator does not consider it necessary to assume administration, control, management and maintenance under section 6 and is of the opinion that a measure short of assumption of control will do, be has been empowered, under section 16, to require any person in charge of or exercising control over the management of any Waqf property to furnish returns, statements, statistics etc. Under section 16 (2), the Chief Administrator, can issue instructions and directions for the proper administration, control, management and maintenance of such Waqf property as he may deem necessary, to the person incharge of such property. There may be cases where despite action having been taken under section 16, the management does not improve and the Chief Administrator may find it necessary to assume control and he can then have recourse to section 6 but that does not necessarily mean that in every case before taking over the Waqf property under section 6, the provisions of section 16 should be resorted to. Even according to the well known rules of construction such a contention is not tenable. The intent of the Legislature is to be discovered from the statute as a whole, considering every provision thereof in the, light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself and endeavouring to make every part effective, harmonious and sensible.
Accordingly, the Court should see to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the statute by endeavouring to harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. If, however, two provisions, are irreconcilable, the provision last in order of 4 position may prevail, since it is the latest expression of the legislative will. Put differently, the proper method of construing a statute, which has different provisions, is not to come to a conclusion that one part overrides another part but to try and see whether different parts can be reconciled so as to give one complete picture.
Bearing this principle in mind, we hold that there being no conflict in sections 6 and 16, the provision last in order of position is not to be read as a rider to the earlier one. Learned counsel attempted to draw support for his contentions by referring to section 34 of the East Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, which is admittedly of overriding nature but when it was pointed out to him that the two provisions are not pari materia, he did not press the argument further.
6. We now turn- to the contention that in the written statement filed by respondent No. 1 it has been averred that because there were complaints from all over Pakistan, the Waqf property has been taken over by respondent No. 1 and as the action was punitive and not preventive in character, the petitioner was entitled to hearing to meet the accusation. We have gone through the pleadings of the parties sand we find that as a matter of fact, action has been taken by the Chief Administrator under section 6 of tile Ordinance and it was not necessary for the said functionary to come to a finding of fact against the petitioner before taking action, which is in no manner punitive. The decision of the Chief Administrator not being dependent upon the finding adverse to the petitioner, we do not See how it can be urged with success that a show-cause notice was necessary. The reference to complaints in the written state--ment is, therefore, of no avail to the petitioner, as at best the said complaints could be considered to be in the nature of information laid before the Chief Administrator of Auqaf and no more.
7. The scope of the right or interest that can be claimed by the petitioner as a person affected has next to be determined. The property being Waqf could have been assumed control of by Chief Administrator under section 6 of the Ordinance. That action of the Chief Administrator has be- n considered by the Ordinance not to be final as the very next section, namely, section 7, provides for a forum to scrutinize the correctness or otherwise of the notification. Under that section, a person affected may claim that the property assumed control of, is not Waqf or that the property is Waqf property within the limits e stated in the petition. Can the petitioner lay claim that the property may not be assumed control of even if it is Waqf property? Admittedly he cannot enforce any such claim. Therefore, viewing the question of application of the rule of audi alteram parten from that angle, the interim or provisional decision of assumption of control passed under section 6 will fall within the exception to the rule, especially when a hearing is provided for against such interim order. Some argument has been raised that an ex post facto hearing is negation of the rule of audi alteram parten. In this respect the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Md. Abdul Karim Khan v. Commissioner, Khulna Division (16 DLR, 624), has been strongly relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner, wherein while discussing the question of adequate remedy it was observed that "it has now become well settled that so far as the relief by way of prerogative writ is concerned it may be refused only where the alternative remedy available is equally inexpensive, expeditious and efficacious or if the right sought to be enforced is a statutory right, the statute has itself provided a special remedy. The alternative remedy, which will exclude the extraordinary relief by way of a writ, most be a remedlum juris of the kind indicated above and not merely one which at some time in the future will bring about relief." The learned Advocate-General argues that no doubt the rule of audi alteram parten is applicable even to adminis--trative action in view of Abdur Rahman v. Collector and Deputy Commissioner and Faridsons Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1965, Lah. 250) but this rule is not of universal application. He has referred us to Khushi Muhammad v. Commissioner, Multan Division (PLD1961SC537) to which judgment one of us (A. R. Sheikh, J.) was a party. In the precedent case while considering a similar contention the following observations, as per headnot0 (a) of the report, were made:- "A comparison of provisions of sections 4, 5, 5-A and 9 with the provisions of sections 40 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will show that wherever it was Intended by the Legislature that the persons affected will have a right to show cause, a distinct provision to that effect is made.
The omission in section 40 of a provision as regards notice to `person interested' in the land to be acquired for the benefit of a Company is, thus, deliberate; the underlying consideration being that the satisfaction of the Commissioner is not in the nature of an adjudication whither land belonging to a person shall be acquired for the benefit of a Company or not but is intended to provide material for determining whether the Government shall act on behalf of a Company in that behalf or not. The non-issuance of the notice to the petitioner in the inquiry under section 40 has, thus no effect on the validity of the consent given by the Commissioner to the acquisition in question.
The rule of natural justice is not of universal application."
The learned Advocate-General has invited our attention to the following two factors, which may exclude by implication) the application of the rule of audi alteram parten appearing in `Judicial Review of Administrative, Action' by S. A. De Smith Second Edition) under the Chapter Natural Justice; The Right to a Hearing" at pages 171 and 177:- "(3) Where legislation expressly rewires notice and hearing for certain purposes but imposes no procedural requirement fox other purposes.
(8) Where appropriate substitutes for prior notice and opportunity to be heard are available."
It is argued that although the Ordinance is silent about the right to show cause before action is taken under section 6, and also there is no express provision to the contrary, yet the very omission of a notice at that stage appears to be deliberate, because the action of the "Chief Administrator is of provisional nature and in the circumstances the proceedings under section 7 would be an adequate substitute for prior hearing. To the same effect, it is maintained, is the following observation in Abul A'la Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 673): I am prepared to concede that whenever an emergency requires the passing of an order without hearing the party concerned an order may be passed and to this extent there has to be a proviso to the maxim audi alteram parten but action can be taken ex parte only to the extent to which it is absolutely necessary. The ex parse order is in such cases to be regarded only as an interim order or a provisional order which will remain In force till a final order is passed after hearing the party concerned . . . . . . ."
The Advocate-General has also referred to the following observa--tions in Broom's. Legal Maxims (Tenth Edn.) at page 68 to illustrate the distinction maintained in judicial decisions as to the application of the rule in respect of interim and final judgments:- "Although cases may be found in the books of decisions under particular statutes which at first sight seem to conflict with the maxim, it will be found on consideration that they are not inconsistent with it, for the rule, which is one A elementary justice, only requires that a man shall not be subject to final judgment or to punishment without an opportunity of being heard."
The learned Advocate-General has also referred to American Law on the question of "due process of Law" in respect of property. The proposition expounded therein is that if property right is affected and hearing is given at some stage, it is sufficient compliance with the requirement of the principles of natural justice. He has relied on 94 Law. Edn. 1089, which is to the following effect:- "Even though discretion of any official may be abused, yet it is not a requirement of due process that there be judicial inquiry before discretion can be exercised, It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for hearing and a judicial determination."
The next citation is 88 Law: Edn. 894 wherein it is held:- "Where only property rights are involved, mere postpone--ment of judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for' the ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate."
The learned Advocate-General also relied on 75 Law. Edn. 1289 which lays down the following rule:- "where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of judicial inquiry into. Liability is not a denial of due process if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate."
On survey of the authority cited at the Bar, we are of the confirmed view that where a statute is a complete code itself and provides for a remedy for the action taken, the complaining party shall first avail itself of the remedy provided by the statute, especially when the impugned action is interim or provisional in nature. The dictim in Md. Abdul Karim Khan v. Commissioner Khulna Division (and we say so with the greatest respect) does not lay down that even in cases of interim or provisional orders, which are subject to scrutiny and a regular hearing by the forum provided for in the statute itself such subsequent hearing will not be an adequate remedy. The argument that absence of power to grant interim relief renders the remedy inefficacious is devoid of force. The main object before the Legislature was the proper management of Waqf properties and the action under section 6 being of emergent nature, if the Legislature in its wisdom had not considered I proper to permit the action of the Chief Administrator to be nullified, even temporarily, by giving powers to the District judge or the High Court, to issue temporary injunctions, it is not for this Court to question the reasonableness or soundness of the legislation. Even otherwise, when possession has been taken over by the Chief Administrator of some property which is proved to be not Waqf in a subsequent regular hearing, the "party affected" will be entitled to all reliefs available according to the law of the country. The contention that before the District Court the vires of the Ordinance cannot be canvassed and, therefore, the remedy is not adequate is merely hypothetical because no objection as to the vires of the Ordinance has been raised even in the proceedings before us.
8. The upshot of the discussion above is that the writ petition fails and is dismissed. However, the parties will be left to bear their own costs in view of the importance of the question raised.