ABAID ULLAH KHAN, J.--The relevant facts and circumstances culminating in the present Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge, dated the 13th July, 1967, dismissing the second appeal of the appellants may be shortly stated as follows. One Mehr Allah Yar was the original tenant of 4,270 Kanals 9 Marlas of the Government land in dispute situate in the area of Chaks Nos. 17/8BR, 18/8BR, 5/8R and 6/8R, Tehsil Khanewal, District Multan. He owned as full proprietor other immovable property as well. He died on the 24th August, 1921, leaving behind two widows, Mst. Sahib Bibi and Mst. Bakhat Bhari and two daughters, Mst. Sardar Bibi respondent 1, and Mst. Gul Bibi, appellant 6. His third degree collateral, Wali Muhammad, laid claim to his estate under custom as his adopted son and also on the basis of the deed of will, Exh. D/15 (said to have been executed by Allah Yar in his favour). The Revenue authorities sanctioned mutation of succession to the land in which Allah Yar had full proprietary rights in the name of Wali Muhammad. However, as his adoption had not been ratified by a registered deed for the purpose of succession to the tenancy in dispute (4270 Kanals 9 Marlas) the revenue authorities ignored his claim and in the absence of male issue sanctioned mutation regarding devolution of succession to the tenancy in the names of Mst. Sahib Bibi and Mst. Bakhat Bhari in equal shares. On the 23rd December, 1930, Mst. Sahib Bibi died. Wali Muhammad tried in vain before the revenue authorities to assert his claim to the half share of the tenancy land left by her. Her share of the tenancy land was mutated in the name of Mst. Bakhat Bhari on the 2nd June, 1932. On the 6th July, 1932, he instituted civil suit against Mst. Bakhat Bhari for possession of the land left by Mst. Sahib Bibi. On the 16th June, 1935, he succeeded to secure a consent decree whereby he and Mst. Bakhat Bhari were to hold 4,270 Kanals 9 Marlas of Government land in dispute in equal shares. At that moment Wali Muhammad was the husband of the sister of Mst. Bakhat Bhari and Mst. Bakhat Bhari's daughter, Mst. Gul Bibi, appellant 6, was the wife of Wali Muhammad's son, Muhammad Nawaz. After some time Mst.Bakhat Bhari and Wali Muhammad paid Government dues and acquired proprietary rights in the entire land measuring 4,270 Kanals 9 Marlas in equal shares. On the 11th October, 1955, Mst. Bakhat Bhari expired. Mutation (copy Exh. P/5) with regard to inheritance of half share of the land in question held by her was attested in favour of the heirs of her deceased husband and there is no dispute relating thereto.
2. On the 7th October, 1958, Mst. Sardar Bibi, daughter of Mst. Sahib Bibi from Mehr Allah Yar and two others, claiming themselves to be the heirs of Allah Yar under Muslim law, filed against Wali Muhammad and others suit for a declaration that the above referred to compromise decree obtained by Wali Muhammad against Mst. Bakhat Bhari on the 16th June, 1935, was void and inoperative on their rights and for issuance of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession of the 5070/11520th share of half of 4,270 Kanals 9 Marlas of land which had devolved on Mst. Sahib Bibi. In the meantime Wall Muhammad alienated the land in dispute by means of oral gift to defendants 1 to 4. The plaintiffs in the suit claimed that in view of the close relationship which Wali Muhammad had with Mst. Bakhat Bhari he had brought a collusive suit and obtained an equally collusive decree as a result of compromise for possession of the land in dispute. They maintained that actually by means of the decree Mst. Bakhat Bhari had transferred the land to Wali Muhammad which being life tenant she was not competent to do under the provisions of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. Vide his judgment, dated the 27th January, 1964, the learned trial Court formulated the view that the compromise decree in fact amounted to transfer of the land by Mst. Bakhat Bhari in favour of Wali Muhammad, which, for lack of the requisite permission of the Collector, violated the provisions of section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, and was altogether void, ineffective and not binding on the plaintiffs. This finding was affirmed by the appellate Court of the learned Additional District Judge, Multan, who dismissed the appeal against the decree of the learned trial Court on the 13th June, 1964. The same was endorsed in further appeal by this Court. The learned Single Judge finding that the plaintiffs were not in constructive possession of the land as co- sharers allowed them leave to amend the plaint so as to ask for possession of their 5070/11520th share of the entire land in dispute and decreed their suit to that extent.
3. The learned Single Judge has given detailed reasons for repelling the contention of the appellants that the impugned decree was a bona fide family settlement and was not hit by the provisions of section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the process of reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge to reach the conclusion that the compromise decree was nothing more than a mere cloak for the transfer of the estate by Mst. Bakhat Bhari to Wali Muhammad who had not even a vestige of any right in him to succeed to the tenancy lands held by' Mehr Allah Yar and there being no real dispute about the succession to the land in question the compromise and the decree could not be treated as bona fide family settlement. The alleged adoption of Wali Muhammad to the tenancy land in dispute had not been ratified by a registered deed as required by section 20 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. Therefore, succession to the tenancy could not have devolved on him. His status of being an adopted son under the customary law could have enabled him to inherit the proprietary land but it could not help him claim any share in the tenancy land. He had tried time and again to claim succession to the tenancy land in dispute after the death of Mehr Allah Yar and Mst.1 Sahib Bibi but had failed because his adoption was not found to have been ratified by a registered deed. Consequently Mst. Bakhat Bhari's consent to the decree in his favour, when he had no right in the tenancy land in dispute, could not but be taken to be transfer of the tenancy land. Such a transfer admittedly took place without the requisite. Sanction of the Collector and was as such void under section 19 of the) Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912.
4. The appellants' contention that the transaction should be taken to be viodable and not absolutely void finds complete answer in the judgment of the learned Single Judge and we respectfully subscribe to his views.
5. The impugned decree being void it cannot create bar of res judicata, as asserted by the appellants, against the present litigation. The plea of limitation which has been adequately dealt with by the' learned Single Judge is not sustainable. The impugned decree being void did not exist in the eye of law and was not required to be set. Aside. Even otherwise the plaintiffs had no right to sue for possession C of the land during the lifetime of Mst. Bakhat Bhari; the right accrued to them only after her death. Therefore, under Article 141 of the Limitation Act, 1908, they could have brought suit for possession within twelve years of her death. The possession of the alienee in such a case was not adverse to Mst. Bakhat Bhari much less to the plaintiffs. It may be mentioned that no serious attempt was made to persuade us to differ from the findings of the learned Single Judge.
6. The learned counsel for the contesting parties are at one on the point that the share of the plaintiffs-decree-holders has been entered in the judgment under appeal slightly in excess of what it ought to be. They have been given 5070/11520th share whereas they are entitled to 4960/11520th share (plaintiffs 1, 2 and 3 are respectively entitled to 4560/11520th, 80/11520th and 320/11520th share). Accordingly the plaintiffs' share of 5070/11520th set out in the judgment and decree under appeal is corrected to be read as 4960/11520th. With the aforesaid minor modification in the plaintiffs' share this appeal is dismissed with costs.