The petitioner Hafiz Azim Bakhsh, a displaced person from Jullundur, had filed a claim in respect of property abandoned by him in India under Schedules I, III and IV of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Deputy Claims Commissioner, by his order dated the 26th of August 1957, verified the claim to the extent of Its.
3,10,080 under Schedule I and Rs. 69,768 under Schedule VI. On appeal the Additional Claims Commissioner, by his order dated the 26th or June 1958, enhanced the verified amount under Schedule I to Rs. 3,40,080 and under Schedule VI to Rs. 71,792. The petitioner was, however, still not satisfied and filed a revision petition which was accepted by Mr. Khurshid-uz---Zaman, the Claims Commissioner, by his order dated the 14th of July 1959 and the amount of the claim was further enhanced to Rs. 3,89,680 under Schedule I and to Rs. 79,356 under Schedule VI. The petitioner had also filed a claim relating to agricultural land which was separately examined by the Central Record Office and verified in respect of an area of 20 Kanals and 16 Marlas by an order passed on the 27th of March 1962.
2. On the 6th of February 1962 one Umar Draz Khan gave information to the Director, Enforcement Police, alleging that the petitioner's claims was bogus and fraudulent. The Director, Enforcement submitted a report to the Claims Com--missioner on the 3rd of June 1962 and the case was entrusted for review to Sheikh Muhammad Rafiq and then to Mr. Saeed---uz-Zaman. Notices were issued to the petitioner in this behalf --on the 1st and the 23rd of July 1963. The petitioner challenged the legality of these notices by filing Writ Petition No. 707 of 1963 which was, however, dismissed in limine by a-. Division Bench of this Court on the 10th of March 1965 on the ground that a new subsection (3-A) had been added to section 7 of the Act by Ordinance XIII of 1964 by which it had been provided that the Claims Commissioner could at any time before the-- 31st day of March 1965 review any order passed under subsec--petition (3) of the same section. It may be stated that the re-opening of the case had been challenged by the petitioner mainly on the ground that the final order of the Claims Commissioner dated the 14th of July 1959 could not be reviewed after the expiry of the prescribed period of ninety days. This argument being no longer available in view of the introduction of the new subsection (3-A) in section 7, the petition was dismissed.
3. When the matter went back to the Claims Commissioner the last date fixed for purposes of review by the newly added, subsection (3-A) of section 7 of the Act had expired, and accord--ingly an objection was raised on behalf of the petitioner that the matter could not proceed. However, in his order dated-- the 29th of May 1965 the learned Claims Commissioner observed that it was contended before him on behalf of the Department-- that the proceedings were not merely for review, as there was material to show that the Enforcement Staff had made a recom--mendation to the Claims Commissioner that sanction be accorded for the prosecution of the petitioner under section 14 of the Act. The learned Claims Commissioner therefore, observed that the question could not be decided without recording evidence, and he accordingly fixed the case for production of evidence on the: 3rd of July 1965. No progress was made on the 3rd of July 1965 and the case was adjourned to the 30th of July 1965, when it was stated by the learned Claims Commissioner that the evidence of the Enforcement Staff had already been completed and an opportunity should be given to the respondent (i.e. The present petitioner) to adduce his evidence. The case was, adjourned to the 16th of October 1965 on which date another-- application was presented on behalf of the petitioner pointing out that the power of review was no longer in existence after the 31st of March 1965. However, this objection was overruled' by the learned Claims Commissioner on the game day by observ--ing that to all intents and purposes the proposed action against the petitioner purported to be under section 14 of the Act, and: there was no limitation in respect of such action.
4. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner has filed the-- present petition, and the main ground urged on his behalf by his learned counsel Mr. Saeed Akhtar is that in view of the specifies provision contained in subsection (3-A) of section 7 of the Act the Claims Commissioner has no jurisdiction, after the 31st of March 1965, to re-open the matter by way of review of the previous order of the Claims Commissioner dated the 14th of July 1959, and the same result cannot be allowed to be achieved by saying that the present proceedings are under section 14 of the Act. It is submitted by the learned counsel that by a notification issued on the 10th of July 1956 Claims Officers and Deputy Claims Commissioners have been authorised to file complaints under subsection (2) of section 14 of the Act, but this power cannot be construed as conferring on them any jurisdiction to re-open claims which already stand finalised under subsection (5) of section 7 of the Act.
5. On behalf of the Claims Department the submission made by Mr. Hidayat Ullah, the learned Settlement Commissioner (Legal), is that in the present case serious allegations of fraud have been levelled against the petitioner, and for the first time a notice in this behalf was issued to him on the 1st of July 1963, but because of the pendency of his previous writ petition in the High Court the matter could not proceed, and when his previous petition was dismissed on the 10th of March 1965, there was not sufficient time for the Claims Commissioner to complete the review proceedings by the target date, namely, the 31st of March 1965, as laid down by the newly added subsection (3-A) of section 7 of the Act. In these circumstances, the learned Settle--ment Commissioner submits, the present proceedings against the petitioner are under section 14 of the Act which deals with fraud and is independent of the power of review conferred by sub--section (3-A) of section 7 of the Act. Mr. Hidayat Ullah further points out that the final order of the Claims Commissioner relates only to one of the units of the property claimed by the petitioner and does not deal with the other units regarding which also allegations have been made in the information given by Umar Draz Khan. It is submitted by the Departmental Representative that the proceedings under section 14 being in the nature of independent proceedings, can continue irrespective of any question of limitation as laid down for the purposes of review by subsection (3-A) of section 7 of the Act.
6. Section 14 of the Act declares that "any person who-
(a) submits, in respect of his claim under this Act, any information which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true, or
(b) fraudulently conceals or misrepresents facts for the purpose of making a claim which he knows to be false, either wholly or in part, or
(c) submits a claim in respect of the same property to more than one Registering or Additional Registering Officer. shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine, or with both". Subsection (2) of the same section contemplates that the Claims Commissioner, or any other person authorised by the Central Government in this behalf, may order the forfeiture of any allotment or other benefit obtained as a result of any act which is punishable as an offence under this section. Section 15 prescribes the penalty for abetment, and section 16 lays down that "no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act save upon complaint in writing made by an officer authorised by the Central Government by general or special order in this behalf".
7. From the provisions of law reproduced above it will be seen that section 14 defines certain acts of omission or com--mission which have been made punishable with imprisonment and/or fine as criminal offences. Subsection (2) of section 14 gives additional power to the Claims Commissioner to order the forfeiture of any allotment or other benefit obtained as a result of any act which has been made punishable as an offence under the section. Now, while it is true that before deciding to take action by way of prosecution or forfeiture the Claims Commissioner or any other officer authorised by the Central Government in this behalf shall have to examine the order on verification which may have been obtained by the person con--cerned as a result of the acts of omission or commission described) in the section, yet the process undertaken by this officer is not essentially a process of review of the order made final under the provisions of section 7 of the Act. The process of scrutiny involves something more, namely, a decision whether the order has been obtained by practising fraud or misrepresenta--petition etc., and whether the circumstances justify penal action by way of prosecution or forfeiture of the benefits obtained as a result of such a fraudulent claim. It seems to me, therefore, that action under section 14 of the Act is indeed independent of the action which may or may not be taken by way of review under subsection (3-A) of section 7 of the Act. If the final order is not that of the Claims Commissioner the power of revision vesting in this officer under subsection (3) of section 7 of the Act could be invoked in appropriate cases for modifying the order of verification passed by a subordinate Claims Officer, but such an order does not by itself conclude the proceedings in so far as section 14 of the Act is concerned. To put it differently, while undoubtedly a decision to take action under section 14 would involve a scrutiny of the last verification order passed in respect of the claim concerned, yet the process is much more than a mere review under sub--section (3-A) or revision under subsection (3) of the Act. On this view of the matter, the proceedings under section 14 would appear to be independent of any proceedings under section 7 of the Act, and could, therefore, be taken irrespective of the limitation prescribed in subsections (3) and (3-A) thereof.
8. The same view was expressed by a Division Bench of this Court comprising Ortcheson and Shakirullah Jan, JJ. In Writ Petition No. 719 of 1962, Ahmad Din v. The Clams Commissioner etc., decided on the 1 of October 1964, Their Lordships accepted the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the Claims Commissioner could not exercise the power of revision after thest prescribed date without applying his mind consciously to the question of limitation, but they observed that action under section 14 was certainly competent as there was no period of limitation prescribed for such proceedings. In coming to this conclusion the learned Judges relied upon observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Farooq Imam v. The Claims Commissioner (PLD 1964 SC 585) to the effect that "in accordance with section 14 the Claims Commissioner can, if he finds a claim to be false, deprive the claimant of the benefit which he may have received, and it is correct as contended by the respondent that there is no limitation for an inquiry under this section. There is nothing, however, on the record to indicate that the Claims Commissioner was acting under this section------...". Those observations undoubt--edly lend support to the contention raised on behalf of the Claims Department that action under section 14 of the Act is not governed by any period of limitation and is independent of the power of review or revision conferred by section 7 of the Act.
9. It was, however, submitted by Mr. Saeed Akhtar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the two judgments men--tioned above were delivered before the law was changed by Ordinance XIII of 1964 on the 28th of December 1964 by which the new subsection (3-A) was introduced and definite time limit, namely, the 31st of March 1965, was prescribed for exercis--ing the power of review. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that section 7(3-A) and 14 deal with the same subject, namely, the question of reviewing a previous order of verification of the claim, and as there is conflict between the two, the subsequent legislation as embodied in subsection (3-A) of sec-- petition 7 should prevail as against section 14 which is earlier in time. In support of this last submission the learned counsel has placed special reliance on the following observations appearing on pages 153 151 of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition:- "An author must be supposed to be consistent with himself, and, therefore, if in one place he has expressed his mind clearly, it ought to be presumed that he is still of the same mind in another place, unless it clearly appears that he has changed it. ---------------.The law, therefore, will not allow the revocation or alteration of a statute by construction when the words may be capable of proper operation without it. It cannot be assumed that parliament has given with one hand what it has taken away with the other. But it is impossible to construe absolute contradictions.
Consequently, if the provisions of a later Act are so inconsistent with, or repugnant to, those of an earlier Act that the two cannot stand together, the earlier stands impliedly repealed by the later."
10. It is true that the judgment of the High Court as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mr. Hidayat Ullah were delivered before the new subsection (3-A) was introduced on the 28th of December 1964, but the principle enunciated therein is not affected by this new provision of law. The question in both cases was whether the proceedings under section 14 of the Act were independent of the power of revision or review as conferred by the various provisions of section 7 of the same act and the answer returned was in the affirmative. This position is not altered by the fact that Ordinance XIII of 1964 prescribes a specific time limit, namely, the 31st of March 1965, for exercising the power of revision or review, instead of laying down that such power could be exercised within the prescribed period of ninety days. The distinction between the two sections remains operative in either case.
11. Maxwell's observations regarding inconsistency between two provisions of the same statute or between the provisions of two different statutes enacted by the same Parliament have no bearing in the present context for the reason that the power of taking action for fraud or misrepresentation as conferred by section 14 of the Act is clearly of a much wider import than the power of review or revision granted by section 7 of the same R Act. There is, therefore, no inconsistency between the two provisions, and in the very nature of things it must be held that the Legislature was consciously conferring power on the relevant authorities to take action for fraud or misrepresentation irrespective of any question of limitation arising in that behalf.
12. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that action under section 14 of the Act can proceed against the petitioner irrespective of the fact that the power of review conferred by C subsection (3-A) of section 7 of the Act could no longer bed exercised after the 31st of March 1965. As a result, the petition' fails and is hereby dismissed, but in view of the legal questions involved, the parties are left to bear their own costs.