MAMOON KAZI, J. --This appeal under S.3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, has been filed against the judgment passed by the Single Judge of this Court, dated 14th October, 1984, in C. P. No. 268 of 1972.
By a short order, dated 25-2-1986, the appeal was allowed by us, for the reasons to be recorded separately.
2. The facts of the case are, that employment in the State Bank of Pakistan, the appellant in this case, was governed at the relevant time by the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Service (Maintenance) Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is alleged that on 27th June, 1972, the Central Labour Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as the respondent No.1, who was then specified authority constituted under section 6 of the Act, went to the appellant Bank in consequence of an illegal strike which had taken place there. During such visit the respondent No.1, after holding informal discussions with some of the officials of the Bank as well as Class II Officers working therein, issued directions according to which all Class I Officers serving in the appellant Bank, after issuance of such directions, were to be treated as "workmen", as defined in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, (hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance').
3. It has been further alleged that some incorrect statements were made by the respondent No.1 in the said directions as the appellant was shown to have been represented by one Mr. I .H. Qarni, Director Administration in the appellant Bank who in fact, was not present at the time of discussions allegedly held by the respondent No.1. It is further said that on the same day, the respondent No.1, addressed letter to the General Secretary of the State Bank of Pakistan Employees onion, informing him that the former had taken cognizance of the industrial dispute under the provisions of the Act, further advising that some issues specified therein would be heard on 1st July, 1972.
4. Thereafter, representation was made by the appellant on 30th June, 1972, whererin objection was taken in regard to the powers of the respondent No.1, to issue such directions as specified authority under the Act. However, the respondent No.1, un 1-7-1972 issued further directions against the appellant in respect of some of their employees. The appellant, thereafter, challenged all such directions issued by the respondent No.1 by means of Constitutional Petition No. 268 of 1972, which was disposed of by the impugned judgment, dated 14th October, 1984, by the learned Single Judge.
In the impugned judgment it was held that the order passed by than respondent No. 1, dated 1st July, 1972, whereby directions in respect of some of the appellants employees were given by the said respondent was contrary to law, but as regards the order, dated 27th July, 1972, whereby all Class II Officers of the appellant Bank were declared to be "workmen" within the meaning of the Ordinance, the same was held to be valid.
5. We have heard Mr. Khalid Anwar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Shahenshah Hussain, learned counsel for the respondent No.7. None appeared for respondents Nos. 1 and 6. Respondents No.2 to 5, who were originally joined as parties to this appeal were later dropped by the appellant.
6. The only contention of Mr. Khalid Anwar before us has been that section 6 of the Act did not empower the respondent No.1 to confer status of "workmen" on Class II Officers of the appellant. The said section under which jurisdiction was purported to have been exercised by the specified authority, inter alia provides: "6. (1) The Central Government, may make rules regulating or empowering a specified authority to regulate the wages and other conditions of services of persons or of any class of persons engaged in any employment or class of employment to which this Act applies.
2. When any such rules have been made or when any directions regulating wages or conditions of services have been given by an authority empowered by such rules to give them, any person failing to comply therewith is guilty of an offence, under this Act."
7. It will not be out of place to mention that the Act which has been enacted to provide for maintenance of certain essential services, applies through its own force to every employment under the Federal Government and to such other employment or class of employment declared by notification in the official Gazette to be the employment or class of employment to which the Act applies. When any such declaration has been made in respect of any employment or class of employment, then section 6 of the Act provides that the Federal Government may by rules regulate or empower a specified authority to regulate the wages and other conditions of service of persons engaged in such employments. It may also be mentioned that in 1962 the Federal Government made rules under section 6 of the Act, known as the Essential Services (Maintenance) Rules, 1962, thereby empowering the respondent No.1 to regulate wages and other conditions of service of persons engaged in such employments.
8. Turning to Mr. Khalid Anwar's argument, it was contended by him that section 6, only empowered the specified authority to regulate wages and other conditions of service of employees which did not include power to confer a particular status under another enactment on certain employees of the appellant. According to Mr. Khalid Anwar, interpretation of the term "regulate" occuring in section 6 of the Act clinched the argument. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on Karachi Electric Supply Corporation v. National Industrial Relations Commission PLD 1982 SC 113 and Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. v. Central Labour Commissioner and 5 others PLD' 1982 Kar. 33, wherein, import of the word "regulate" was examined. In the first cases, the Supreme Court, after referring to various dictionary 'meanings of the term observed as follows: - "Further, it seems to me that section 5, as worded, puts an over all premium on the cessation of employment and subsection (2) of section 6 of the Act, renders the employees or the employer liable to penal action punishable under section 7 for contravening any Rules framed by the Central Government or a direction of the specified authority regulating wages or conditions of service of persons or any class of persons engaged in such employment. In Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary at page 1138, this word is defined to mean, 'to control, to adapt, or to adjust by rule.' It is synonymous with the word 'control' or 'govern'. Accordingly, in ordinary parlance it implies the right to prescribe and enforce all such proper and reasonable rules as may be deemed necessary and wholesome in conducting an avocation in a proper and orderly manner. This seems to be the proper meaning to be given to this word in the context of guideline as used in section 6(1) of the Act and rule 3(1) of the Rules of 1962."
In the other case, decided by a Full Bench of this Court, it was held: - "On the consensus of judicial authority and dictionary meaning of the word 'regulate' it appears that the word truly and faithfully implies only a power to create circumstances and to lay down principles or rules to continue the existence of an existing state of affairs in a fair or proper manner.
It further connotes the obtaining of a sort of uniformity in matters of conduct so that arbitrariness, whimsicality and capriciousness is avoided."
9. As far as interpretation of the term "regulate" is concerned, that presents no difficulty, but it is not the meaning of the term "regulate" alone which requires interpretation as the words "conditions of service" also require examination. These words have not been defined in the Act. However, the word "condition" according to its dictionary meaning, means a term of contract, or something which must precede the operation of a cause: or a provision upon which obligation depends. See Chamber's 20th Century Dictionary. Accordingly, power to regulate conditions of service, would therefore, mean only such power by which rules are made or directions are given for future guidance of employers and employees for governing relationship between them.
10. We may now advert to the question, whether the respondent No.1, could confer the status of "workmen" on Class II Officers of the appellant? According to Mr. Shahenshah Hussain, the learned counsel for the respondent No.7, such power does fall within the ambit of section 6 of the Act, as according to the learned counsel, what the specified authority, by declaring certain employees of the appellant as workmen in fact, meant was to make all such terms and conditions of service applicable to them as are applicable to workmen under the Ordinance. This argument proceeded on assumption that the Ordinance deals with terms and conditions of service of workmen. Before we examine these contentions, it would be advantageous to reproduce the definition of the term "workmen" as given in section 2 (xxviii) of the Ordinance: The same reads: - "2 (xxviii) 'Worker' and 'workman' means any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as a supervisor or as an apprentice) in an establishment or industory for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor, whether the terms of employment by expressed or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay off or removal has led to that dispute but does not include any person:-
(a) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity or,
(b) who being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding rupees one because of the nature of duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of managerial nature."
11. The purpose of (sic) its preamble is (sic) to formation of trade union, regulation of relations between the employers and workmen and avoidance and settlement of difference or disputes arising between then and matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto. An examination of various provisions of the Ordinance makes it manifest that it is mostly procedural in nature. Mr. Shahenshah Hussain has, however, argued that subjects like formation of trade unions, right of strike, redress of individual grievances, etc. Clearly relate to conditions of service. Be that as it may, but these matters primarily and essentially relate to procedure as the subjects with which the Ordinance deals include formation and registration of trade unions, raising and settlement of industrial disputes, certain offences and their trials, etc. Since these are matters purely relating to precedure, we cannot agree with Mr. Shahinshah's contentions that the Ordinance deals with condition: of service of workmen.
12. Once again turning to Mr. Khalid Anwar's argument, the impugned directions, dated 27-6-1972, do not specify any conditions of service for Class II Officers of the appellant as all that has been said therein is that from the said date, all Class II Officers of the appellant were to be treated as "workmen" as defined in the Ordinance, as amended Whether a person is or is not a workman under the Ordinance, depend upon the nature of duties for which he has been employed. But as a result of the impugned directions, all the provisions of the Ordinance as were applicable thereunder to workmen also became applicable to all Class II Officers of the appellant, irrespective of their nature of duties Such directions, therefore, besides being vague, are bound to conflict not only with the provisions of the Ordinance but even with those of the Act itself under which the respondent No. l was exercising jurisdiction and are clearly outside the scope of section 6 of the Act. To quote for example, the Act prohibits strike or lock-out but the Ordinance on the other hand, concedes such right to workmen or employers as the case may be. Apart from that, section 6 of the Act only empowers the specified authority to, issue directions touching such matters as fall within the ambit of regulation of wages and other conditions of service The power, in our opinion, therefore, extends only to such matters would relate to fixation of wages, appointments and promotions of employees, fixation of their seniority, matters relating to their leave pension, efficiency and discipline and other similar subjects, as such matters, in our opinion, relate to conditions of service of employers. If any doubt exists in this respect, reference may be made to Civil Servant Act, 1973, which deals with conditions of service of persons in Civil service of Pakistan, or any other similar enactment.
13. We are, therefore, clearly of the view, that the impugned directions are clearly outside the scope of section 6 of the Act or rules made thereunder and the respondent No. 1 has acted in excess of power; vesting in him under the law. For such reasons, this appeal was allowed by the order passed by us on 25-2-1986 and the said directions giver on 27-6-1972, were set aside.
14. In view of the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.