NAIMUDDIN, J.--This is a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution filed on 5-10-1980, by the petitioner in the following circumstances.
2. Superintendent of Police Traffic Branch, Karachi, respondent 3 issued a show-cause notice, dated 3-10-1978, requiring the petitioner to show cause against the charge of omission and misconduct is that on the night of 4th/5th September, 1978 he illegally proceeded abroad and returned to Karachi on 9th September, 1978 and on his return he was apprehended alongwith 2 Army Officers by army authorities and that he was involved in espionage activities and was subsequently detained under section 2(1)(d)(ii) of Pakistan Army Act.
3. The petitioner submitted his explanation admitting that he went to London while on medical leave and since he was afraid that he had some serious trouble with his glands he went for medical check-up giving an application to his younger brother to deliver it at his office, requesting for Ex-Pakistan leave. According to the petitioner he, however, returned to Karachi on 9th September, for want of sufficient funds. As regards the allegations of involvement in espionage activities, he explained that these allegations were based on some misunderstanding and that he was not detained and that could be verified from army authorities.
4. However, the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not found satisfactory and respondent 3 by an order, dated 5-12-1978, dismissed him from service with immediate effect finding him guilty of misconduct.
5. Aggrieved by the order, the petitioner filed an appeal with the Deputy Inspector-General Police, Karachi Range, Karachi, respondent 2 who rejected It by the order, dated 17-5-1979.
6. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a mercy petition/ Reyision application, dated 19-5-1979 with the Addl. Inspector-General of Sind Police who by the order, dated 3-9-1979 partly accepted it and re- instated the petitioner with immediate effect, treating off duty period as leave of the kind one. He, however, awarded punishment of reduction of salary by Rs.14 in the time-scale Rs.335-14-447/16- 575 for a period of one year having no cumulative effect. Respondent 2 in paragraph 4 of the order observed as follows:- "I have examined all the relevant record of proceedings. The only charge remained against him now is that he left, Pakistan without proper permission and punishment of dismissal from service is too harsh for this lone charge. In view of this, his appeal is accepted and he is re-instated in service with immediate effect. The duty off period is to be treated as leave of the kind due."
7. Thereafter, the Inspector-General of Police respondent No. 1, after the petitioner had already partly suffered the punishment awarded, issued a show-cause notice, dated 22-3-1980, requiring the petitioner to show cause why order, dated 3rd September, 1979, should not be annulled thereby reviving the order of dismissal from service passed by the Superintendent of Police, Karachi, dated 5-12-1978.
8. The petitioner challenged the show-cause notice in this Constitutional Petition. However, during the pendency of the petition the petitioner was dismissed from service on 1st of October, 1980. He, therefore, with the permission of the Court, amended the petition also challenging the order of his dismissal.
9. The petitioner has challenged the order as being in violation of the principle of natural justice, void, corum non judice on several grounds in which we need not to go for the reasons which we may state /immediately. A perusal of the petition shows that it relates to terms and conditions of the petitioner in the service of Pakistan and, therefore, the jurisdiction of this Court is barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of 1973.
10. Mr. Azizur Rehman Khan Survery, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that orders which are void, corum non judice and nullity are not excepted from the jurisdiction of this Court and he has relied upon in support of his submission on:-
(1) Saeed Hassan v. Province of Punjab and others 1981 PLC 297.
(2) Turaj Ahmed Khan v. D.I.-G. Police, Multan PLD 1982 Lah. 464.
(3) Wali Ahmad v. Government of Sind and 6 others 1982 PLC (C.S.) 1.
(4) Muhammad Afzal Khan v. Karachi Development Authority PLD 1984 Kar. 114.
11. There is no doubt that the first case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner supports him but in view of Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Abdul Bari v. Government of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1981 Kar. 290 this could not be considered to be a good law. We may here quote paragraph 8 of the Full Bench Judgment wherein the two cases on which the learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court relied upon namely, Mujeebullah Aijaz v. D.-G. T&T Department PLD 1980 Quetta 58 and Afzal Hussain Syed v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1980 Lah. 697 have been expressly dissented from paragraph 8 read as follows:- "It has, however, been contended, on the aforesaid premises, that the present petitions would still be competent before this Court for a number of reasons. It is first contended that even though the order of the nature in question before us may be appealable before the Tribunal nevertheless the High Court has always been held to have jurisdiction under Article 199 in respect of order which are mala fide, ultra vires or coram non judice. The argument is that "that the availability of an alternate remedy under the Statute has never been recognized as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 in respect of orders of the nature mentioned. In fact some of the decisions of the High Courts referred to above, have taken this view. I may mention the Full Bench judgment of the Baluchistan High Court in Mujibullah Aijaz's case already referred to earlier. In this case the Court expressed the opinion that no appeal will lie before the Tribunal, inter alia, in a case "When the order is not passed by a competent departmental authority and is for such reason void". In Afzal Hussain Syed v. Government of Punjab PLD 1980 Lah. 697 also it was held that an order of retirement,. As in the present case, was appealable before the Tribunal, nevertheless the "High Court may also intervene if the order is void, or coram non judice on the face of the record". The reasoning in these cases proceeds on the basis that orders which are mala fide, ultra vires of the authority passing them or coram non judice are null and void in law and, therefore, any Court before which they are brought is not only entitled, but bound to are ignored them. With all due respect for the learned Judges we are unable to agree with the proposition. In the first place before a Court could examine whether an order is really of the nature mentioned above it must have jurisdiction to undertake the examination and determine the question. As soon as it is shown that, a particular order of the departmental authority lies within the ambit of the Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the civil Courts including the "High Court is ipso facto ousted as a result of the barring provisions of Article 212. The High Court would, therefore, not be competent on any ground to examine the validity of an order which falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The decision on which reliance seems to have been placed for the view canvassed in support of the arguments related to the ouster of jurisdiction under sub-constitutional legislation and in relation to finality clauses in statutes. Apparently in such cases the power of judicial review available to the High Court under Article 199 is not affected and, therefore, recourse can be had to the extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge such orders on the ground of nullity. But the situation under Article 212 is entirely different. The ouster contemplated under that Article is of the constitutional nature and, therefore, of necessity curtails the jurisdiction of the High Court totally in respect of the subject-matter committed to the Service Tribunals. The second important reason is that the plain reading of the provisions of clause (2) of Article 212 leaves no manner of doubt that these provisions did not envisage concurrent jurisdiction of the civil Courts and the Tribunal in regard to any matter on any ground in respect of the terms and conditions of service. The situation contemplated in the said provisions is that the jurisdiction conferred on the service Tribunals and the jurisdiction vested in the civil Courts in respect of the terms and conditions of service of civil servants is mutually exclusive, so that the field covered by "the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal is totally outside the jurisdiction of the civil Courts including the High Court. That orders which are mala fide, ultra vires or coram non judice are within the ambit of Service Tribunal has been held in several cases. In Igan Ahmed Khurrum v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1979 Kar. 610 a D.B. Of this Court held that orders which are ultra vires or violative of rule of natural justice or void were within the competency of the Service Tribunal to determine ............ Such being the scope of the powers of the Service Tribunal, we have no manner of doubt that all the grounds of attack urged before the Tribunal including of grounds of mala fide, ultra vires and coram non judice are within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal to determine and, therefore, it follows that the High Court will have no jurisdiction to grant relief on those grounds in respect of orders appealable before the Service Tribunal."
12. Now, so far as the case of Turaj Ahmad Khan is concerned it was decided about 5 months earlier-of the Full Bench decision but it does not take into consideration the bar provided under Articles 212 of the Constitution.
So far as the other two cases of Wali Ahmed and Muhammad Afzal Khan are concerned, it may be stated that in those cases the petitioners were not Civil Servants, therefore, the question of bar of jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution was not raised or even considered.
13. We are, therefore, of the opinion that though the petitioner bona fide, filed this petition in view of various decisions of different High Courts but in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Abdul Bari's case by which we are bound, we hold that this Court has no jurisdiction in the matter of the nature on hand. Accordingly, petitioners remedy lies with the Service Tribunal and not with this Court. We would, therefore, dismiss this petition with no 1 order as to costs as earlier than the decision of the Full Bench there was difference of opinion on the question as where an order was impugned as void, corum non judice or nullity a petition could or could not be maintained in the High Court. The petitioner may seek his remedy with the Tribunal according to law, if so advised.
A. A