' The petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging order, dated 10-5-1976 passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner respondent No,6 whereby portion 'B' of property No,S-I-56-S-3, situated in Gawalmandi, Lahore, was transferred to the petitioner, his brothers Noor Ahmad, Sardar Ahmad respondents Nos.4 and 5 and the legal heirs of his deceased brother Muhammad Shafi, respondents Nos.1 to 3 in equal shares. His grievance against the aforementioned order is that respondents Nos.1 to 3 were not entitled to get any share in the property as their predecessor-in- interest Muhammad Shafi had died before coming into force of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 with the result that the provisions of section 4 of the Ordinance under which the heirs of a pre- deceased son or daughter are entitled to succeed to the estate of the propositus alongwith the other heirs so as to get the share of the pre-deceased son or daughter, as the case may be, were not applicable to the case. It has also been contended that respondent No,6 had no jurisdiction to review the order of his predecessor passed on 5-3-1974 whereby the petitioner, his two brothers respondents Nos.4 and 5 and their mother Mst. Begum Bibi were, given the property in question and the claim made by respondents Nos.1 to 3 to get a share in the property as being the heirs of Muhammad Shafi, who had died during the lifetime of the father of the petitioner and respondents Nos.4 and 5, was turned down.
2. Briefly stated the relevant facts of the case are that the disputed property was allotted to Muhammad Shafi deceased son of Sheikh Daulat Ali alias Daula and it was occupied by Sheikh Daula, his wife and four sons. Sheikh Daula, being a claimant, applied for transfer of the property and submitted C.H. Form in that behalf. Muhammad Shafi allottee of the property died before it could be transferred to his father Sheikh Daula. On 17-5-1960, Noor Ahmad respondent got the suit property transferred in his name claiming to be the sole heir of Sheikh Daula. Sheikh Daula died on 27-9-1960 and after his death P.T.O. Issued in favour of Noor Ahmad respondent was amended vide orders, dated 26-11-1966 and 26-4-1967 passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner whereby the names of other heirs of Sheikh Daula excluding respondents Nos.1 to 3 were incorporated. Later on, the property was resumed under the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on 21-2- 1970. On appeal against the said order, the case was remanded by the Additional Settlement Commissioner on 12-3-1970. It was during the course of proceedings pending before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner that respondents Nos.1 to 3 submitted an application so that their names were incorporated in the P.T.O. As heirs of Muhammad Shafi deceased. This application was, however, dismissed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner vide order, dated 5-3-1974. A revision petition was filed against the aforementioned order and the Settlement Commissioner, after hearing the parties, remanded the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for consideration of the claim of respondents Nos.1 to 3 vide order, dated 6-3-1975. After remand of the case, respondent No,6 examined the claim of respondents Nos.1 to 3 and came to the conclusion that respondents Nos.1 to 3 were entitled to get the share of their father in the disputed property to which he would have succeeded in case he had survived his father Sheikh Daula. The above order was passed by respondent No,6 on 10-5-1976 which has been challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition.
3. The petitioner's objection that respondent No,6 had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, as he could not review the earlier order passed by his predecessor on 5-3-1974 whereby the claim of respondents Nos.1 to 3 was rejected, is not tenable for the simple reason that order, dated 5-3- 1974 had ceased to exist when the Settlement Commissioner, in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction, had remanded the case vide order, dated 5-3-1975, to respondent No,6 for deciding it afresh.
4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the provisions of section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 were not attracted to the facts of the case, as both Sheikh Daula and Muhammad Shafi had died before coming into force of the above Ordinance. He has also submitted that the instructions contained in Memo. No,II-C(2)/J/57/7359, dated 11-5-1957 issued by the Claims Commissioner of Pakistan that for the purpose of claims, the children of a person who died in the lifetime of his/her father are to be treated as rightful claimants to the share which their father would have inherited on which reliance has been made by respondent No,6, in the impugned order, were also not applicable in the present case, because the claim of Sheikh Daula had been registered during his lifetime when his son Muhammad Shafi was also alive. The above instructions were not applicable for determining the heirs of a deceased claimant entitled to the transfer of evacuee property against the claim of the deceased claimant.
5. There is no doubt that Sheikh Daula and his son Muhammad Shafi had both died before the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, was promulgated, but the question of entitlement to the transfer of the property in dispute was decided only after the promulgation of the aforementioned Ordinance. Sheikh Daula died on 27-9-1960. His application for transfer of the disputed house was pending at the time of his death. It was only on 18-11-1963 that P.T.O. No,832992 transferring the property in the name of Noor Ahmad respondent was issued. The Mulsim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 was in force on the aforementioned date. Before the issuance of P.T.O., no legal right had accrued in respect of the disputed property to any heir of Sheikh Daula deceased. It was only at the time of issuance of the provisional transfer order that the question to who were entitled to succeed to Sheikh Daula was determined by the Settlement Authorities. In other words succession to the estate of Sheikh Daula deceased opened on 18-11-1963 when it was decided to issue the provisional transfer order in the name of his heirs. In the impugned order, there is a reference to order, dated 17-5-1960 whereby Noor Ahmad respondent got the property in question transferred in his name, but this order has no legal existence because Sheikh Daula was still alive and as such the property could not be legally transferred to Noor Ahmad respondent as heir of Sheikh Daula. The relevant date for the purpose of determining the heirs of Sheikh Daula deceased is 18-11-1963 when the P.T.O.
Was actually issued by the Settlement Authorities. Respondents Nos.1 to 3 were entitled to claim the share of Muhammad Shafi deceased in the suit property by virtue of section 4 of the -Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 as the question .Of succession to the estate of the deceased' had arisen after the promulgation of the Ordinance.
6. Learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 t2 3 has contended that the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect and as such this Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction should not interfere in the matter. There is considerable force in the above argument of the learned counsel, because it cannot be said that respondent No,6 had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. The petitioner's objection that respondent No,6 could not review the order passed by his predecessor has been found without any substance. The only ground on which the impugned order can be assailed 'is whether the order has been made by respondent No,6 without lawful authority. Obviously respondent No,6 had jurisdiction to decide the case after it "had been remanded by the Settlement Commissioner. The mere fast that he has not decided it correctly, as contended by the petitoner, does not justify interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
In Muhammad Hussain Munir etc. v. Sikandar etc. PLD 1974 SC 139 it was observed that where a Tribunal or Court had jurisdiction to determine a question of fact or law, it cannot be said that it acted illegally or with material irregularity merely because it came to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law. An erroneous interpretation of the provisions of a statute by a Tribunal would not make an order passed by it as being without lawful authority so as to provide a ground for interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Mian Jamal Shah v. Member Election Commission PLD 1966 SC 1 may also be referred in this connection.
7. The upshot of the above discussion is that the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect and as such cannot be regarded as without lawful authority. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed with costs.