1. After hearing Mr. M.M. Prizada for the petitioner, Mr. Azizullah K. Shaikh, for respondent No.2 and Mr. Akhlaq Ahmed Siddiqui for the State, this Criminal Revision Application was dismissed by short order, dated 17-2-1986 for reasons to be recorded separately. Following are the reasons in support of the said short order.
2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that on 9-11-1979 at about 4-45 p.m. The occurrence took place at the hotel of Moula Bux in Village Kohi. It is alleged that respondent Dad Darim came to the hotel and exchanged hot words with deceased Dad Rahman, the driver of his vehicle over rendition of account with regard to use of the vehicle. Apart from complainant Haji Abdullah, Arab and Jamal were present at the time of occurrence, They tried to plead with the parties but the respondent /accused did not listen to them. He demanded of the deceased to settle the accounts there and then or else he would tear of his stomach. On refusal of the deceased to comply with such demand the accused took out knife from the folds of his Shalwar and inflicted injury to him on his right leg Dad Rehman's was first taken to police station Malir where F.I.R. Was lodged. Thereafter, he was referred to Jinnah Hospital where he breathed his last on the following day. After due investigation the accused was sent up in Court to take his trial under section 302, P.P.C. But the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi by his judgment, dated 24-4-1982 acquitted the accused. This Revision Application is directed against the said judgment.
3. It was contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that the findings of the trial Court are contrary to the admission made by the accused himself. In support of this argument he referred to the F.I.R. Lodged by the accused in the counter-case pointing out that although the accused has admitted the presence of complainant Haji Abdullah at the time of occurrence, yet the learned trial Judge has expressed his doubts about his presence at the Vardat. In this connection he invited my attention to the observations made by the learned Judge which appear at page 9 of the impugned judgment and read as under:- "P.W. Moula Bux has stated that complainant Hap Abdullah resides at Gadap which is 17 miles from the Hotel. Under the circumstances there was no reason for him to come to the place of incident."
4. As against the above observations the F.I.R. Of the counter-case produced by S.I. Muhammad Niazuddin clearly shows that complainant Haji Abdullah was one of the persons who were present at the place occurrence at the time of incident. However, the question arises if the learned trial Judge had doubted the evidence of the complainant Haji Abdullah solely on the ground of his being resident of Gadap situate 17 miles away from the place of occurrence. On perusal of the appraisement of the evidence made by the learned trial Judge, it would appear that he has given alternate argument for disbelieving the said witness. He has observed that in view of the admission of the witness that he is deaf and can only hear not beyond the distance of 2/3 paces and that too not very clearly, it is not possible to believe him that he could hear talks that transpired between the deceased and the accused and as such his evidence does not inspire confidence. Thus, the doubt expressed by the learned Judge about his presence at the time of occurrence is not the only reason to disbelieve Haji Abdullah.
5. The learned counsel for the applicant further argued that the witnesses should not have been disbelieved by the trial Court only because they did not make mention in their evidence about the injuries received by the accused. According to him it was not necessary that the injuries found on the person of the accused were caused to him in course of the incident of this case. I regret I cannot accept this argument. It is an admitted position that two counter-cases have been filed in respect of the same incident. In F.I.Rs. Of both the cases the place of the occurrence is same. As state above it was the learned counsel's own argument that the findings of the learned trial Judge were inconsistent with the admission made by the accused in his counter-version. Even the age of the injuries discovered on the person of the accused was found by the trial Court to tally with the timing of the incident. In view of all this material, the argument that accused might have received the injuries at different place and under totally different circumstances is devoid of any substance.
6. It appears that the prosecution seem to have relied upon the injuries of the accused as a piece of evidence in support of their case. Therefore, there is no manner of doubt that the accused had received the injuries in course of the same incident. However, all the witnesses including the complainant has suppressed this aspect of the case, as they are conspicuously silent in this regard. On the other hand even the accused has denied having caused any injury to the deceased.
7. When both the parties are found to have suppressed some important facts the tasks of the trial Court is rendered difficult, as it is unable to arrive at definite conclusion with regard to such facts. In the instant case each side has suppressed the fact of causing injuries to other side. In such circumstances the observation of the learned trial Judge that the possibility of the accused having acted in self-defence was more probable is not without force. In support of his observations he has rightly relied on the case of Safdar Ali PLD 1953 FC 93 wherein it was held that on examination of whole evidence if the Court is of the opinion that there is reasonable possibility that the defence set up by the accused might be true, such view would react on the --whole prosecution case and the accused would be entitled to benefit of doubt not as matter of grace but as a matter of right.
8. Apart from above it is admitted that no acquittal appeal been filed on behalf of the State. This shows that the Government did not think fit to challenge the acquittal of the accused in appeal.
9. Moreover, the reasoning that has prevailed with the learned trial Judge for acquitting the accused cannot, by any standard, be regarded as --perverse or absurd. Even, if alternate argument can be advanced for the purpose of believing any particular witness, the order of acquittal cannot be disturbed on such ground unless the reasoning supporting the acquittal is palpably wrong or perverse. The learned counsel for the applicant has not been able to point out any such flaw in the judgment of acquittal. The scope of interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction is very limited. Nevertheless, it can make probe even into the facts of the case, if the Court is convinced that the view taken by the trial Court is patently wrong or it is so foolish, perverse or absurd that it cannot be sustained. But that is not the case here.