' C.A. REHMAN, J.--This order would dispose of Civil Miscellaneous Petition No, 4134/C of 1984 submitted by the appellant in the present appeal, Civil Miscellaneous Petition No, 4138/C of 1984 in R.F.A. No, 132 of 1984 and Civil Miscellaneous Petition No, 4142/C of 1984 in R.F.A. No, 133 of 1984 submitted by Said Ahmad Khan appellant seeking condonation of delay in filing these appeals by invoking the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908. These 'three appeals have arisen out of three pre-emption suits instituted by the appellant to pre-empt three sales of agricultural land effected by means of registered sale-deeds, dated 20-5-1979 by his father Haji Muhammad Saleem Khan in favour of the respondents. All the three suits were consolidated by the learned trial Court and were dismissed by judgment, dated 6-6-1982. The appellant challenged the aforementioned judgment by filing three separate appeals in the Court of the District Judge.
Learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala to whom these appeals were entrusted ordered the return of memoranda of appeals, vide his order, dated 10-7-1984 on the ground that in each case, the jurisdictional value for appeal exceeded his pecuniary jurisdiction of Rs,50,000. After the return of memoranda of appeals, the appellant submitted the same in this Court and alongwith appeals, filed applications under section 14 of the Limitation Act praying exclusion of the time taken in pursuing the appeals in the District Court for computing the period of limitation. The appeals were formally admitted to hearing subject to the determination of the question of limitation for which notice was issued to the respondents in the applications under section 14 of the Limitation Act. The respondents have opposed these applications and we have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length in support of their respective contentions.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the jurisdictional value of the suit, as shown in the decree sheets was less than Rs,50,000 and the appellant on the basis of that value had rightly filed the appeals in the District Court. Although, the learned trial Court had determined the jurisdictional value of the suits on the basis of the market value of the land in dispute in each case and the value so determined was in excess of rupees fifty thousand, no amendment was made in the plaint to give effect to the above decision of the Court. Consequently, the value of the suits as shown in the plaints was entered in the decree sheets notwithstanding the above determination by the learned trial Court. According to the learned counsel, the appellant had been pursuing his appeal in good faith in the District Court and as such in computing the period of limitation, the time taken in the District Court should be excluded as provided for in section 14 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the order of the learned Additional District Judge returning the memoranda of appeals is illegal and without jurisdiction, as the appeals had been rightly filed in the District Courts for the reason' stated above.
3. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that after the determination of valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction by the learned trial Court, the proper foruip of*appeal was the High Court as the jurisdictional value in each case exceeded rupees fifty thousand. It was immaterial whether any amendment was made in the plaint or not to give effect to the decision of the learned trial Court regarding valuation of suits for purposes of jurisdiction. The appellant cannot question the legality of the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge returning their memoranda of appeals, as he has not challenged the said order in the appeals filed in this Court. The appellant is not entitled to the concession available under section 14 of the Limitation Act in the circumstances of the present case, because the appellant or his counsel cannot be said to have acted in good faith by filing the appeals in the District Court which in view of determination of jurisdictional value by the learned .Trial Court lacked pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the appeals. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the decisions in Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar PLD 1977 SC 102; Mirza Muhammad Saeed v. Shahab-ud-Din and 8 others PLD 1983 SC 385; Mahmooda Begum and others v. Major Malik Muhammad Ishaq 1984 C M R 890; Bashir Ahmad v. Government of the Punjab and others 1985 C M R 333 and Mian Aizad Bakhsh v. Sheikh Muhammad Afzal 1985 C M R 1003. He has contended that negligence of the counsel in filing the appeals in a wrong forum in the circumstances, noticed above, does not entitle the appellant to the concession available under section 14 of the Limitation Act.
4. We have given anxious consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. It has been rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the respondents that the appellants cannot assail the order of the learned Additional District Judge whereby their memoranda of appeals were returned in the present appeals which are directed only against the judgments and decrees, dated 6-6-1982 passed by the learned trial Court. The appellant may seek his remedy against the aforementioned order by moving this Court separately if permissible under the law. The appellant has presented the memoranda of appeals in this Court in compliance with the aforementioned order of the learned Additional District Judge. After having done so, he cannot plead that in good faith he has been pursuing his appeals in the District Courts. If he had filed the appeals in the district Court under some wrong legal advice, he cannot be heard to say that he had acted in good faith and that the case fell within the purview of section 14(1) of the Limitation Act. As wrong legal advice or negligence of the counsel are no longer considered as valid grounds for condonation of delay in view of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the cases cited by learned counsel for the respondents.
' For the reasons stated above, we find no merit in the petitions filed by the appellant under section 14 of the Limitation Act and the same are hereby rejected. Since the appeals have been filed in this Court long after the expiry of period of limitation and the delay in filing the same cannot be condoned, the appeals are dismissed as being barred by time. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.