' This petition under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitutional Order, 1981 is directed against the orders of the learned Commissioner dated 4-5-1980 and the learned Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, dated 9-7-1985 whereby Sikandar Ali respondent No,3 was appointed as Lambardar.
2. Facts, briefly stated, are that the post of Lambardar of ChakNo,417/EB, Tehsil Burewala fell vacant on the death of Hassan Din Lambardar in 1977. Rustam Zaman petitioner who is the son of the deceased Lambardar and Sikandar Ali respondent, amongst others, applied for appointment as Lambardar. District Collector, Vehari appointed the petitioner as successor Lambardar on the ground that he was the son of the deceased Lambardar and was also a graduate. Order of the District Collector was challenged in two separate appeals, one filed by Sikandar All respondent and the other by Muhammad Amin. Learned Commissioner, Multan, accepted the appeal of Sikandar Ali respondent and appointed him as Lambardar setting aside the appointment of the petitioner on the ground that he was not a permanent resident of the Chak as he was employed in the National Bank of Pakistan at Karachi. Petitioner as also Muhammad Amin filed two revision petitions which have been rejected by the learned Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue vide order, dated 9-7-1985. It was conceded before the learned Member that the petitioner was employed in the National Bank of Pakistan. Learned Member, therefore, took the view that he could not be considered as permanently residing in the Chak and as such he was not a suitable choice for appointment as Lambardar.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned counsel for Sikandar Ali respondent who has appeared at the limine stage.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not denied that the petitioner was employed in the National Bank of Pakistan at Karachi and was, therefore, not permanent resident of the Chak. He has, however, contended that the instant case falls under rule 19(2) of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968 whereunder hereditary claim is given overriding importance and as such the fact of the petitioner being an absentee from the Chak was immaterial. Learned counsel has referred to a ruling of the Board of Revenue reported in PLD 1975 Rev.
41. The case cited by the learned counsel is of no help to him because the person appointed as Lambardar in that case was found to be residing in a contiguous Chak and it was, therefore, held that he would be able to perform his duties as Lambardar.
4. No doubt, in cases falling under rule 19(2), nearest eligible heir according to the rule of primogeniture is to be appointed as successor to the office of headman. The appointing authority, however, can ignore him on any ground which would necessitate or justify th dismissal of a Lambardar. This is so provided in clause (c) of sub-rul (2) of Rule 19 which is reproduced hereunder:- "The Collector may also refuse to appoint a person claiming as an heir, on any ground which would necessitate or justify the dismissal of that person , from the office of the headman."
Rule 18 lays down the grounds for dismissal of a Lambardar. Ground relevant for the purpose of the present case is contained in clause (c) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 18 according to which a headman is liable to be dismissed if "owing to age or physical or mental incapacity, or absence from the estate, he is unable to discharge his duties:"
' Now the combined effect of the provisions of Rule 19(2)(c) and Rule 18(2)(c) is that a person claiming appointment to the office of Lambardar on the basis of his being an heir of the deceased Lambardar can be ignored if he is an absentee from the Chak and is, therefore, unable to perform the duties and functions of the Lambardar. Needless to observe that the continued presence of the Lambardar in the Chak is necessary for performing the functions of his office.
5. In view of the legal and factual position stated hereinabove, petitioner did not have any absolute right to be appointed as Lambardar by virtue of being a son of the deceased Lambardar. Relevant authorities undoubtedly had the jurisdiction to refuse to appoint him on the ground that he would not be able to perform the duties and functions of the office of Lambardar on account of his absence from the Chak. Learned Commissioner, therefore, acted lawfully in upsetting the appointment of the petitioner on the ground of his absence from the Chak. Quite evidently, petitioner being employed at Karachi was unable to discharge the functions as Lambardar.
Learned Member, Board of Revenue, in dismissing the petitioner's revision petition has also attended to the relevant aspects of the matter and has rightly held that notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner was the son of the deceased Lambardar, he was not suitable for appointment as Lambardar because of his permanent absence from the Chak. Thus the impugned orders passed by the learned Commissioner and the learned Member, Board of Revenue did not suffer from any illegality or jurisdictional defect and are, therefore, unexceptionable.
6. Apart from what has been held above, the petitioner cannot claim to have any vested right to be appointed as Lambardar appointments to which office are made to facilitate the performance of administrative functions. That being so, petitioner is not entitled to any relief in writ jurisdiction.
Reference may pertinently be made to the following observations of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Abdul Ghafoor v. The Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue and another 1982 SCMR 202:- "No one has a vested right to be appointed as Lambardar and the relevant authorities select the persons best suited for the purpose with a view to facilitate the performance of administrative functions entrusted to Lambardars. In the present case all the competent authorities on the revenue side i.e. Collector, Commissioner and the Member, Board of Revenue after considering merits of both the sides, have ultimately selected Nawab Khan, respondent for the office in question. The learned Judges of the High Court were, justified in observing that even if the final order of the Member Board of Revenue is assumed to be erroneous it could not be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court."
' For what has been said above, there is no merit in this petition which is dismissed in limine.