1. On 3-5-1969 Mian Abdul Ghani and Haji Abdul Hameed responder filed suit for possession by pre- emption of house situated in Wai No. 17 City Khanpur. The suit was resisted, issues were framed, evidence of the parties was recorded, arguments were heard and the case w fixed for announcement of judgment when on 13-11-1977 respondent plaintiffs moved application under Order XIII, rule 2, Order VIII, 2 and section 151, C.P.C. For permission to produce and tender evidence additional documents i.e. Registered sale deeds. The applicate was contested. The trial Court, however, accepted the same on 6-12-195 hence this revision.
2. 2.The learned counsel for the respondents contended that impugned order being not a "case decided" within the meaning of sect 115, C.P.C., the revision is not maintainable. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that not only the impug order was a case decided but also there was no legal justification the trial Court to allow application for the production of document: late stage inasmuch as that tantamounts to filling in the lacuna in evidence. Further, no good cause was shown for the non-production the documents at an early stage. Learned counsel for the respond supporting the impugned order on merits relied on PLD 1981 255 to contend that rules relating to filing and reception of document has to be liberally construed in favour of documents being allowed put in evidence, and that the discretion once having been exercise favour of the respondents, it is not a fit case for interference exercise of the revisional jurisdiction.
3. 3.I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned co, for the parties with care. As for the preliminary objection raise the learned counsel for the respondent, I am of the view that the "case" is wide enough to include interlocutory order on question permission to produce and tender in evidence additional document Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Rehman Dad and an v.
4. Major Raja Sajawal Khan, etc. Reported as 1976 SCMR 35(1 held that order finally deciding whether a party is entitled to pr evidence amounts to a case decided and revision application a such order is maintainable. Coming to the merits I find that the was filed on 3-5-1969 and that the case was at the stage of announce of judgment when application for additional evidence was moved the trial Court on 12-11-1977. In the application, no cause at all was shown for the non-production of the document at an early stage. The grounds taken therein were:- the trial court on 12-11-1977. In the application, no cause at all was shown for the non-production of the document at an early stage. The grounds taken therein were:- It is worth notice that although these documents were not filed with the plaint, yet no reason for non-production thereof was given in the application. The trial Court accepted this application on the only ground that the documents were not forged one. In para. 2 of its order, the Appellate Court stated:- "2. The relevant facts giving rise to this revision petition are that the petitioners had pre-empted the sale of the house in dispute as described in the title of the plaint on payment of Rs.3,000 on the basis of having the property contiguous to the house in dispute. The suit was resisted by the respondents and the parties were put to trial on as many as four issues. After closing of the evidence of the petitioners, they filed an application under Order XVI, rule 1, C.P.C. Wherein they sought permission to produce more witnesses in their evidence. The learned trial Court had partly accepted the application of the petitioners and allowed them to produce witnesses No.3 and 4 on payment of Rs.10 as costs. He had disallowed witnesses No.l and 2 to be produced in rebuttal evidence of the petitioners".
5. It is thus obvious that the question of receiving the document at subsequent stage of the proceedings was not appreciated by the trial Court in its true perspective. To my mind, even documents of unquestionable authenticity cannot be received at subsequent stage unless good cause for non-production thereof is shown to the satisfaction of the court. The real question, therefore, for consideration was the good cause to be shown by the applicant for the non- production of the documents at an early stage but the trial Court failed altogether to B consider this aspect of the case and without satisfying itself as to the good cause for the non-production of the documents, at an early stage allowed documents to be produced. To my mind, in the instant case the trial Court exercised its discretion arbitrarily and as such it is a fit case for interference with the impugned order. Even before me the learned counsel has not been able to show good cause for the non---production of documents at an early stage.
6. For what has been stated above, the revision is accepted and the impugned order, dated 6-12-1977 is set aside leaving the parties to bear their own costs.