1. Facts giving rise to the Civil Revision under section 115, C.P, C may briefly be s'4!Ed as follows: By deed of sale registered on 12-7-1977 one Muhammad Nazir sold suit property consisting of 34 Kls. 11 MIS. t Rajasab Khan for a sale price of Rs.45,000. Mahmood Hussain to Gulistan Khan, as heirs (collaterals) of the vendor and co-sharers, pre-empted the sale of suit property. Price paid for the suit property was also disputed and plaintiffs offered to pay Rs. 30, 000 which they stated was the price fixed in good faith and paid and it was also the market value of the suit property. Vendee denied the right to pre-empt as also the allegations about sale price. It was pleaded that suit property was bona fidely purchased for Rs. 45, 000 and that the sale price was actually paid to the owner of the suit property. On 11-1-1979, vendee conceded plaintiffs' superior right of pre-emption and also agreed that suit may be decreed subject to the payment of Rs.39,000. On this very day, plaintiffs accepted the offer and expressed their willingness to pay Rs.39,000. By consent, suit for pre-emption was decreed in favour of pre-emptors. They were directed to deposit sum of Rs.39,000 minus Zar-e-Panjam into Court by 24th of January, 1979, and in default of payment by the pre-emptors, their suit was deemed to have been dismissed. Parties are not in dispute as to the facts enumerated so far.
2. Admittedly, last date fixed for payment of decretal amount in the Court, fell on 24-1-1979.
3. Unfortunately for the decree-holders, on this day Presiding Officer was not there as 24th January was declared a holiday. On 25th January which was a Thursday, the pre-emptors wrote out an application in which after stating that they were directed to pay Rs. 30,000 till 24-1-1979 which was observed a holiday, they sought permission to tender the decretal amount in Court. On the' back of this application Rana Muhammad Jahangir, learned Civil Judge, Gujar Khan observed: "25-1-1979. Applicants' counsel present. On account of closed day on 29-1-1979 the amount could not be deposited and time for banking business having run out, Naib Nazir is directed to receive Rs.
4. 30,000 from the applicants, keep the amount in custody and deposit the same in the Treasury on 27-1-1979".
5. 26th January being Friday was a closed day. It is not in dispute that the amount was deposited in the bank on 27-1-1979 but as to the manner and mode of the deposit as also the actual tender of amount on 25-1-1979 there is a serious dispute between the parties. Meanwhile, vendee applied to Court for release of decretal amount to him. On the report of relevant officials, it was noticed that the decretal amount except Zar-e-Panjam was not in deposit. On discovery of default, an application was filed by the vendee that inasmuch as Rs.30,000 had not been paid into the Court by the pre-emptors by the final date fixed by the Court, the suit should be deemed to have been dismissed b.8 force of pre-emptory provisions of Order XX, rule 14, C.P.C. As also the terms in which the pre-emption decree was couched. Court, on the examination of record, as also the provisions of law relied upon, found that default was there and observed, on 31-7-1980, that the pre-emption suit was deemed to have been dismissed. Pre-emptors appealed. D succeeded and resulted in remand, on 30-4-1984. Learned Additional District Judge observed: "The case is remanded back to the learned lower Court to examine the said Civil Nazir as a witness and to provide the parties a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine him and then to decide the petition under section 47, C.P.C. Moved by respondent in accordance with law." Remand order was not challenged by either party and it attained finality. When the case was returned to the Court of first instance, it proceeded to record the statement of Muhammad lqbal, Naib Civil Nazir as C.W.1 on 14-3-1985.
6. Parties also availed of their right of cross-examining the witness. On 4-4-1985, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that deposit of decretal amount in the Bank on 27-1-1979, in the circumstances of the case was "valid deposit and was within prescribed time" and rejected the application of judgment debtor/vendee. Reading of the judgment given on 4-6-1985 shows that the Court was of the view that faithful compliance with the terms of the decree was proved to have been made by the decree-holders. These findings were upheld by the learned lower appellate Court.
7. The main ground urged by Mr. Bashir Ahmad Ansari, Advocate for the petitioner Rajasab Khan was that the learned Judges of the Courts below had clearly misdirected themselves in finding that the terms of decree were, in letter and spirit complied with by the decree --holders so as to divest the vendee of his title to the suit property. His main reliance was on rule 14 of Order XX, C .P . C . And with reference to this rule, it was vehemently argued that the decree which had directed the pre- emptors to make payment in Court by 24-1-1979 was not complied with and, on record, default was clearly brought home to the respondents. Courts of fact, it was argued, were erroneous to condone clear default and in so doing they had not approached the issue from a correct perspective. Chief reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din v. Muhammad Bakhsh and another PLD 1979 Lah. 766 where a Division Bench of this Court, on examination of provisions of Order XX, rule 14, Order XXI, rule 2, C.P.C. As also the provisions of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 found that payment of pre-emption amount of Court was not a valid payment so as to amount to a proper compliance with the pre-emption decree. On facts also, findings recorded were not acceptable to Mr. Ansari. He argued that these findings of fact though concurrent, yet were not sacrosanct so as to be completely immune from examination by this Court in second appeal.
8. As much turns on the wording of rule 14 of Order XX, Code of Civil Procedure, its terms, so far as relevant to the point et isle, may be briefly referred to. It reads thus: "Where the Court decrees a claim to pre-emption in respect of a particular sale of property and the purchase money has not been paid into Court, the decree shall.--
(a) specify a day on or before which the purchase-money shall be so paid, and
(b) direct that on payment into Court of such purchase-money, together with the costs (if any) decreed against the plaintiff, on or before the day referred to in clause (a), the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff ....
9. Decree in this case was quite in accord with the provisions aforenoticed and clearly directed the plaintiffs to pay the amount in Court by 24-1-1979. The first point at issue to be examined is whether tender of, decretal amount in Court on 25-1-109 by the decree-holders, in the circumstances found by the Courts below, could be held to be a sufficient compliance with the pre-emption decree.
10. Second point, which may also require consideration is whether findings of fact reached on appreciation of evidence are open to challenge in revision at the instance of the vendee-petitioner, and, if so, whether these were correctly reached.
11. It is correct that in the first round, Rana Muhammad Jahangir, learned Civil Judge himself had found that terms of the decree had been breached and observed that the decree-holders were clearly in derfault. It may be observed that incidentally, he was the same learned Civil Judge before whom application was put in on 25-1-1979 for deposit! Tender of the decretal amount. In course of hearing Mr. Ansari attempted to make some capital out of this situation and argued that when learnea Civil Judge who was posted with the knowledge of full facts and when facts were fresh in his mind, had himself found default proved, the vendee was not wrong in raising grievance that evidence on record did not justify the conclusions subsequently arrived at. With respects, this circumstance in itself was not of much moment to turn the scales in favour of the vendee. This order of learned Civil Judge was reversed on appeal and case was remanded for fresh decision after recording A the statement of Naib Civil Nazir. Remand order, as observed above, was not challenged in the subsequent round, and, therefore, reliance on order dated 31-7-1980 qua its correctness was clearly misplaced. Pivotal issue falling for decision is whether pre-emption decree was complied with and decretal amount tendered or paid in time as directed by the Court. 24th was the last day for payment. It was declared a holiday. Payment of decretal amount, therefore, could be validly made B on 25-1-1979. This conclusion is supportable by reference to section 9 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1956 as also the case of Umer Hayat v. Aziz U11ah Khan etc. PLD 1956 Lah. 297, Najabat Khan v. Noor Ahmad and 7 others PLD 1957 (W. P.) Lah. 92 and also section 4 of the Limitation Act. On 25th January, decree-holders wrote out an application and along with their counsel Mirza Muhammad Yousuf, Advocate approached the Court to accept the payment.
12. On the back of the application, learned Civil Judge recorded an order. And directed the Nazir to accept the amount. It is in the statement of Muhammad Iqbal, Naib Nazir that when he was approached to accept the decretal amount on the same day, he expressed his inability to comply with the order of Court as he had no proper arrangements for the safe custody of such a big amount. There is, however, some dispute on the point whether decretal amount thereafter remained with the pre-emptors who deposited it in bank on 27-1-1979. Application seeking approval of the Court of deposit of the decretal amount is not on record. In its absence, date when permission to deposit was granted is not readily ascertainable. Treasury challan does not provide the necessary data. On the basis of Courts record which attract presumption of regularity as also correctness, and the statement of Muhammad lqbal, Naib Nazir, D.W.1, relevant circumstances and probabilities of the case, learned Courts below concluded that decree-holder was in possession of the requisite amount on 25-1-1979, and that it was formally tendered by him for payment in Court, but was not received by Naib Nazir for want of adequate arrangements. It was also in evidence that at the time, Court was approached, banking hours were over. On these questions, both) the Courts of fact are in complete unanimity. These findings of fact have to be accepted and are not open to challenge in revisionary jurisdiction. If so, can it be urged successfully that decree-holders acted in violation of the decree. Somewhat similar situation was before this Court in Mahboob Ali and another v. B. Bishan Singh AIR 31 1944 Lah. 470, a Division Bench decision, in which the Court observed: it is not disputed by the decree-holder that no default would have taken place had the payment been made on Ist July. The question is that if the agent of the payee without any rhyme or reasons closes his business at 2 p.m. So far as such payments are concerned, is the payer to be penalized on that account. In my view it would be most inequitable to do so. The working hours of a Court as also of a bank range between 10 a.m. And 4 p.m. This period cannot be arbitrarily curtailed by either the Court or the bank. If a tender, therefore, is made long before the working hours of the day terminate, it is a valid tender and if the payee or his agent refuses to accept that tender on the basis of some sort of a domestic rule made by them so as not to receive any deposit after a time arbitrarily fixed by them, the payer is not to blame." Application dated 25-1-1979 was presented through Mirza Muhammad Yousuf, Advocate. It was taken to the Court and money was offered, which, as observed above, was refused by the Court official on the sole plea that arrangements for its safe custody were not available. It is in evidence that at that time the required amount was with the decree-holder. In these circumstances, all that was possible for the decree-holders to do was done by them and if the Nazir refused to accept the amount, even, in the presence of Court's direction, commanding him to accept the amount, could the payers be penalized and their suit dismissed for want of compliance of a Court decree. In my opinion such a course was not permissible. It is well-established statement of law that a litigant cannot be made to suffer for act or neglect of the Court or its officials. Wrong done to a party by act of the Court cannot be allowed to stand. For these various reasons, I find that finding of the Courts below that there has been proper compliance with the Court's decree and that there was no default in payment of pre- emption money by the due date, are sound and correctand there is no force in this civil revision and the same is dismissed in limine. Last but not the least, justice has been done between the parties. No interference can be made in revision which is essentially a discretionary jurisdiction.