AWARD SHAFFI MUHAMMAD R. AKHUND (CHAIRMAN)---In this, application, under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1959, the applicant seeks his legal dues from the respondent.
The applicant's case is that he was appointed as Accounts Assistant by the respondent on 22nd June 1970. He was appointed for one week on trial basis, where-after he was to be absorbed in the permanent staff: After the expiry of one week, he requested the Management to issue the letter of his regular appointment, but they kept on avoiding to do so, though he continued in their service.
Ultimately, on 30h October 1970, they Issued the letter of appointment according to which he was to remain on probation for 6 months from 1st October 1970 and the proceeding period was to be treated as trial period. The probation period expired on 31st Match 1971, during which, according to him, his work and conduct were found most satisfactory and no warning etc., was ever given to him. On completion of the period of probation, he requested the respondent for his con--firmation but he was given to understand that, since the period of probation had not been extended, he was automatically deemed to be confirmed as per the practice of the Company. On 22nd May 1971, however, he was served with an order terminating his services from that date, without any reason or notice, and he was given only 22 days' salary. He made a representation to the respondent claiming his other dues but the respondent refused his request, vie their letter dated 10th June 1971.
He has; therefore, moved this application claiming the following dues from the respondent:- Rs.
1. One month's notice pay 350.00
2. Gratuity for the above period350.00
3. 14 days earned leave salary163.00 Total863.00 The respondents, in their reply statement, state that the applicant could not satisfy his employer during the trial period and hence he voluntarily offered to serve for another 6 months on probation on purely temporary basis. Consequently, he was appointed for 6 months on probation on temporary basis subject to termination of his services without notice. But, since he failed to satisfy the employer even during the period of probation, his services were terminated without notice, and he accepted 22 days' salary in full and final settlement of his accounts and signed receipt to this effect. The respondent admit that the applicant made a representation claiming his dues, which were refused. Therefore, according to the respondent, the service of the applicant being voluntary and temporary, he is not entitled to any dues.
During the proceedings, the applicant examined himself, but no witness was examined on behalf of the respondent. The respondent has produced through the applicant, application Exh. E/1, dated 15th June 1970, made by him for his appointment. On this application, the order was passed appointing him on trial basis for one week and thereafter he was to be continued in the grade on probation for 6 months. The order Annexure 'A' dated 30th October 1970, shows that the applicant having completed the Initial training period as Accounts Assistant with effect from 22nd June 1970, was appointed on 6 months probation during which period his services will be purely temporary subject to termination without notice on either side. This order further shows that on satisfactory completion of the probationary period of service, he will be eligible for confirmation. Now, there is nothing in this order to show that the work of the applicant was not satisfactory during the training period, nor is there any evidence to the effect that his work was unsatisfactory during the period of probation. Even the order terminating his services, Annexure 'B', does not state that his services were terminated because his work was unsatisfactory, as is alleged by the respondent. It merely states that his services were no longer required.
The only ground on which the claim of the applicant is resisted by the respondent is that he was a temporary employee and that his services could be terminated without notice, as per the terms of the order of his appointment Annexure 'A'. Section 2 (g) of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Ordinance, however, provides that the period of probation shall not be more that three months and thereafter the employee shall be deemed to be permanent. Clause (b) of the section defines a "permanent workman" as follows :- "(b) A 'permanent workman' is a workman who has been engaged on work of permanent nature likely to last more than nine months and has satisfactorily completed a probationary period of three months in the same or another occupation in the industrial or commercial establishment, including breaks due to sickness, accident, leave, lock-out, strike (not being an illegal lock-out or strike) involuntary closure of the establishment."
A "probationary" is defined as follows in clause (c) :-- "(c) A 'probationer' is a workman who is provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy in a post and not completed three months' service therein. If a permanent employee is employed as a probationer in a higher post he may, at any the during the probationary period of three months, be reverted to his old permanent post."
Thus, the law having provided a maximum period of three months for probation of a workman, the employer cannot extend this period nor can he keep the workman indefinitely on proba--tion as the respondent have done in this case. The Employs can extend the period of probation if the work of the employee is found unsatisfactory. But, as 'already observed, there b no evidence on record to show that the work of the applicant was not satisfactory either during the trial period or the probationary period. The applicant was', admittedly, appointed on 22nd June 1970. Therefore, according to the provisions of section 2 (g) he was deemed to have become permanent on 22 September 1970. But even assuming that the period of probation commenced from 1st October 1970, as per the order of appointment, the applicant became permanent on 1st January 1971. It is significant that the services of the applicant were not terminated even after the period of six months which the respondent had given him for probation. He was retained in service for nearly 2 months more.
Therefore, in any case, the applicant was a permanent workman at the the of termination of service within the defini--tion of section 2 (g). The law does not mike any exception nor is the employer authorised to extend the period beyond three months. Consequently, the applicant i9 entitled to the duos accruing to a permanent workman. The application of the applicant is, therefore, allowed and he is granted the dues he has claimed from the respondent.