SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J.--This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the order dated the 28th of October 1971 of our learned brother K. E. Chauhan, J., whereby he dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellant against the order dated the 12th of October 1971 of the District Judge, Rawalpindi dismissing the appeal of appellant against the ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller, Rawalpindi, on the application of Mian Abdul Jabbar, respondent,
2. The appellant was in occupation of shop bearing No. 4111, Beef Market, Gawalmandi, Rawalpindi, as a tenant under respondent No. 1, Mian Abdul Jabbar. The respondent, through his mother as next friend, applied to the Rent Controller for ejectment of the petitioner on the ground that he wanted to reconstruct the premises. The parties produced evidence before the Rent Controller and the arguments were being heard on the 27th of July 1971 when an agreement was arrived at between the parties upon which the ejectment order was passed against the appellant, relevant part of which is in the following terms "Arguments were heard on the 27-7-71 when it was agreed between the parties that the petitioner after reconstruction of the building will provide the respondent with a shop, but would charge rent according to the assessm ent of the Cantonment Board. The respondent also agreed to this arrangement. The respondent is therefore hereby ordered to vacate the suit shop by 30-9-71. As agreed by the petitioner he will provide the respondent with a shop as soon as the new building is constructed and will charge the assessed rent to be fixed by the Cantonment Board."
The appeal preferred against this order was dismissed by the learned District Judge on the ground that no appeal lay against an order passed on a compromise.
3. Learned counsel repeated the arguments which he had advanced before the learned Judge in Chambers, viz., (a) that the Rent Controller had not recorded the compromise as was required under Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure and his order is, therefore, bad in law; and (b) that there was no subsisting sanction for the construction of the building on the 6th of August 1971 and that being so even If the appellant had entered into an argument, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. He also contended before us that, in fact, no agreement had been arrived at between the parties.
We do not find any of these contentions tenable. The appellant, if he had actually not entered into the arrangement which is referred to in the order of the Rent Controller, should have made a grievance of this fact in his grounds of appeal which he preferred before the District Judge. He did not do so, as is clear from the certified copy of the grounds of appeal.
4. The objection raised on behalf of the appellant that the, Rent Controller did not record the compromise and, therefore, his order is a nullity is equally untenable. In Khadim Mohy-ud-din v.
Rehmat Ali (PLD 1965 SC 459) it was held: "Though under section- 16,1 West Pakistan urban' Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, the 'Controller' has been given powers of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the procedure of evidence, he is not bound in every case to follow the proce--dure as Laid down In the Code of Civil Procedure. He has been given powers under sections 4, 10(3) and 12 to make orders after holding such inquiry as he thinks fit. In such cases the question of nature of enquiry is left to him. Thai, means that in such enquiries the parties have no right t o insist on production of such evidence as they desire to adduce in support of their case. In short these inquiries may be such as are conducted by an executive officer." It was further observed: "If the word `satisfied' imports the necessity of an inquiry, even then it cannot be said that in holding such inquiry will be bound by any particular procedure." Thus, the failure on the part of the Rent Controller to record the compromise being not violative of any provision of law, does not affect the validity of the order.
5. In order to appreciate the contention of the appellant that the sanction for the construction from the Cantonment Board was not subsisting on the date the impugned order was passed, it is necessary to refer to subsection (2)(vi) of section 1 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, which provided that "a landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply the Controller for an order in that behalf, and the Controller may after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of show-- ing cause against the application make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, if he is satisfied the.; the landlord intends to demolish the building for constructing a new building on the same site and has already obtained the necessary sanction for such construction from Cantonment Board." It is not disputed by the learned counsel Cat the respondent had obtained the necessary sanction for construction from the Cantonment Board. He, however, submits that the sanction expired on the 30th June 1969. Learned District Judge has observed in his order that the Cantonment Board had, by its resolution No. 2(a) 9, dated the 10th of September 1971, granted extension for a year to the respondent for con--struction. It is Laid down in section 183 of the Cantonment Act, 1924, that "every sanction for the erection or re-erection of a building given or deemed to have been given by the Board hereinbefore provided shall be available for one year from the date on which it is given, and, if the building so sanctioned is not begun by the person who has obtained the sanction or some one lawfully claiming under him within that period it shall not thereafter be begun unless the Board on application made therefore has allowed an extension of that period". It is thus clear that the respondent had obtained the necessary sanction of the Board and the fact that the period of one year had expired would not make any difference because he could always apply for extension to the Board. The case between the parties was pending before the Rent Controller and the respondent could riot undertake the construction unless he had succeeded in evicting the appellant. The period of one year provided in section 183 of the Act, therefore, expired for no fault of the respondent. The Court, in the circumstances, was to take into consideration the fact that the sanction had been obtained by the respondent, and not whether the period within which the construction was to commence under section 183 had not expired.
Instead of applying for extension from time to time during the pendency of proceedings before the Rent Controller, the proper course for an owner is to wait if the period of sanction had expired till the case is decided and then to apply for its extension. What is required of the Rent Controller under clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 17 is to see that the landlord has obtained the requisite sanction which is the basis for moving an application for ejectment, and not that the period within which the construction is to com--mence is subsisting. The interests of a tenant are protected by subsection (6) of section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, which lays down: "Where the land--lord who has obtained possession of a building in pursuance of an order made under subsection (5) does not himself, or where possession of the building has been obtained for any member of his family, such member does not occupy the building within one month of the date of obtaining its possession, that tenant who had been evicted may apply to the Collector for an order directing that the possession of such building be restored to him and the Controller may thereon make an order accordingly". However, in the event the landlord falls to obtain the extension of the time and is consequently unable to demolish or reconstruct the building within the pre--scribed period, he exposes himself to a criminal liability under subsection (7) of section 17 aforesaid.
6. It was next contended that under section 17(2) of the Act the Rent Controller was required to have satisfied himself that the landlord intended to demolish the building for con--structing a new building on the same site and had already obtained the necessary sanction for such construction from the Cantonment Board, and that being so even if the appellant had entered into some arrangement with the respondent agreeing to be evicted, the Rent Controller was under a statutory obligation not to have made the order of ejectment unless he was himself so satisfied. The satisfaction of the Rent Controller contem--plated in subsection (2) of section 17 in respect of the matter provided for in clause (vi) thereof can arise only if the parties are at issue an that point. If, however, the tenant does not join C Issue and agrees to the order being passed, the Controller is absolved of his responsibility to decide upon that question. The tenant 9n that case admits the correctness of the plea of the landlord by his own conduct.
7. It was next contended by the learned counsel that the respondent had submitted a plan for reconstructing a hotel and ho will, in the circumstances, not be able to comply with the order. We do not feel competent to decide this question in these proceedings. If the respondent tails to honour his part of the agreement, it will always be competent for the appellant to enforce his right in the proper forum.
8. We would also like to observe that since the Rent Controller passed the impugned order at the instance of the appellant himself, the latter could not make any grievance of the fact that the order should not have been passed. The learned District Judge was justified in holding that the appeal was not p competent. The Rent Controller and the District Judge have both acted within their lawful competence and have not violated any provision of law. Their orders are, therefore, unexceptionable. The writ petition has rightly been dismissed by the learned Single Judge.
9. We find no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismiss: ed in limine.