1. ' All these appeals arise out of a single judgment and decree, dated 2-1-1983 passed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Larkana As the appellants in all the appeals are same and the points of law and facts are also same I propose to dispose of all of them by this order.
2. ' The facts leading to this litigation in brief are that at the instance of present appellant the Co/lector, Larkana acquired certain land on 12-8-1971 under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act). The land so acquired included the land of the respondents in the present appeals. It was acquired for the appellant to set up sugar factory at Naudero. By award, dated 18-4-1973 the Land Acquisition Collector awarded compensation to the land owners at the flat rate of one anna per square foot (Rs 2,722.50 per acre) besides the compulsory acquisition charges and interest as allowed under the Act. At the instance of the respondents who were not satisfied with award, the Collector made references under section 18 of the Act to the District Judge which were subsequently transferred to Second Additional District Judge, Larkana who disposed them of by the impugned judgment wherein he raised compensation to Rs, 4,000 per acre besides compulsory acquisition charges and interest as admissible under the law.
3. ' As the Government of Sind or the Collector did not file appeal against the judgment and decree passed by Additional District Judge the appellants who had filed cross-objections before the Additional District Judge under section 22-A of the Act, filed these appeals.
4. ' I have heard Mr. Ghulam Sarwar Abbasi learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Farman All learned counsel for the respondents in all the ap' peals at length.
5. ' A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Farman Ali challenging locus standi of the appellants to file these appeals. He has argued that a private person or a company is specifically barred under proviso to subsection (2) of section 50 of the Act from demanding reference under section 18 of the Act. Therefore, such person or party has no right of appeal specially when no such right has specifically been conferred upon such party or person by the Act which is a special law. In his support Mr. Farman All has relied on the case of WAPDA v. Aurangzeb Khan and others (1). In the reported case the company viz. WAPDA filed appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the District Court Judge on the reference under section 18 of the Act when no appeal against such decree was filed by the Government it was held by Division Bench of Peshawar High Court as under :- "In proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the provisions of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908 in so far they have been judicially construed to concede to a person (although not a parry to the proceedings) a right of appeal against an order/decree by which his interest has been adversely affected, would have no application.
6. ' By virtue of subsection (3) added to section 18 by Ordinance XLIX of 1969, the Provincial Government has been given the right to refer the matter to Court within a period of six months from the date of announcement of the award, provided it has not accepted the award. But then a company/local authority has not been given any right. It would, therefore, follow that if the Government accepts the award or else does not refer the matter to Court under section 18(3) of the Act, a company/local authority would have no such right in view of the express bar contained in proviso to subsection (2) of section 50 of the Act, which reads :- f t ............. That no such local authority or company shall be entitled to demand a reference under section 18.
7. ' To insist, therefore, that a company/local authority shall have the right to appeal against the decree of District Judge would be evidently fallacious, for if it has no right to seek a reference to the Court of District Judge, it cannot possibly claim the higher right of appeal."
8. ' In this case the learned Judges have traced history of the judicial (11 PLD 1975 Pesh 1 pronouncements on the subject. They have referred to number of cases including Municipal Corporation of Pabna v. Jogendra Narain Baikut (1), Faqir Chand v. Municipal Committee, Hazara (2), Collector and Chairman, District Board, Gujranwala v. Hira Nanl (3), Niaz Chand and others v.
9. District Board, Mianwali (4), Palma Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Kaliprashad Bhattacharyya and another (5)
10. ' In all these cases consistent view of the superior Courts appears to be, that a private party, for whose benefit the land is acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act, does not have the right to file appeal against the judgment and decree of the District Judge passed on reference under section 18 of the Act.
11. ' A similar case came for consideration before a Single Bench of this Court in case of Kasimbhai and another v. The Deputy Commissioner, Dadu and others (6). In that case WAPDA for whose benefit the land was acquired and who had to pay a compensation awarded by the District Judge, applied for being impleaded as a party. Mr. Justice Qadeeruddin Ahmed, J. (as his Lordship then was) held ............ Acquisition having been made by the Government, the authority for whose benefit it is made cannot be said to have private with the owners of land and cannot claim to act as a party to the proceedings held in respect of those transactions."
12. ' His Lordship has also quoted the observations made by J. P. Singhal. While discussing the position of company or local authority, which may be desirous of acquiring land, under section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Author has summarised the principles on the basis of which the superior Courts appear to have based their view that a private party has no right to file appeal. It will be advantageous to reproduce these observations :-- "No local authority or company is compelled to proceed under the Land Acquisition Act. If it can procure any land which it is desirous to acquire more cheaply by private negotiations, it is entirely at liberty to do so, but if it elects to set in motion the special powers given to Government for public objects it can expect no higher privileges and powers than those given to Government itself. Thus, the interests of the local authority must be subservient to that of Government and it would be dangerous to allow private individuals, local authorities and companies to interfere in a proceeding under Part III of the Act. Under such circumstances if Government declines to prefer alt appeal the local authority cannot be permitted to do so except in cases of patent injustice."
13. ' His Lordships in the end further observed : "What is objectionable is that WAPDA should come forward and criticise the past conduct of the case by the Government in not filing an appeal knowing all the while that its interest is subservient to that of the Government."
14. Mr. Abbasi learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the position has changed after the amendment in the Land Acquisition Act
(1) 4 I C 382 (2) (1913) 47 P R 225
(3) AIR 1929 Lah. 10 (4) AIR 1936 Lah. 564
(5) PLD 1960 Dacca 46l (6) PLD 1968 Kar. 126 brought about under Land Acquisition (West Pakistan Amendment) Ordinance No, XLI of 1965. He argues that. Under section 22-A of the Act certain rights have been conferred upon the private party. Section 22-A reads as under :- "22-A. Cross-objection.-The Provincial Government, or a local authority or a company for which land is being acquired. May lodge a cross-objection to the objection made by any person interested and the Court may reduce the amount awarded by the Collector if it considers it just and proper."
15. ' Mr. Abbasi has also relied on subsection (5) of section 9 and clause (c) of section 20 which are also reproduced as under :- "Section 9.-(5) The Collector shall also serve notice of the enquiry -to be held under section 11 (such notice not being less than fifteen days prior to the date fixed under subsection (2) for determination of claims and objections) on the Department of Government, local authority or company, as the case may be, for which land is being acquired, and require it to depute a duly authorized representative to attend the enquiry on its behalf for the purpose of making objections (if any) to the measurement of the land claims to any interest in the land or the amount of any compensation. Such authorised representative shall be party to the proceedings.
20. Service of notice.-The Court, shall thereupon cause a notice specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection, and directing their appearance before the Court on that day, to be served on the following persons, namely :- (a)
16. (h)
(c) if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of the compensation, the Collector and the Department of Government, local authority or Company, as the case may be, for which land is being acquired."
17. ' The position after these amendments his also been considered in the Peshawar case and it has been held as under :- "We on our part, are of the firm view that by adding subsection (5) to section 9 and clause (c) to section 20 of the Act, all that the West Pakistan Ordinance XLIX of 1969 had intended to achieve was to magnify therein the existing legal position contained in subsection (2) of section 50 of the Act, namely :- ' In any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation: ' For, it is axiomatic that only a party to the proceedings is entitled to notice and to adduce evidence. And considering that under subsection (2) of section 50 of the Act, this right had been conceded to a company/local authority, without mentioning in there, of course, that it would be a party to and entitled to receive notice of the proceedings, the Legislature moved into the matter and by Ordinance XLIX of 1969 added subsection (5) to section 9 and clause (c) to section 20 of the Act as a measure of abundant caution. It is significant, however, that the words of former subsection do not occur in clause (c) of section 20 of the Act. And hence it would be impermissible to import into it the said words, particularly when notice is taken of the fact that both these sections were amended by the same Ordinance.
18. ' Section 11, section 22-A and subsection (2) of section 31 are in the nature of consequential amendments, introduced in the Act, in view of the addition of subsection (5) to section 9 and clause (c) to section 20 of the Act by Ordinance XLIX of 1969, and thus they would need no discussion."
19. This view that a private person or company has no right of appeal against the judgment and decree of a District Court on a reference under section 18 of the Act still holds the field. In this respect two more citations may be seen. In the case reported in PLJ 1982 Azad J & K 55 a Division Bench of the Court has held :- "Local authority or a company concerned for whose benefit the land is acquired may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation but such local authority or company or any other agency is not competent to initiate reference under section 18, or prefer appeal against judgment or decree made on the reference initiated by any party.
20. Government only in circumstances held to be competent to prefer the appeal against award."
21. ' In a more recent case of Karachi Development Authority v. Mst. Fatima Bai and another (1), a Division Bench of this Court has observed as under "Local authority which had no right even to demand reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894, was not competent to file appeal against order of Court passed on such reference.'
22. I see no reason or grounds to disagree with or differ from this consistent and unanimous view of the superior Courts as to the competency of a private party to file appeal against the judgment/award passed by the District Judge on reference under section 18 of the Act.
23. ' It, therefore, follows that the appellants whose interests are subservient to the interests of Government have no right of appeal independent of Government against judgment and decree passed by the District Court. As such appeals which are not maintainable under law are dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
24. ' It was requested by Mr. Farman Ali learned counsel for the respondents that this Court may decide as to the rights of the respondents under the Land Acquisition (Sind Amendment) Ordinance, 1984 (Sind Ordinance No, XXIII of 1984). I have already held that these proceedings viz. Appeals filed by the appellants are not competent and were not maintainable C under the law. As such the only order that can be passed in such proceedings is to dismiss the appeals. The parties may pursue their rights, if any, if they so desire, in proper proceedings in the appropriate forum.
(1) 1985 M 1. 13 1496