The respondents who are related to one another were tried by the Civil Judge and F. C. M., Schvvan for offences under section 447 read with sections 148 and 149, P. P. C. and acquitted by the learned Civil Judge and F. C. M. by his judgment dated 12th December 1968. The applicant, who was the complainant in the trial Court, was aggrieved by this judgment, therefore he filed a revision against it in this Court which has now come up for hearing before me.
2. The dispute in this case relates to 500 acres of land situated in Duri Dero Dadu District. This land was owned by the respondents but according to the applicant it had been sold to the applicant's father by a registered sale deed dated 13th December 1954. Thereafter, according to the prosecution, the applicant's father had been in possession of this land and had been cultivating it.
On the morning of 15th November 1967 at about 11a. m. the applicant happened to be present on this land and his father's Haris were cultivating it. Suddenly, the respondents came armed with weapons, threatened them, drove them out and took possession of the land from them. Therefore the applicant lodged an F. I. R. at Police Station Bhan Saidabad which was recorded by P. W. Head Constable Aurangzeb, and 1 may point out here that, although the police station was at a distance of 10 miles from the scene of offence, the F. I. R. was recorded the next day at 1-40 p.ra. Be that as it may, the police thereafter commenced investigations and visited the vardat. The mushirnama of the vardat (Exh. 5A) was prepared on 17th November 1967 and was witnessed by mashir Muhammad Ali. After investigations were completed, the respondents were put up in due course for their trial under sections 447 read with sections 148 and 149, P. P. C.
3. In support of his case the applicant examined himself and two eye-witnesses. P. Ws. Loung and Abdul Karim both of whom were his Haris. The applicant said in his evidence that his father had purchased the land in dispute by a registered sale deed which he produced (Exh. 1-A) and he also said that on the day of the occurrence P. Ws. Loung, Abdul Karim and other Haris were cultivating this land when the respondents came armed with deadly weapons, threatened them and forcibly ejected them from their land. I may observe here that this evidence is fully supported by that of P.
Ws. Loung and Abdul Karim. However, the applicant was cross-examined about the alleged purchase by ' his father from the respondents of the land in dispute, and he admitted in his cross- examination that the land had been resumed by the Government. He further stated: "It is no longer our property. At present I am in possession of it as a lessee from the Government." He also admitted that at the time of the occurrence his father did not have any Ijazatnama from the Government. The other witness examine^ gave evidence of a formal nature which is not relevant. / 4. The plea of the respondents in section 342, Cr. P. C. statements was one of denial and they said that they had been falsely implicated because of their dispute over this land with the applicant's father. I may, however, refer to the evidence of the respondent Nabi Bux, as it is in greater detail. This accused said in his statement emphatically to the Court that the land belonged to him and the respondents and further said as follows: "On 11-11-1967 the Commissioner, Hyderabad Division ordered that the whole of Na clause No. 70 of Deh Duria Dero Rajati belonged to me and Abdul Ghafoor and to other Halepotas. On 13-1-1967 because Pir Illahi Bux (father of the applicant) called me to his otaq and asked me to execute a sale deed in his favour for 500 acres of Na clause No. 70 on which he got me and my caste-fellows implicated in this case. P. W. Pir Abdul Hamid also was present when Pir Illahibux ordered me for the execution of the sale deed. One Wadero Dost Muhammad, one Jani Solangi and one Wadero Ahmed Halepota were also present there at that time."
In support of this plea the respondents also examined Ahmed and Dost Muhammad who supported the respondent Nabi Bux's version of the facts. applicant had produced the sale deed in his father's favour, in view of his admissions in cross- examination, which I have quoted earlier, the learned Civil Judge and F. C. M. was not impressed by his evidence nor that of his Haris. Accordingly, he held that the prosecution had failed to prove the applicant's claim of possession to the land in dispute and therefore he acquitted the respondents.
As the State did not file an appeal, the applicant filed a revision which has now come up for hearing.
6. Mr. Mazharali, learned counsel for the applicant admitted that he could succeed only if he could establish the applicant's claim to have been in possession of the disputed land at the time of the occurrence. But, according to learned counsel, this had been proved by the sale deed as well as the evidence of the other witnesses. Taking first the question of the other witnesses, the learned Civil Judge and F. C. M. has not accepted the evidence of the applicant's Haris P. Ws. Loung and Abdul Karim, and in the circumstances, I cannot interfere with his appreciation of evidence in this revision. The only other witnesses were the mashir and the Investigation Officer, but their evidence is totally irrelevant to the question as to who was in possession of the disputed land at the time of the occurrence. Thus the real question in the revision is whether the applicant's evidence supported by the sale deed is sufficient to prove his claim for possession. I may further observe here that Mr. Mazharali also stated that the sale deed (Exh. 1A.) was the sheet anchor of his case and because it had to be presumed to be correct and because it contained a recital that possession had been delivered to the applicant's father, learned counsel invited me to hold that the applicant had proved his claim for possession. That the registered sale deed was a piece of evidence in the applicant's favour cannot be disputed but both Mr. Sarki and Mr. Abdullah Shah submitted that it was not sufficient to prove the applicant's possession, and in this connection Mr. Abdullah Shah pointed out that the sale consideration in the sale deed being only Rs. 7,500 for an area of 500 acres invited suspicion; therefore, according to counsel, this by itself was sufficient to prove the falsity of the sale deed. As the applicant was not cross- examined specifically on this point, the sale deed cannot be rejected totally on this ground but the amount of the consideration perhaps lends some support to the statement of the respondent Nabi Bux that the day prior to the occurrence he had been called by the applicant's father and threatened. I may also point out here that this statement is supported by that of the defence witnesses, and although Mr. Mazharali invited me to reject their evidence on the ground that they were chance witnesses no enmity has been proved against them, and as the trial Court has not disbelieved their evidence, I would not be justified in rejecting it. Further, the trial Court has rightly placed stress on the applicant's own evidence in the witness-box which I have quoted, and I may repeat here that the applicant has categorically admitted that the Government had resumed the land in dispute and that, at the time of the occurrence, his father did not even have an Ijazatnama in his favour. In these circumstances, the applicant's failure to examine his father who was the purchaser under a sale deed challenged by the respondents, is a circumstance which cannot but lead to a strong adverse inference against the applicant's claim. It is also not irrelevant to refer here to the statement of the respondent Nabi Bux that the Commissioner of Hyderabad had decided the claim of tie respondents to this land in their favour. In all the circumstances discussed it cannot possibly be said that the view of the trial Court that the applicant had failed to prove his claim- of possession was perverse or that it was based on some gross and palpable error in the reading of evidence. Therefore, whatever be the position in an appeal, as I am hearing a revision application, 1 would not be justified in interfering with the trial Court's appreciation of evidence.
7. Mr. Sarki, learned counsel for the State, also drew my attention to the fact that the revision application had been filed without the certificate of the District Magistrate, therefore, he thought that the application itself was not competent. However, as a contrary view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Revision No. 26 of 1967, this argument cannot be accepted.
8. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed.
Revision not allowed.