MUHAMMAD AFZAL LONE, J.--This is the second round of litigation between the parties, before this Court. The facts are that respondent No. 1 was employed as an Accounts Assistant, with the petitioner-Company and his services were terminated on 25-2-1981. He challenged this termination through a grievance petition filed on 25-4-1981 in Labour Court No. 2, Lahore, which in fact, lacked territorial jurisdiction, But the petitioner did not raise any objection in this behalf in the written statement. It appears that some evidence was also led by both the parties and at that stage the petitioner objected to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court through a miscellaneous application which was turned down on 27-2-1982 on the ground that such an objection should have been urged in the written statement. However, subsequently, he applied for amendment of the written statement. This request was allowed by the Labour Court by its order, dated 29-4-1982 and an objection incorporated in the written statement that by virtue of the Notification No. S.O.
(Lab-VI) 3/4-73 Vol-II, dated 24-2-1977 issued under section 35 of the I.R.O. Labour Court No. 2 lacked territorial jurisdiction.
2. It is discernible from the record that before this objection could be adjudicated upon, the respondent moved application, dated 16-5-1982 before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal that either the case might be transferred from Labour Court No. 2 to Labour Court No.1, which admittedly was possessed of the territorial jurisdiction, or a direction given to Labour Court No.2, to proceed with the hearing and finalize the case. But before any decision could be rendered on the application it was unconditionally withdrawn on 6-7-1982. The parties, therefore, reverted back to Labour Court No.2 which recorded their evidence or the jurisdictional issue as well on merits. The question of jurisdiction was also argued but before the order could be announced the respondent on 21-6-1983 again moved the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 37(8) of the I.R.O. With a prayer to allow Labour Court No.2 to decide the case, as if it had the jurisdiction to do so. This application was considered as misconceived and dismissed on 7-9-1983.
3. Thereafter, on the respondent's request, Labour Court No.2, made a reference to the Appellate Tribunal either to assign the case to Labour Court No.1 or to some other Court, as deemed fit by it.
On this reference the Tribunal made order, dated 21-9-1983 reproduced below.
"As reported by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. 2, the case is assigned to the same Court to avoid inconvenience to both the parties."
The petitioner then moved an application, dated 24-9-1983 before the Tribunal requesting it to recall the order aforesaid on the plea that it was made in his absence. But this request was rejected by the learned Tribunal under its order, dated 12-10-1983.
4. The petitioner assailed this rejection by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. His Writ Petition No. 5268 of 1983 was accepted, and a direction given to the Tribunal to dispose of the petitioner's said application afresh. Consequently, the Tribunal re-heard the application accepted it and direct Labour Court No. 2 to decide the jurisdiction point. The Tribunal's order in this behalf is, dated 9-5-1984.
5. In pursuance of this order, when Labour Court No.2 took up the case, the respondent sought its leave to withdraw the grievance petition, to file the same in the competent Court. The petitioner did not object to this request. Accordingly, the request was allowed and the grievance petition returned to the respondent who instituted it on the same date in Labour Court No.1 and along therewith moved an application under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of the delay.
6. The Labour Court No.1 took the view that objection to the territorial jurisdiction of Labour Court No.2 was raised on 2-2-1982; and evidence was led on 29-11-1982 which showed that Head Office of the petitioner-Company fell within the territorial jurisdiction of Labour Court No.1. The Court maintained:-- "---------..Be as it may, neither the petitioner nor his counsel can deny that at least on 29-11-1982 (when the Muharrir was examined) it had become clear that with reference to the map the respondent's Company office at Abid Market was falling within the territorial limits of Police Station Mozang. The Notification was on record which was bearing out that Mozang Police Station was within the jurisdiction of Punjab Labour Court No.1. It remained unexplained that when in November 1982 the question of jurisdiction had become crystal clear, why on 21-6-1983 (through transfer application made to Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal) it was persisted that the Labour Court No.2 might have been allowed to decide the case as if it had the original jurisdiction. The petitioner and his counsel remained adamant in their wrong stand even in spite of remand order of High Court."
In the estimation of the Court, the respondent did not act in good faith and his conduct disentitled him to the enlargement of time. Thus, the grievance petition was dismissed as barred by time.
7. But when the matter again came up before the Tribunal in appeal, it held that the institution of the grievance petition by the respondent in Labour Court No.2 was not tainted with any mala fides.
In this respect the Tribunal also referred to its powers under section 38(7) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The respondent's appeal was accepted, the grievance petition was treated within time and the case remanded to the Court below for decision on merits. The Tribunal's order, dated 26- 6-1985 is under challenge in this writ petition.
8. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that there was no confusion in finding out that which was the proper forum, to hear the grievance petition but the respondent without exercising due care filed in the wrong Court and then remained adamant on its hearing by that forum. According to the learned counsel, there was no good ground to conduct the delay and the Tribunal erred, in law, in treating the petition as within time.
9. In reply to these submissions the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the notification conferring jurisdiction on the Labour Courts Nos. l and 2 was not easily available and drew our attention to his application in which late submission thereof was attributed to the non- availability of the notification. He argued that the entire evidence had been recorded the matter, therefore, could not have been thrown away on a technical objection, resulting in multiplicity of litigation.
10. We have examined the available record to evaluate these submissions. It needs to be considered as to whether or not in the light of the facts already narrated, it can rightly be claimed by the respondent, that within the meaning of section 14 of the Limitation Act, he has been prosecuting the case in Labour Court No. 1, in good faith and with due diligence. The term "good faith" is defined in Section 2(7) of the Limitation Act. It ordains that what is not done with due care and attention cannot be considered to be done in "good faith". The only explanation offered by the respondent for instituting the grievance petition, in wrong Court is, that the notification under section 35 was not available. This plea can hardly lend a sufficient cause for condonation of his lapse. "Sufficient cause" means, the circumstances beyond the control of a party. This connotation has been approved by the Supreme Court in Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar PLD 1977 SC 102, the ratio whereof fully applies to the case in hand. Of course, the matter would have been different, if there was any ambiguity in the law governing the conferment of jurisdiction on respondent was misguided by some judgment of the superior Courts. Merely because, he asserts that the notification was not available to him, is no ground to hold that he was under a bona fide mistake to commence the proceedings in the wrong Court. The notification is not a type of the document, which could not have been found out, had the respondent cared to locate the same. His conduct smacks of want of due care. A litigant who on account of his own negligence commences action in a wrong forum cannot be entitled to any indulgence of the Court.
11. It is noteworthy, if not earlier at least on 2-2-1982, the respondent became aware of the petitioner's objection to the jurisdiction of Labour Court No. 2 but he insisted upon the hearing of the case by that Court. In these circumstances, it is difficult to accept that he prosecuted the case before the wrong Court with due diligence to entitle him to the exclusion of the time spent in conducting the proceedings before that Court. The learned Appellate Tribunal acted without lawful authority, in interfering with the well-reasoned decision f of the Labour Court. The impugned order is, therefore, liable to be removed through judicial review.
15. For the foregoing reasons this writ petition is accepted and the impugned order declared to have been passed without lawful authority and as of no legal effect. Consequently, the order of the Labour Court stands restored. The parties are left to bear their own costs.