1. This second appeal under section 100, C.P.C: is filed by the plaintiff appellant against the judgment of the first appellate Court in 1st Civil Appeal No.314 of 1977 whereby the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in favour of the appellant was reversed and the suit instituted by the appellant against the respondent was dismissed with costs. The following facts may be stated here which are not in dispute. The appellant instituted Suit No.172 of 1965 for recovery of a sum of Rs.9,655.45 under Order XXXVII, of C.P.C. Against the respondent No.1 alone on the allegation that the aforesaid amount is due to the appellant from respondent No.1 against a promissory note which was executed by the respondent No.1 on 1-7-1959. It appears that subsequently the respondents Nos.2 to 4 were also added in the suit was guarantors and thereafter a request was made to the Court to try the suit as ordinary money suit. The suit was consequently registered as Suit No.1404 of 1968 and was tried by the 14th Civil Judge, 2nd Class, Karachi. Only respondent No.1 appeared and contested the suit while respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were ex parte. The respondent No.1 in his written statement besides taking other pleas mainly contended that the suit instituted by the appellant was time-barred as it was instituted after expiry of 3 years from the date of execution of the promissory note, dated 1-7-1959. Several issues wen framed by the trial Court on the basis of the pleading of the parties and after recording evidence the trial Court reached the conclusion that the suit instituted by the appellant was within time as the letter, dated 20th March, 1963 (Exh .P-7) written by respondent No.1 to the appellant and reply of the appellant's Advocate, dated 16-1-1964 (Exh.P-9) amounted to a fresh agreement within the meaning of section 25(3) of the Contract Act to pay time-barred debt and, therefore, the suit was within the time having been instituted on 20th August, 1965. On appeal the learned first appellate Court, however, reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court solely on the ground that the suit of the plaintiff was time-barred as the alleged payment of Rs.500 made by the respondent No.1 in the account was not within the period of limitation and, therefore, it could not have the effect of extending the limitation period within the meaning of sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act. The first appellate Court also disagreed with the trial Court on the conclusion that the two letters namely Exhs.P-7 and P-9 amounted to a fresh agreement within the meaning of section 25(3) of the Contract Act as according to the learned first appellate Court these letters did not fulfil the requirement of said sections Mr. Nizam Ahmed, learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the judgment of the first appellate Court in this second appeal and has contended that the two letters, dated 20th March, 1963 and 16-1-1964 read together will amount to a fresh agreement within the meaning of section 25(3) of the Contract Act and, therefore, even, if it is held that the suit is instituted was time-barred on the basis of the promissory note, dated 1-7-1959 the suit was well within time from 20th March, 1963 on which date a fresh promise was made in writing by the respondent No.1 to pay time-barred debt. To meet this argument learned counsel for respondent No.1 invited my attention to various paragraphs of the plaint and contended that neither it is pleaded in the plaint that a fresh cause of action on the basis of a fresh agreement within the meaning of section 25(3) of the Contract Act had arisen to the appellant nor any such evidence was brought on record to show that the case of the appellant was based on the basis of the fresh agreement as contemplated in section 25(3) of the Contract Act. Learned counsel also referred to the cause of action clause in the plaint, to contend that even in this clause it was nowhere alleged that any fresh cause of action arose to the appellant on 20th March, 1963 on the basis of such an alleged new promise by the respondent No.1. Learned counsel for the appellant tried to meet the above argument by contending that since both the Courts below considered the contention of the appellant n the basis of a fresh agreement between the parties which came into existence by virtue of letters Exh.P-7 and P-9, this Court can go into he question that whether the suit is within time on the allegation that here was a fresh agreement by respondent No.1 to pay time-barred debt within the meaning of section 25(3) of the Contract Act. It is true that both the Courts below have considered the argument with reference to section 25(3) of the Contract Act but from pleadings o the parties and issues it is no where spelt out that such a plea was raised by the appellant before the trial Court. It appears that only during the course of arguments in order to meet the plea of limitation raised by the respondent No.1 in his written statement a reply was made by the appellant both before the trial Court as well as firs appellate Court in this regard. The question whether there came into existence a separate and independent agreement to pay time- barred debt within the meaning of section 25(3) of the Contract Act is a question of fact which was required not only to be pleaded specifically but should have been established by leading evidence on this score. As neither in the plaint nor in the issues this plea was specifically raised, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 is justified in making a grievance that this plea should riot be decided without allowing respondent No.1 to meet this new case. However, keeping in view the fact that both the Courts below have considered this aspect of the case I feel it only appropriate to remand the case back to the trial Court with the option to the appellant to amend the suit suitably to bring his case within the meaning of section 25(3) of the Contract Act and thereafter the trial Court may frame appropriate issue in this regard and after allowing opportunity to the parties decide the case on the basis of evidence which may be brought on record. I accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of both the Courts below and remand the case to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law in the light of the above observations. The appellant will be entitled to amend the plaint in the manner observed above and thereupon the suit will be proceeded as directed above. There will be no order as to costs.