1. MUHAMMAD SHARIF, C. J.-This is the plaintiff's second appeal which arises out of his suit brought in the Court of the, Sub-Judge, Rawalakot, for a declaration that he is the owner of the Khalsa land survey No. 1067/711 measuring 21 kanals and 4 marlas situate in village Chhota Gala under Council Order No. 282 of 1957 as he had broken up the land in the year 1949. The suit was dismissed by the learned Sub-Judge by his judgment dated 25-5-67. The plaintiff then went up in appeal before the District Judge, Rawalakot, who by his judgment and decree dated 22-8-1967 dismissed the appeal with costs. Hence this second appeal.
2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that the Government passed an Order, No. 282/57 dated 22- 7-1957, which was published in the Government Gazette dated 23rd July 1957, ordering that all such persons who are proved to have been in continuous possession of Khalsa land without the permission of the Government and are recorded as such till the 1st day of January 1950, shall be granted proprietary rights of such land subject to certain limitations. The plaintiff made an application to the Revenue Assistant Poonch on 13-9-1949 praying that he be allowed to break up 50 kanals from the Khalsa land in Chotta Galla. On measurement and preparation of the plan the land under the plaintiff's possession measured 21 kanals and 4 marlas. The Revenue Authority did not enter the land in the name of the plaintiff as owner. He then filed a civil suit in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Rawalakot, for a declaration as stated above. The suit was pending in the Court of the Sub-Judge when the Legislative Authorities passed the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Khalsa Waste Land Shamilat-i-Deh Act, 1966. Section 9 of the Shamlat Deh Act provided that: ---- "No civil Court shall have jurisdiction on any matter which the Government or any Revenue Officer is competent to dispose of under this Act and shall not take cognizance of the manner in which the Government or any Revenue Officer exercises any power vested in it or in him by or under this Act or under Government Order No. 282/57."
3. The Sub-Judge framed an additional issue on the point of jurisdiction and holding that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was barred dismissed the suit. The plaintiff then went up in appeal and the learned District Judge also upheld the judgment of the learned Sub-Judge.
4. It was argued by Mr. Said Muhammad Khan learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant that if under any Act a special forum is provided even then the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not ousted where the suit is of a civil nature. He cited Mst. Dilbar Jan v. Ghulam Muhammad Khan (PLD 1960 Pesh. 15) in support of his contention which lays down that:- "There is no provision in West Pakistan Rent Restriction Act, 1957 which ousts the jurisdiction of the civil Courts, and forbids them to entertain suits for ejectment."
5. It was further laid down in this ruling that: "A bar against jurisdiction of civil Courts requires, to be inserted in an Act in clear language and no case which is otherwise entertain able by civil Courts can be excluded from the cognizance of those Courts unless the exclusion is in express words. There is no provision in the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Act, 1957, which bars the jurisdiction of civil Courts in express language within the meaning of section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code from entertaining a suit for ejectment."
6. Learned counsel also argued that no statute can be given retrospective effect unless the intention to give the Act retros--pective effect is shown expressly or impliedly. He submitted that procedural laws ought to be given retrospective effect but an amendment should not be given retrospective effect where it deals with or affects not only procedure but also vested rights. His contention also was that a provision creating or establishing a forum for getting redress is a procedural matter but it is not retrospective if such an amendment touches the existing rights or deals simultaneously with these procedures. Learned counsel's argument was that the Shamilat Deh Act, 1966 takes away the right of forum which is a substantive right and not a pro--cedural right, therefore, an amendment taking away the jurisdiction of the civil Court should be given prospective and not retrospective effect. He also cited Pakistan v. Devachand Muljimal (PLD 1968 Kar. 107) in support of his contention. Qadeeruddin, J. Laid down in this authority that:- "An amendment is generally prospective, unless the Legislature has expressly made it otherwise.
7. One of the exceptions to it is that an amendment is generally retrospective if it is procedural. An exception to the latter proposition is that it is prospective if it deals with or affects not only procedure but also vested rights. For example, the law of limitation is ordinarily procedural; therefore, its amendment is ordinarily retrospective; but if it were to interfere with or impair or imperil a vested right, it would be prospective. The right to sue is not a procedural matter; therefore, it cannot ordinarily be taken away after it has accrued to a plaintiff.
8. A provision creating or establishing a forum for getting redress is a procedural matter; therefore, its change is retrospective. But it is not retrospective if such an amendment touches the existing right or deals simultaneously with procedure."
9. Learned counsel for the appellant also referred to Bindira's book on the Interpretation of Statutes and General Clauses Act, 4th Ed., p. 584 Note-5 wherein it is written that perhaps no right of construction is more firmly established than this-that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation otherwise than as regards matter of procedure and a statute which impairs vested rights or legality of past transactions or the obligations of contract should not prima facie be held to be retrospective. Such rights cannot be taken away by implication. Further that the retrospectivity of a procedural statute will not, however, affect substantive rights which have already vested in a citizen. One such right is that although nobody has a vested right in any course of procedure, there is a vested right to continue the proceedings in the tribunal before which the same had already commenced according to the state of law as it stood at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. Bindra's book page 587 was also referred to wherein under the heading Right of a suitor in Court' it is written that: --- "The right of a suitor to have his pending application dis--posed of by a competent Court is a matter of right and not a matter of procedure. The Civil Procedure Code is not confined to procedure. The provisions of the Code are regulations dealing with the jurisdiction and governing the procedure of the Courts in India. But jurisdiction and procedure are distinct: jurisdiction does not come under the description of procedural matter. The right of a party to institute a suit or to file an appeal in a particular Court must, in view of the decision of the Privy Council in 1905 A C 369 (Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving) be regarded as a substantive right and not merely a matter of procedure or procedural law."
10. Page 588 of Bindra's book was also referred to wherein under heading Jurisdiction it is written that:- "When a statute deprives a person of his right to sue or affects the power or jurisdiction of a Court in enforcing the law as it stands, its retrospective character must be clearly expressed. The rule that a statute relating to procedure operates retrospectively unless other--wise provided in the statute is not applicable when the statute in question affects the jurisdiction of a Court. Provisions relating to jurisdiction are more than matters of procedure. They touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute."
11. On the other hand it was argued by the learned Additional Government Advocate that the Government Order No. 282/57 dated 22-7-1957 authorised the Col--lector and the Assistant Collector Grade I to sanction the grant of proprietary rights in respect of Khalsa land covered by this order after satisfying himself through an enquiry made by the Tehsildar as to from which date the Khalsa land was brought under cultivation by the appellant and then the Collector was to assess the land revenue thereon and recover the premium as provided in paragraph 1. His con-- tention was that the Government Order No. 282/57 created a right and also the remedy for enforcement of such right as also the tribunal for enforcing such rights. He argued that the tribunal provided in the Government Order No. 282/57 was the Collector or the Assistant Collector 1st Grade whose orders were appeal-able under the Land Revenue Act to the Commissioner and a further appeal lay to the Additional Financial Commissioner. Therefore, he argued that the jurisdic-- petition of the civil Court was barred. He also argued that retrospective effect can be given to an amending statute even by implication. He cited Fazle Mahmood v. Muhammad Hussain Chatha (PLD 1964 Lah, 74) and Ahmad Khan v. Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division (PLD 1965 Pesh. 65).
12. Faizullah Khan and Bashiruddin, JJ. Laid down in Ahmad Khan v. Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division that the Court can even modify the language of an Act to give effect to the manifest and undoubted intention of the Legislature.
13. The general principle is that every right has a remedy. It is also a general principle that where two proceedings or two remedies are available under the law, one of them must not be taken as operating in derogation of the other. An in fragment of an existing legal right is always actionable in a civil Court unless its cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. A suit is said to be expressly barred when it is barred by an enactment for the time being in force. Where a right of action exists, a suit is maintainable to enforce that right independently of the] special remedy provided by law.
14. There is, however, one quali--fication for this rule. Where a right is created by statute and a method of enforcing the right or of redressing grievance caused in the exercise of enforcement of the right, is pointed out by the statute creating such right, then the general remedy] of suit will be impliedly barred.
15. It has been laid down in Sasala Raminaidu v. Secretary of State (AIR 1942 Mad. 127) that :-- "When a right is given by a special statute and a remedy is provided for the violation of the right in that very statute, ordinarily the person whose right is violated is bound to follow the remedy provided in that Act.
16. A village headman who has been dismissed has under section 23 of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895, a right of appeal to the District Collector and a further appeal to the Board of Revenue. Therefore, he has no right of separate suit in a civil Court that the order of dismissal is ultra vires on the ground that the rules have not been strictly followed."
17. It was held in Narayanaroju Ramamurthy v. Parimi Venkata--narayana (AIR 1941 Mad. 506) that.:- "Rule 1 of the Rules under the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920 does not debar a civil Court from going into the question whether an election was in point of fact held or not. If the Court comes to a finding that an election was held, it must at once stay its hands and allow the procedure under rule 1, to take its normal course. If, on the other hand, it comes to a decision that no election was held, its duty is equally clear. It must grant a declaration that no election was held."
18. It was laid down in Secretary of State v. Allu Jaganradham (AIR 1941 Mad. 530) that:- "Rule 6 of the Rules under the Madras Local Boards Act of 1920 impliedly excludes the right to file a suit in respect .Of an improper surcharge imposed thereunder. The power to surcharge arises not under the common law but under the statutory rules and hence the remedy provided by the rules in case of an improper surcharge alone is open."
19. It was held in Karam Devi v. Ladha Kishan and others (AIR 1935 Lah. 406) that:- "The power to remove an executor and to provide for a successor to his office is one conferred upon the High Court alone by section 301, and such relief cannot be sought by regular suit."
20. Raoji Narainji v. Ratanji Kanji (AIR 1930 Bom. 431) lays down that:- "A suit would lie to set aside the proceedings purporting to be taken under Schedule 2, Civil P. C., if the proceedings are fraudulent, fictitious or vexatious, but not if there has been an agreement to refer and the party wants to impugn the award made on such reference."
21. The Arbitration Act provides a remedy for setting aside the award and no regular suit lies for setting aside the award. Where a special tribunal or a public body is created by or under the authority of an act of Legislature for the purpose e of determining questions as to rights which are the creation of the Act, then the jurisdiction of that tribunal or of that body is, unless provided otherwise, exclusive and the civil Courts] cannot take cognizance of such matters. It was lard down in Mani Ram v. Bhagwant Sarup (AIR 1949 All. 50) that:- "The cognizance of the civil Court to hear an election petition under the U. P. Municipalities Act or to give any relief in the nature thereof is clearly impliedly barred under the provisions of the Municipalities Act. The civil Court cannot assume the jurisdiction of Returning Officer nor can it assume the jurisdiction given to the Commissioner under section 28. It is therefore not competent to the civil Court to declare a person to have been duly elected, nor can it decide the election petition that was filed before the Commissioner."
22. Ramabhaktula Ramayya v. Chittor District Co-operative Deputy Registrar (AIR 1945 Mad. 370) was a case under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act of 1932. It was laid down in this judgment that:- " It is not necessary that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts should be expressly excluded. The exclusion can be implied.
23. The act provides an ample machinery for the execution of orders and the hearing of objections to sales in executions of the orders under the Act and therefore the only reasonable conclusion is that the Legislature intended the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to be removed in matters relating to execution of orders and sales in execution of the orders. Therefore, where an order is made by the liquidator against a member of the society under section 47 of the Act for the payment of a certain amount and the order is executed by sale of the, member's property the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit by the member for a declaration that sale was fraudulent and that all the proceedings in an execution were: vitiated by material irregularities."
24. Section 9 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Khalsa--Waste Land Shamilat Deh Act, 1966, in clear terms bars the; jurisdiction of a civil Court on any matter which the Govern--ment or any Revenue Officer is competent to dispose of under this Act. Section 9 is reproduced below:- "Section 9 (1). No civil Court shall have jurisdiction on any matter which the Government or any Revenue Officer is competent to dispose of under this Act and shall not take cognizance of the manner in which the Government or any Revenue Officer exercises any power vested in it or in him by, or under this Act or under Government Order No. 282/57."
25. The section also provides that no civil Court shall take cognizance. Of the manner in which the Government or any Revenue Officer exercises any power vested in it or in him by or under this Act or under Government Order No. 282/57. The intention to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to take cognizance of the manner in which the Government or any Revenue Officer exercises any power vested in it or in him under the Govern--ment Order No. 282/5 % has been clearly expressed.
26. Now remains the question whether section 9 of the Shamilat Deh Act should be given prospective or retrospective effect.
27. We have discussed above and held that the intention to give retrospective effect to an amended statute need not be in express terms only but can be implied also. The Government had created a right in favour of persons who had broken up, the Khalsa land without permission of having such lands assessed to land revenue provided they were in possession on the first day of January 1950.
28. Thus right was created under Govern--ment Order No. 282/57 dated 22-7-1957 which is reproduced below:- "The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government is pleased to, order that all such persons who are proved to have been in continuous possession of Khalsa land without the permission of the Government and are recorded as such till the 1st Day of January 1950 be granted proprietary rights of such land subject to the following limitations:
(i) No such rights can be granted in areas within demarcated or un-demarcated forests or in respect of land likely to be required for any public purpose e.g. Public roads graveyards, and areas reserved for grazing or watering of cattle;
(ii) Such rights can be granted to the extent of 20 kanals only to a family.
(iii) The area in respect of which such rights are granted shall not exceed one-fourth of the Khalsa land in a village.
(iv) Such rights can be granted only on payment of premium equal to 20 times the land revenue of such land plus entire land revenue for the period of possession of -such land. This amount shall be paid in such manner as the Government may provide and may be recovered as arrears of land revenue.
(2) The Government is further pleased to authorise the Collector and Assistant Collector 1st Grade of the District concerned to sanction the grant of proprietary rights in respect of Khalsa land covered by the first paragraph of this order after satisfying himself through an enquiry made by the Tehsildar as to from which date the Khalsa land was brought under cultiva--petition by the applicant. The Collector shall assess the land revenue thereon and recover the premium as provided in paragraph 1.
(3) On payment of the premium the proprietary rights of the land shall be mutated in the name of the Nautor Kunandas."
29. The tribunal before which such rights were to be enforced was also provided in the Government Order. Persons who had broken up Khalsa lands without permission of the Government were coming to the civil Courts to seek their remedy in respect of the right created under the Government Order No. 282/57. A large number of cases were pending in Courts, therefore, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Khalsa Waste Land Shamilat Deh Act, 1966 was enacted and the intention to give effect to section 9 retrospectively can be implied because the Government wanted to put a stop to the civil suits that were pending in respect of a right created by a Government Order which also provided the tribunal for enforcing such rights. We --are of the opinion that section 9 of the Shamilat Deh Act intended to apply not only to future suits but also to pending suits and can be impliedly given retrospective effect so as to bar the jurisdiction of the civil Court even in respect of pending suits.
30. The right to pursue one's remedy before a particular tribunal provided under the existing law may be a vested right but under the existing law the jurisdiction of the civil Courts had been barred, therefore, there was no vested right in the plaintiff or persons claiming similar rights under the Government Order No. 282/57 to come to the civil Court. Bindra, no doubt, writes on page 584 that there is a vested right to continue the proceedings in the tribunal before which the same had already commenced but there is a qualification to this rule that the proceedings should have commenced in the tribunal according to state of law as it stood at the time of the commencement of the proceedings.
31. Gulab Khan filed his suit on 10-9-63. The state of law on], this date was that the right which he claimed to enforce in the civil Court had been created under the Government Order No. 282/57 which also provided a tribunal for enforcing such rights. So the state of law as it stood at the time of the com--mencement of the suit was that the civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. The Government Order No. 282/57 not only created the right but also the tribunal where such right was to be enforced. If the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the order of the Collector or Assistant Collector 1st Grade he had a remedy by way of appeal before the Commissioner and a further appeal before the Additional Financial Commissioner. We have already E said above that where a special tribunal or a public body is created by or under the authority of an act of Legislature for the purpose of determining questions as to rights which are the creation of the Act, then the jurisdiction of that tribunal or of that body is, unless provided otherwise, exclusive and the civil Courts cannot take cognizance of such matters.
32. We agree with the Courts below that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
33. S. A. H.