' Respondents, being the joint transferees of an erstwhile evacuee Bungalow No,309, bearing Property No,NE-1-R-309, G.T. Road, Lahore, sued out the appellants on 26-6-1978, for recovery from them of possession of its different portions, as squatters, who had even raised certain constructions in the plots of the bungalow. Appellants admitted the transfer made in favour of the respondents but denied their claim for recovery of possession by pleading their occupation of the property since the inception of Pakistan and contested the suit by claiming protection of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. They also raised a number of preliminary objections with regard to maintainability of the suit multifariousness and valuation thereof as also to the jurisdiction of the Court. A total of 10 issues were settled in the suit, whereof issue No,3 relates to the protection claimed by the defendants and issue No,9 is with regard to the merits of the claim of the plaintiffs and was settled to determine their entitlement to the decree prayed for. Parties led their evidence and ultimately, trial Court held the defendant-appellants not entitled to the protection envisaged by the since repealed section 30, of the 1958, Act and decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs. Valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction, fixed at Rs,35,324 as found by the trial Court to be correct for the reason of its being e price entered in Schedule 'A' to the plaintiffs'. Transfer Order h.P.3 which had not been disproved by the defendants whose evidence d not go beyond making bare statements that it was worth lakhs of pees. Consequently, trial Court decreed the suit on 27-3-1982 in your of the plaintiff-respondents.
An appeal there against taken by le defendants to the District Court has been dismissed by a learned additional District Judge by affirming the findings of the trial Court 1 all the issues. Their objection with regard to the suit suffering .Om multifariousness was repelled with reference to Order I, Rule 3 of se C.P.C., as had also been done by the trial Court. Valuation of le suit on the basis of Transfer Order was found to be correct and mention of the defendants about their continuing in possession of le property since the inception of Pakistan was held to have been negative by the unchallenged evidence of P.W.1, a Record Keeper of le Settlement Department and, on the basis of admission of Din Muhammad, one of the defendants, as D.W. 3 about non-payment of snt to the Settlement Authorities, it was held that they did not qualify nder the definition contained in section 2 (6) of the Act of 1958 and nisequently they could not be entitled to the protection under section ), of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 158, which had even been repealed since before the filing of the suit. Defendants have now come up to this Court by way of this Second ' In support thereof, learned counsel, in the first place, contended at benefit of section 30, of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & ehabilitation) Act, 1958 was available to the appellants who had not even served with the requisite notice by the plaintiff-respondents about he transfer to them of the property. In the same strain, he also red that the Civil Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain nd determine a regular civil suit against the defendant-appellants who would be lawfully ejected only under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, y proving the requirements laid down therein. When pointed out that here is concurrent finding adverse to the appellants recorded by the wo courts below on this question of fact on the basis of evidence led n the suit, learned counsel came out with a self-defeating argument hat, on account of omission of subsection (2) of section 6 of the 1958 et by the Amending Act LV of 1973, possession held by the defendants s not liable to be proved in the technical sense and deserves to be onsidered in its ordinary connotation. It is beyond comprehension as o how may the appellants then claim to remain in possession of the roperty? More particularly so, because the transfer to plaintiffs was made on 14-1-1978, subsequent to the repeal of the Act itself in the mar 1975. As such, they are nothing more than mere trespassers.
Since the suit was instituted in the year, 1978, therefore, there could not be any question of the appellants being entitled at that time to the service of notice contemplated by section 30, of the 1958, Act. In Ghulam Qadir v. Nazir Ahmad PLD 1980 B J 15, it was held that the A landlord's liability to issue notice to the tenant continued only so long as section 30 was in force. The obligation being co-extensive with the law on the subject, the landlord shall not be burdened with it, after the repeal of the Act. This view has been approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Ramzan v. Ch. Bashir Ahmad PLD 1981 SC 340 in holding that in a situation as this, an eviction application D cannot be filed because character and intention underlying the provisions of section 30, relating to issuance of notice and protection of tenant were of transitory and temporary character and were not intended to create any permanent rights and liabilities. It is obvious that with the omission of the definition of the word 'possession' from the Act 1958, possession of the appellants, however, back it may date to, would only be unauthorized in law and no valid objection can be taken to their being sued to be evicted out by means of a regular suit and the decree for the purpose passed against them. Contentions of the learned counsel are, therefore, repelled.
3. At one stage, learned counsel had also reiterated his plea taken in the written statement to the effect that the valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction was not correct but, on a further consideration of the implications of his argument on the point, learned counsel decided to abandon this plea for the reason that the suit had been tried by a Civil Judge 1st Class so that even the trial Court's jurisdiction would not get affected thereby and its decree would remain protected by the provisions of section 99 of the C.P.0 . Even otherwise, the defendants have not discharged the burden of proof of issue No,5 to prove the correct valuation by means of any clear and cogent evidence. Since the trial Court had not been led to think under section 9 of the Court Fees Act that the market value of the suit property had been wrongly estimated, therefore, consequential provisions simply did not come into effect.
4. The decrees passed by the two Courts below are not open to any valid objection and there does not emerge any case within the scope of section 100 of the C.P.C. Hence, this second appeal is dismissed. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.