1. This is an application under section 50 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 filed by Abdul Rashid Khilji, General Secretary, National Mills' Labour Union, Lyallpur for the interpretation of the following clause of the settlement dated 17-1-1970, arrived at between the parties: "only those workers will be entitled to receive bonus who have put in service for at least 90 days."
2. The respondent besides resisting the application on merit also raised to preliminary objections, namely :-
(1) That application was not competent because the reference could only be made by the Government under section 50 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969-
(2) That the petitioner-Union had no locus standi to file, this application because it is not the collective bargaining agent.
3. Preliminary Objection No. 1 In order to appreciate this objection It will be better to reproduce section 50 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which reads a follows :- "Interpretation of settlement and awards: (1) If any difficulty or doubt arises to the interpretation of any provisions of an award or settlement, it shall be referred to the Tribunal constituted under this Ordinance.
(2) The Tribunal to which a matter is referred under subsection (1) shall after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide the matter and its decision shall be final and binding on the parties."
4. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, reference can only be made by Provincial Government and not by any body else. In this connection, he relied on section 32(3) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which reads as follows :- "In any case in which the Provincial Government prohibits a strike or lock-out it shall forthwith refer the dispute to the Labour Court."
5. He also relied on section 35 (5) (a) and (b) of the same Ordinance. Section 35(5)(a) reads as follows :- "A Labour Court shall adjudicate and determine an Industrial dispute which has been referred to or brought before it under this Ordinance."
6. Section 35(5)(b) reads as follows:- "A Labour Court shall enquire into and adjudicate any matter relating to the implementation or violation of a settlement which is referred to it by the Provincial Government."
7. In section 50 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, it is, not mentioned that in case If any difficulty or doubt arises to the interpretation of any provisions of an award or settlement, the reference has to be made by the Government. If the Intention of the Legislature was that it was only the Provincial Government; who could make a reference, It would have been so mentioned as in the case of sections 32(3) and 35(5) (b). In any case it is only the parties who are concerned about the interpretation of the provisions of an award or a settlement and not the Provincial Government.
8. Therefore the word `reference' used in section 50 of the Ordinance does not per se mean that it is the Provincial Government, which has to make the reference. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied on section 51 of the Ordinance, which reads as follows :- "Recovery of money from an employer under a settlement of award.-(1) Any money due from an employer under a settlement, or under an award or decision of the arbitrator. Labour Court or Tribunal may be recovered as arrears of land revenue or as a Public demand upon application by the Provincial Government if It is moved in that behalf by the person entitled to the money under that settlement, award or decision.
9. (2)
10. This section in my view has no relevancy at all because at the present stage there is no question of recovery of any money due from the employer under the settlement. All what is required is to interpret clause 3 of the settlement dated 27-1-1970. The learned counsel, in support of his arguments, also relied on a judgment of East Pakistan Industrial Court in the case Barisal Motor Launch Employees' Union v. Messrs Kamaluddin Chowdhry & Co., Barisal (1961 PLC 1443). It is a short judgment which is reproduced as under :- "AWARD-A. S. M. AKRAM (CHAIRMAN).-This is an applica--tion by the 1st party for a Reference under section 35 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance LVI of 1959 concerning an Award in Industrial Dispute Case No. 2/60 disposed of on 25th Novem--ber 1960 on a joint petition of compromise filed by the parties.
11. I am of the opinion that a Reference under section 35 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance LVI of 1959 by a private party cannot be entertained. File."
12. In order to appreciate this judgment, it will be proper to reproduce section 35 of Industrial Ordinance LVI of 1959 which reads as follows :- "Interpretation of awards.-(1) If any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provisions of an award or settlement, it shall be referred to a Court constituted under this Ordinance.
(2) The Court to which a matter is referred under subsection (1) shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide the matter and its decision shall be final and binding on the parties."
13. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the wordings of this section are exactly the same as in section 50 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and, therefore, in his opinion, this authority will be applicable to the present case also.
14. In the above judgment no reasons have been given for reaching that conclusion and, therefore, I cannot reply on it. In the result I find no force in the preliminary objection raised by the respondent.
15. Preliminary Objection No. 2 It was contended that petitioner-Union was not a collective bargaining agent and, therefore, it had no locus stands to file the application. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand argued that though petitioner-Union is not a collective bargaining agent but since it has been recognised as such by the employer, it has locus stands to file this application. In this connection he relied on section 52 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which reads as follows :- "Any at or function which is by this Ordinance required to be performed by or has been conferred upon a collective bargaining agent may, until a collective bargaining agent has been ascertained under the provisions of this Ordinance be performed by a registered Trade Union which has been recognised by the employer or employers."
16. The Settlement dated 27-1-1970 of which clause 3 is sought to be interpreted was signed both by the employer and o0loe--bearers of the petitioner-Union. Further, I find that the office---bearers of the petitioner-Union also signed the settlement dated 6-3-1969, Annexure C, arrived at between the same parties. This document was produced by the respondent, who placed reliance on it while arguing the case on merits. It appears that the respondent is blowing both hot and cold in the same breath because on the one hand he does not recognise the petitioner --Union as a collective bargaining agent for the purposes of interpreting settlement dated 27-1-1970 but on the other hand--- while arguing on merits, he placed reliance on the settlement dated 6-3-1969, which is also signed by the same parties. If the respondent did not recognise petitioner-Union as a collective bargaining agent he should not have entered into settlement with the petitioner-Union.
17. In these circumstances. I have come to the conclusion that the Management impliedly recognised the petitioner-Union as a collective bargaining agent and now it does not lie in his mouth to deny that status to it. In view of the above, I find no force in this preliminary objection.
18. On merits, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the settlement dated 27-1-1970 was invalid and of no legal effect and, therefore, the interpretation of clause 3 of the said settlement was not called for. In this connection it was stated that as a result of Gherao by the members of the petitioner-Union, the settlement was drafted by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (General), Lyallpur, in the absence of the conciliator and after it had been signed by the parties, the Labour Officer was sent for and made to sign it. I have perused the settlement in question an-- find that the Labour Officer has specifically mentioned that the said settlement was signed in his presence. Prima facie, therefore, it cannot be said that the said settlement was drawn: up and signed in the absence of the conciliator. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the settlement dated 27-1-1970 was not arrived at during the course of conciliation proceedings and, therefore, was not binding on the parties. These matters, in my view, are only relevant at the the of implementation of the said settlement and not at the present stage where the only relief asked for is to interpret clause 3 of the settlement.
19. Lastly, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that in order to interpret clause 3 of the settlement dated 27-1-1970, one has to peruse previous settlement dated 6-3-1969, Annexure 'C' arrived at between the same parties. In that settlement it is mentioned that the method for calculation of bonus would be the same as before. Prior to that there was an office order regarding the distribution of bonus, Annexure 'D' issued by the Manage--ment. In that order it is mentioned :- "1. Any workman employed in the Mills who after the completion of training and the probationary period com--pletes one calendar year service as a permanent workman from lift January to 31st December, and also continuously remains in service till the the of Bonus Distribution, shall be entitled to receive bonus."
20. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, clause 3 of the settlement dated 27-1-1970 means that only those workmen who have at least put in 90 days' service and are also in service at the the of distribution of bonus are entitled to receive bonus. This contention, in lily view, has no force, because if this was the intention then in clause 3 of the settlement dated 27-1-1970, the second condition of being in service at the the of distribution of bonus would have also been mentioned. In view of the above, I find no force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. In the result I hold that clause 3 of the settlement in question means that only those workmen who have put in at least 90 days' service would be entitled to receive bonus for the year in question. It does not exclude those workmen who were not in service at the the of the distribution of bonus, provided they had fulfilled the condition of having been in service for at least 90 days in that particular year.