1. MUHAMMAD ZAHOORUL HAQ, J.--Mr. Muhammad Ahmad, Advocate for respondent No. 1 has .Made a statement that respondent No. 1 is not interested in the result of the petition as they have already deposited the Group Insurance amount. No other respondent has appeared in spite of notice.
2. The petitioner has felt aggrieved against the order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation on 12-8-1978 as well as the order in appeal passed by Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi on 25-11-1978.
3. The petitioner is the son of one Muhammad Shafi, who was employee of respondent No. 1 and died in an accident leaving behind the petitioner and two daughters as his heirs. The petitioner claimed the Group Insurance money of Rs.15,000 by an application before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. The same was dismissed on 12-8-1978 on the ground that the petitioner and the two daughters were independent and, therefore, they were not depending upon Muhammad Shafi and since the procedure of Workmen's Compensation Act applied, therefore, the petitioner and the two daughters in spite of being the admitted heirs of Muhammad Shafi, were not entitled to claim it under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act. However, the sum of Rs.15,000 which had been deposited by respondent No. 1, was ordered to remain in deposit for two years and thereafter it was to be transferred to the Workmen's Compensation Benefit Funds.
4. The appeal of the petitioner was dismissed on 25-11-1978 on the gound that it was time-barred and that section 14 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Merits were not discussed.
5. Mr. Mirza Ghiasuddin has submitted that the petitioner has obtained copy of the order of Workmen's Compensation Commissioner on 20-8-1978, but wrongly filed the appeal in the High Courf on 15-10-1978, because the original section 30 of Workmen's Compensation Act had provided an appeal to the High Court. The said-provision was, however, amended in 1975, but the petitioner's counsel was not aware of that amendment and, therefore, the said mistake occurred. The said appeal was returned by the High Court on 28-10-1978 and it was represented before the S. L. A .
6. Tribunal on the same date. He submitted that the appeal period being 60 days under section 13(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the appeal was within time on 15-10-1978 and if time between 15-10-1978 and 28-10-1978 was excluded as a time spent in executing civil proceedings under the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, then his appeal would have been in time on 28-10- 1979 when it was filed.
7. We are of the view that the S.L.A. Tribunal has failed to correctly consider the application made by the petitioner under section 5 of the Limitation Act and has dismissed the appear without properly considering the application made by the petitioner under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Tribunal has merely considered the application of section 14 of the Limitation Act to the appeals under the Workmen's Compensation Act and since it took the view that an appeal incompetently filed before the Appellate Authority, not having jurisdiction in the same, was not covered by section 14 of the Limitation Act, therefore, it did not feel inclined to extend the time.
8. We are of the view that the respondent No. 3 was to consider the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, in view of the affidavit filed by the petitioner's counsel wherein he had stated that he had committed a mistake and he had looked at the original provisions of section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and had not been able to see the amendment which had been made in 1975 investing the Labour Appellate Tribunal with the jurisdiction of hearing such appeals.
9. The view of the Labour Appellate Tribunal that every one is presumed to know the law is correct generally, but one the appellant's counsel had sworn affidavit and given a reasonable explanation of his lack of knowledge in respect of the amendment introduced in 1975, thereby it had become incumbent upon the Appellate Tribunal to treat the filing of appeal in the High Court by the petitioner as a bona fide mistake and to allow the time spent in pursuing the said appeal bona fide and to exclude the same or at least to condone the same. We are fully convinced that a very good case for condonation of the time of 13 days had been made by the petitioner and, therefore, the same should have been condoned and the appeal should have been heard on merits. Since the same has not been done, therefore, the order in question suffers from an inherent defect and it is, therefore, declared to be without lawful authority.
10. The result is that the appeal filed by the petitioner before respondent No. 3 would be treated to be pending and shall have to be disposed of by respondent No. 3 in the light of the observations made in this judgment.
11. While passing this order, we will also note that in PLD 1975 A J & K 131 it was held that time taken by preferring an appeal in wrong Court due to wrong advice of lawyer, should be excluded under the provisions of sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. Petition allowed in the above terms.