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1972 PLC 247

MUNAWAR HUSSAIN vs SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, AGRICULTURE MACHINERY

Citation1972 PLC 247
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Petition No. 147 of 1970
Date1970-03-18
Judge(s)Ghulam Safdar Shah, Muhammad Hayat Junejo
ResultPetition dismissed

1. GHULAM SAFDAR SHAH, J.-The petitioner in this case was employed as Turner in the Agricultural Development Corporation at Sukkur when his services were terminated by respondent No. 1 on 2-8- 1969. Before taking this action respondent No. 1 had sent the petitioner show-cause notice (under registered cover acknowledgement due) asking him why action should not be taken against him, including dismissing him from service, for having remained absent from duty without permission.

2. The learned counsel admitted before us that this registered letter was returned to respondent No. 1 with the endorsement of Postal Authorities that it had been refused. The learned counsel also did not deny that this letter had been sent to the petitioner on his proper home address. It was in these circumstances that respondent No. 1 terminated the services of the petitioner. Against this order the petitioner filed an appeal before the Director, Guddu Barrage Project which was disposed of in these words: "Heard the appellant. It appears that hasty action has been taken in the matter. Superintending Engineer, A. M. O. Should consider the appellant for absorption in his Organi--zation."

3. In paras. 11 and 23 of the petition it is alleged that respondent No. I, illegally refused to comply with the order of the Appellate Authority and therefore the petitioner filed an application in the First West Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi under section 18 (5) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), but it was dismissed. The learned Industrial Court was of the view that the application was incompetent as the petitioner was not an officer of any registered Trade Union nor when his services were terminated he was the member of any such Union. The learned Court was further of the view that even on merits the petitioner had no case as section 15 (4) of the Ordinance had been sufficiently complied with by the respondent.

4. Mr. Abdul Majeed Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the impugned order firstly on the ground that it was passed in violation of section 15 (4) and (5) of the Ordinance and in the second place it violated the provisions of section 55 of the Agricultural Development Corporation Act. The learned counsel, however, admitted that the Ordinance had no application to the case of the petitioner and it was for this reason that he did not file an appeal against the order of the Industrial Court. If this be so then the first contention of the learned counsel is misconceived. Even otherwise the contention has no force. The proviso to section 7 of the Ordinance makes it clear that it shall not apply to industrial and commercial establishments carried on by or under the authority, of the Central or any Provincial Government, where statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline are applicable to the workmen employed therein. Now it is not denied that the Agricultural Development Corporation is the creature of Ordinance XXV of 1961 and is run under the authority of the West Pakistan Government. In para. 28 of the petition it is alleged that the petitioner was governed by the Government Civil Service Rules as they had been adopted by the Agricultural Development Cor--poration. It would, therefore follow that the Ordinance would not be applicable to the case of the petitioner as his remedy would lie under the Civil Service Rules. As already stated the petitioner alleged that respondent No. 1 did not comply with the remand order of the Appellate Authority. This in substance would mean that respondent No. 1 maintained his earlier order and refused to re-employ the petitioner. Therefore the remedy of the petitioner was to file an appeal against this order before the Project Director and not to invoke Article of the Constitution.

5. Assuming that the Ordinance was applicable to the case of the petitioner even then he would have no grievance. The requirement of section 15 of the Ordinance is that before action is taken against a workman he should be informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. This is exactly what respon--dent No. 1 had done by sending the charge-sheet to the petitioner under registered letter which he refused. Therefore, under section 26 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act the presump--tion would be that the petitioner had been served with the charge-sheet unless he could show to the contrary. The learned counsel did not point out anything from the record that the petitioner bad discharged this burden.

6. Section 25 of the Agricultural Development Act is also not applicable to the case of the petitioner as it appears to provide for service of notices on persons other than the employees of the Corporation. Assuming however that the section applied, even then it provides the service of notice by registered post which was exactly what was done in this case.

7. Mr. Abdul Majeed Khan next contended that respondent No. 1 was biased against the petitioner and therefore his order was vitiated. In this respect he referred to paras. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the petition but they do not disclose any facts to indicate the mala fides of the respondent.

8. Mr. Abdul Majeed Khan next contends is that in this case the principles of natural justice were violated but in view of our discussion the contention appears to be misconceived. The petitioner chose not to appear before the respondent in spite of the registered notice having been sent to him and therefore he cannot be heard to say that he was not given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him.

9. Mr. Abdul Majeed Khan next contended that the impugned order was ineffective for lack of approval of the Chairman of the Agricultural Development Corporation as provided by section 15 of the Ordinance. He however admitted that the Ordinance is not applicable to the case of the petitioner. If this be so then the contention is clearly misconceived.

10. Under the circumstances we find no force in this petition which is summarily dismissed.

Cited by 1 case

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