1. ORDER.
2. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment, dated 6-5-1985 of the Lahore High Court; whereby two Civil Revisions filed by the petitioners (vendees) defendants, arising out of two pre-emption suits, were dismissed.
3. The respondent-sides in these two petitions filed two separate pre-emption suits against the petitioners. They were consolidated. On an objection raised by the petitioners regarding deficiency of court-fee ' both the plaints were rejected by the trial Court under Order VII, Rule 11, C . P. C . Both the pre-emptors filed appeals which were allowed and the cases were remanded to the learned trial Court for further proceedings. The petitioners-vendee-defendants filed two Civil Revision Petitions in the High Court. The same having dismissed by the High Court by placing reliance on Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another PLD 1984 SC 289 the petitioners have new sought leave to appeal.
4. Learned counsel has urged only one point in support of the petitions; namely, that although the plaintiff -pre-emptors in one appeal impleaded the other pre-emptors in their appeal as respondents, the pre-emptors in the other appeal did not implead their rival pre-emptors as party in their appeal. Therefore, one of the appeals thus having been rendered incompetent due to non- joinder the other appeal had to be dismissed on the principle of res judicata. The argument being that the rejection of the plaint by the trial Court in the incompetent appeal would become final in favour of the petitioners. Learned counsel has relied on two cases: Suleman v. Partap and others 93 IC 1926 and Gurmukh Singh v. Hari Chand and others (No. 8 Punjab Record 1904).
5. Both the cases cited at the Bar are clearly distinguishable. We need not examine them. In this case the learned District Judge when dealing with the question raised, observed that in appeals the rival plaintiff pre-emptors had not sought any relief against each other. They were directed only against the petitioner-vendees. Therefore it was inconsequential whether one set of pre-emptors impleaded the other as respondents or not. Be that as it may, the fact remains that both the pre- emptor-sides were arraigned before the learned first appellate Court either as appellants and/or as respondents. The technical omission by one of them not to implead the other could, in case of a real need, be overcome by the learned appellate Court by passing a formal order of adding a party which was already before it in the connected appeal. It needs also to be noticed that concerned pre-emptors did not raise any objection before the learned appellate Court regarding their having been omitted as party in the appeal filed by the rival pre-emptors.
6. Keeping in view the above aspects we feel that in the circumstances of this case no prejudice having been caused to the petitioners, the technical point raised by their learned counsel does not justify grant of leave to appeal by this Court; the same, therefore, is refused in both the petitions.