JUSTICE SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN).--The appellant, Muhammad Anis Qureshi, was communicated the adverse remarks recorded on his performance by Mr. Nafees Hussain, Director of Accounts and countersigned by Asaf Ali Shah, Chief Accounts Officer, for the period .0-5-1981 to 31-12-1981, by Mr. Masood Ahmad, Director (Staff) under letter, dated 27-11--1982. The appellant represented against the adverse remarks to the Director-General, T & T, Islamabad by petition, dated 15-12-1982. This representation was rejected and the appellant was informed of the decision by letter, dated 27-3-1983. The appellant then filed an appeal to the Auditor-General of Pakistan on 17-4-1983, challenging the order of the Director-General, T & T, rejecting his representation. This appeal was withheld on the ground that no second appeal/ representation was competent. The appellant was informed accordingly by letter, dated 16-6-1983. This appeal before the Tribunal was filed on 21-7-1983.
2. On objection being raised with regard to limitation, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the decision, dated 16-6-1983 withholding the appeal addressed to the Auditor- General, was received by the appellant on 21-6-1983, and that as such the appeal filed on 21-7- 1983 is within time. The learned counsel for State, however, contended that letter, dated 16-6-1983 is not an order either original or final, and that the passing of this order does not enlarge the time. It was pointed out that the appellants representation against the communication of the adverse remarks having been communicated to the appellant on 27-3-1983, he should have come straight to the Tribunal and that the second appeal/ representation to the Auditor-General- was a futile exercise. In substance, the stand taken by the learned counsel for State is that against the communication of the adverse remarks, only one representation was competent and that when that representation is rejected, the time starts running against the aggrieved civil servant.
3. The learned counsel for' the appellant, however, argued that communication of the adverse remarks is not an order and that the rejection of representation by the Director-General, T & T was, in fact, the first order which could be challenged by the appellant by way of representation under section 22(2) of the Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973). We are not impressed by the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant. Section 22 ibid comes in operation only when there is no provision in any rule, law or instruction with regard to appeal or representation. If there is any such provision in any law, rule or instruction, then the representation shall have to be made in accordance with that law, rule or instruction. Section 25(2) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 has kept alive and given the force of law to all rules, orders or instructions not inconsistent with the said Act.
The relevant provision with regard to representation against adverse A remarks in the Annual Confidential Report is contained in "A GUIDE TO PERFORMANCE EVALUATION". Instruction 3.31 and the form of the A.C.R. Clearly provide that there shall be only one representation against the advarse remarks, which should be made within a period of fortnight. This instruction is reiterated in instruction No. 3.32 specifically bringing to the notice of all civil servants that only one representation against adverse remarks can be entertained and that too if submitted within the prescribed period of 15 days. These instructions under section 25(2) of- the Civil Servants Act, 1973, not being inconsistent with any provision of that Act, have the force of law. We are not convinced by the arguments of the learned counsel for the B appellant that the communication of the adverse remarks is not an order and that the first order is the one which is made on first representation. The word "order" in section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973) is used in the wider sense, and in our opinion, includes any communication which adversely affects a civil servant. In view of these facts, we are inclined to agree with the learned counsel for State that decision, dated 27-3-1983 communicated to the appellant rejecting his representation for expunction of remarks was the final order appealable to this Tribunal and further that the appeal having been filed about four months thereafter is barred by time.
4. The result is that this appeal is dismissed but without any order as to costs.