' This appeal is directed against the order of ejectment passed by VIIIth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, dated 27-5-1982.
' The appellant is the landlord and had sought ejectment of the respondent from the disputed flat on the ground floor on personal need as well as on the ground of impairment of the value of the premises by construction of two rooms. The application was resisted by the respondent who denied having raised structure and also denied that the appellant needed the premises for his personal use.
2. Mr. Manzoorul Haq has submitted that the impairment of the value of the premises was proved on record and that the need of the landlord was also established as bona fide because there was only one room with the appellant and he was residing with his son and daughter and the son had to be married.
3. As far as impairment of the value of the premises is concerned, I do not find any where from the statement of the appellant that they had been any impairment in the value of the premises. The very phras of impairment suggests that sorpething should be done to the premises whereby their utility or strength is injuriously effected. However, thereA is no such statement made by the appellant.
' Mr. Manzoorul Haq further stated that the addition of two room was impliedly admitted by the respondent because he had stated in his affidavit that he had only one room in his occupation and the sam could not meet the requirements of the appellant. This is merely an implied interpretation in respect of the addition of the room and if the appellant wanted to show that there had been a construction then it was for him to positively prove-it. The learned counsel stated that an inspection could be made of the premises which would show that there are more than one room in existence. Such application, if any, should have been made by the appellant before the Rent Controller and today it is an afterthought. I, therefore, find justification for the finding of the Rent Controller that there was no proof of the impairment of the value of the premises by the respondent.
4. In respect of the personal need of the premises by the appellant it would be enough from my point of view to note that the appellant had taken ejectment order in respect of second tenant for the second flat but the appellant chose to compromise with that tenant and instead of having the said flat vacated he felt satisfied with the increase in the rent of the said flat. This is admitted in the cross-examination of the appellant. This reflects adversely on the bona fide requirement of the appellant. If the appellant was really in urgent need of accommodation then he should have executed the ejectment order against the other tenant and occupied the same instead of compromising with him.
I am of the view that a landlord who chooses to increase the rent of a premises instead of getting its vacant possession, then he can hardly- urge thereafter that his need for accommodation is genuine. After all if the accommodation is needed' then an accommodation which can easily available to the landlord should be occupied by him instead of waiting for the ejectment case against the other tenant to be finalized. Another aspect of the matter is that if the landlord has given benefit to another tenant of allowing him to remain in the premises in spite of ejectment order and he is insisting thereafter, to proceed against th other tenant then, without there being any special reason for the same, the landlord is acting in discriminatory and vindictive manne against the second tenant and the same reflects upon the bona fide o the landlord.
5. Mr. Manzoorul Hag relied upon 1982 CLC 318 where one of th Hon'ble Judges of this Court has taken the view that provisions of section 14(2) contemplate actual occupation of building owned by th landlord and not mere notional occupation. However, the facts of that case were different. It was of course an ejectment order against anothe tenant, but there was no compromise entered into by the landlord with the tenant in that case. It could, therefore, be the view of the Hon'bl Judge that the tenant was not in actual occupation of the landlord, therefore, bar of section 14(2) was not attracted. It is correct that the bar of section 14(2) in the present case is not attracted but my view is that if the landlord has the opportunity of going into a premises and he allows that opportunity to slip and takes the option of increasing the rent of the said premises then thereafter, it is not possible fo him to contend that he is still in bona fide need of the premises.
6. Learned counsel has also relied upon 1981 CLC 1091 where landlord had got the cabin vacated about 31 years back but had rented out the same to some one else and in spite of that it was held that ejectment could be granted on ground of personal need on fresh cause of action even if the landlord previously got possession of a tenement and relet it. The said case was, however, based on its own particular facts and a cabin and a shop have to be distinguished. In any case it was based on the proposition that the landlord can make his own choice in respect of the premises.
I have no doubt in respect of the accuracy of the propositio that the landlord can choose the premises that he wants and therefore, he can file ejectment against any one of the tenants. But the landlor has to give reasons and satisfy the Court that the premises which had been made available to him by the ejectment of a tenant were no suitable for his needs and therefore, he had let in the other tenant and wants to proceed only against a particular tenant and got hi premises to satisfy the personal need of the landlord. However, ther is no such evidence adduced by the appellant in this case and therefore, I am of the view that the bona fide of the appellant were doubtful in respect of the need for this particular premises when he had let ou another flat to slip from his hands which was readily available to him. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed.