' This petition for leave to appeal is addressed against the order of a learned Single Judge of the High Court, recorded on 11-7-1985, whereby the learned Judge refused to exercise his powers under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, to undo the order passed by the learned Custodian on 14-4-1984. By this order the learned Custodian upheld the allotment of the land in question made in favour of the non-petitioners, Lal Din and Muhammad Din, by the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner and dismissed the revision petition.
2. The controversy has arisen in the following circumstances:-- Evacuee land entered under various field numbers measuring 28 Kanals 1 Marla, situate in the area of Village Dhara, Tehsil Bagh, was initially allotted to two brothers, namely, Muhammad Shafi and Shah Muhammad. The Government, with their consent, cancelled their allotment on 15-4-1981.
Thereafter, it was allotted to Lal Din and Muhammad Din, refugees (respondents herein), by the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner on 26-4-1982. The petitioner's appeal before the Rehabilitation Commissioner to question the validity of the allotment made by the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner was disallowed on 3-10-1982. His main claim in the appeal was that on the basis of an agreement executed by Salah Muhammad, who got the land from Muhammad Shafi, and for his being the local destitute, he has better right to the land as compared with the respondents, Lal Din and Muhammad Din. He moved a revision petition before the learned Custodian to undo the order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner which was also disallowed on 14-4-1984. The writ petition before the High Court, as said earlier, was also dismissed on 11-7-1985. This petition for leave to appeal seeks reversal of the order of the High Court.
3. The petitioner's case thus is and was that he being the local destitute and in possession of the land by virtue of an agreement executed by Salah Muhammad for a consideration of Rs, 23,00C, who earlier occupied it on the basis of another agreement executed by Shah Muhammad in his favour on 18-2-1980 on payment of Rs, 2,500 is entitled to have the land.
4. Kh. Muhammad Saeed, the learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contended:-
(1) that Tehsildar was not competent to record the statements of the allottees. It may be stated here that the allottees' statements to abandon the allotment of the land were recorded by the Tehsildar; and
(2) that under section 14 of the Rehabilitation Act it was imperative for the Rehabilitation Commissioner, in appeal, and the Custodian, in revision, to hold an inquiry as to whether Shah Muhammad and Muhammad Shafi, in fact, had abandoned their allotment, especially when it was questioned by the petitioner.
5. I have considered the arguments and examined the relevant record. The points canvassed merit no consideration for the following reasons:-
(a) Tehsildar has not made the allotment; rather it was made by the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner who was competent to make it after its cancellation by the Government from the names of previous allottees. I have not been shown any law to suggest that Tehsildar was not competent to record the statements under the orders of the superiors.
(b) Apart from the above, the question as to whether the previous allottees have given a statement before the Tehsildar in abandoning their allotment is a disputed question of fact. Such questions are not, as a rule, amenable to adjudication in the extraordinary writ jurisdiction, A for the High Court exercising writ jurisdiction does not sit as a Court of appeal but merely as a Court for correcting a grave illegality. Ordinarily, where the questions raised require investigation and proof it does not fall appropriately within the writ jurisdiction.
(c) The second grouse that under the provisions of section 14 of the Rehabilitation Act, which reads:- "Section 14. Powers of Rehabilitation Authority when holding inquiry.-(1) When holding an inquiry under this Act, the Rehabilitation Authority or the Officer appointed under subsection (2) of section 12 shall have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:-
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath or affirmation;
(b) compelling the discovery and production of documents, articles and things; (c)issuing a commission for the examination of witnesses;
(d) any prescribed matter.
(2) Any proceeding before the Rehabilitation Authority or such Officer as aforesaid under this Act shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 196 and 228 and for the purpose of section 196 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and the Rehabilitation Authority or such Officer as aforesaid shall be deemed to be a Court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898." any inquiry into the matter was a must to adjudge as to whether the previous allottees had, in fact, made a statement abandoning their allotment, has also no substance. Section 14 of the Rehabilitation Act only gives certain powers to the Rehabilitation Commissioner while holding an inquiry in a matter. It does not visualise that the matters, like the one before me, must be inquired into.
(d) It is also now settled law that the relief in a writ petition is entirely discretionary depending on the circumstances of each case. The Supreme Court does not and will not interfere where the High Court has exercised its discretion on sound judicial principles Nothing has been shown to me that the High Court in this case has exercised the discretion in an illegal fashion.
(e) If the petitioner's grouse that he has been deprived of Rs, 23,000 by Salah Muhammad is correct, he is at liberty to pursue his remedy before a competent forum. This relief surely could not be allowed to him by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
( j ) 1n a petition for writ the first question that the Court has to consider is as to whether petitioner nas locus tandi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. In the instant case no right in the suit land seems to have been created by virtue of the agreement referred to above.
Therefore, it is doubtful as to whether the petitioner had the locus standi to move the writ petition before the High Court.
' On the above premises of the reasonings no good case for acceptance of this petition for leave to appeal is made out. Therefore, the petition stands dismissed with costs,